

revolutionaries living in different cities of Scandinavia to use their individual opportunities. He printed some very important pamphlets in Stockholm and forwarded them to Russia through reliable channels. Therefore, I humbly ask for your permission to pay him 6,000 marks a month for the next three

month.

3. Klein also successfully sent a number of important information leaflets and small pamphlets to Russia. He also set up an information service at the train station in Stockholm which informs Russians coming from America and Canada how to avoid mobilization into the Russian army, or, if mobilization is unavoidable, convinces them by illustrative materials and verbally that Russian prisoners in Germany are in good conditions. For this information service and for distribution in the Russian trenches, a simple picture book from the life of prisoner-of-war camps in Germany, with a detailed description of the conditions of their detention, should be published. Klein receives a salary of 300 marks a month, but the expenses caused by his new activities have now risen to 700 marks a month. I would also ask you to give me 3-4 thousand marks for the publication of the proposed book with pictures. 4. I estimate the cost of our private printing establishment, which will start work this month, at 800-1000 marks per month. Later it will print everything needed for Klein, Lichev and Keskula. 5. The cost of translating and

publishing in several languages a book describing the situation in Russia on the basis of speeches by Russian members of the Duma will probably amount to 10,000 marks.

Therefore, I ask Your Excellency to agree to
disbursement of the following amounts:

1. Keskula. Balance for March, April, June - 70 thousand. 2.
 - Lichev. May, June, July - 18 thousand. 3.
 - Klein. April, May, June (salary, organizational expenses, book) - 7 thousand 4.
- Printing work in
- Stockholm - 2 thousand 5. Duma reports - 10
 - thousand 6. Small businesses,
 - travel, small printing work - 23 thousand

Total - 130 thousand
marks. May I ask Your Excellency to transfer this amount to account
A of the Deutsche Bank?

STEINWAKS

THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN BERN TO THE
CHANCELER

Message No. 1885 Mission of the German Empire

Bern, August 24, 1916 Contents: Connection with the Russian socialist-revolution

Top secret! Urgently!

Baron Hennet,²⁴ who is currently serving in the military bureau of
the Austro-Hungarian Mission, met yesterday with the Russian Socialist-
Revolutionary Zivin. The military attache of Austria-Hungary was aware
of this. The main reason for this meeting is that Zivin wanted to go from
here through Germany to Sweden. Baron Henneth told me the following
about

Zivin. A little over a year ago, Zivin quite by chance
met the Austro-Hungarian consul in Davos, who introduced him to
the Austro-Hungarian mission. Zivin is a member of the Party of
Socialist Revolutionaries (Socialist-Revolutionaries), he has excellent
relations with its leading members, for example, Chernov²⁶ and
Bobrov²⁷. He took an active part in revolutionary actions in 1905 and
1906, spent some time in prison, but was soon released, and since then
he has lived in Switzerland. He was engaged in revolutionary and pacifist
propaganda both among Russian prisoners of war in Austria and in
Russia. After that, Zivin was twice sent to Austria in the fall of last year
and at the beginning of this year. Baron

Hennett emphasized that Zivin made a very positive impression in
the competent military departments, which declared their readiness to
put large sums of money at his disposal.

At that time, Zivin visited several POW camps. At the same time,
he had the opportunity to select a few suitable people who could be sent
from Switzerland to Russia.

Then Zivin for some time supplied Russian prisoners of war in
Austria with relevant literature. However, then the transfer of books and
other materials ran into

certain difficulties, since the commandants of several Austrian camps refused to give socialist literature to their prisoners of war.

Tsivin later had to abandon his plan to send freed POWs to Russia. During his short visits to the POW camps, he did not have enough time to check the reliability of the prisoners of war provided to him.

Under such circumstances, he did not want to risk - the prisoners after arriving in Switzerland, they could betray him and his plans.

But then he sent several people to Russia who worked there for his party. In particular, they set up printing houses there, in which manifestos were printed, which were widely distributed, especially thanks to the military organizations created by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Zivin showed Baron Hennett several of these manifestos, including the originals. In addition, he regularly informed him about the activities of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and numerous committees, as well ^{her} as about the internal situation in Russia.

However, he could not provide concrete evidence of the success of his proxies, which, however, is not surprising, given the extreme complexity of ties with Russia. But Tsivin claims that several terrorist acts that he predicted and which later actually took place were carried out thanks to the activities of people from his party. In addition, Zivin found himself in a difficult situation, since his party should not have known about the origin of the money that he placed at its disposal. Otherwise, his claims were modest enough; in all, during the eleven months that the Austro-Hungarian mission was in contact with him, approximately 140,000 [Swiss] francs were transferred to him. Baron Hennett told me that, in principle, he and Colonel von Einen were quite pleased with Zivin's activities and expected him to continue

to render them valuable services in the future.

But about three weeks ago, the Austro-Hungarian High Command suddenly announced that Zivin "had not been active enough," and therefore no money would be provided to him in the future.

In this regard, Zivin found himself in a very delicate situation. Expecting to receive money in the future, he took on obligations that he could not fulfill now. Therefore, he now considers it necessary to suggest to his people that they stop or at least significantly limit their activities. Now he wants to go through Germany to Sweden to try to get funds there to continue his activities. But in general he would prefer to stay in Switzerland, because here he could better organize all the work. One of the leading members of his party, Bobrov, is in constant contact with Russia. He is in Switzerland, and he attaches special importance to relations with him. Until May of this year, the head of the party, Chernov, was also here; then he left for Russia, and since then Tsivin has heard nothing more about him. Baron Hennett confessed to me that he was extremely sorry that

can no longer support Zivin. He considers it

an honest person. By the way, the Supreme High Command also emphasized that it had no reason not to trust Tsivin; it only thinks that he is not energetic enough. In general, it is not entirely clear what prompted the Austrian High Command to suddenly refuse to support Zivin. It probably harbored illusions about the possibility of a rapid revolutionization of Russia and expected direct influence on the rear in a militarily advantageous way. However, the Russian offensive dashed these expectations; the Austro-Hungarian military lost patience and decided that it did not make sense to spend money on these purposes.

Zivin, who makes a favorable impression, rightly emphasizes that before the war it was hardly possible to speak of the existence of a revolutionary organization, and it had to be created under the most difficult conditions during the war. In addition, it should be taken into account that the wealthy liberal circles, who provided material support to the aspirations of the Socialist-Revolutionaries during the revolutionary uprisings of 1905, after the outbreak of the world war, became patriots and advocated war. Under such circumstances, the revolutionary movement cannot make quick progress and depends on external support. And yet the organization is gaining more and more supporters both in the army and beyond. It has hundreds of thousands of supporters, the party includes many

officers. In recent years, war weariness has sharply intensified. The immediate goal of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is to end the war as soon as possible. Only after the end of the war will it be possible to implement the program of the party. Consequently, with regard to the speedy end of the war as a goal, the interests of the party and the governments of the Central Powers run in parallel. Supporting revolutionary propaganda would, on the one hand, make it harder for the Russian government to continue the war, and, on the other hand, would strengthen the desire of the reactionary government to end the war.

With regard to the success of revolutionary propaganda, the information that Zivin gave me largely coincides with what I heard from another source, namely from Kesküla.

Zivin will be extremely sorry if he suddenly has to stop supporting his friends. The whole organization is well established, and it would be a great pity if most of this organization falls apart. His party comrades can hardly expect to receive the necessary funds from any third party. Nevertheless, he wants to try to get funds in Stockholm and will be very grateful if he is allowed to transit through Germany, since it is difficult to count on the fact that he will be able to get to Stockholm through England, since recently the British authorities only in exceptional cases allow Russian transit to Stockholm. True, he fears that if he travels through Germany, this may compromise him in front of his party comrades. Of course, they must not know that he is connected with us and with the Austrians.

When I asked what funds he needed to continue his work, he replied that he needed 25,000 francs, which would be enough for 3-4 weeks. But this amount must be received as soon as possible, since even now he has already delayed payments to his friends through no fault of his own for three weeks and must unequivocally tell them whether they can continue to count on his support or not.

Of course, I limited myself to listening to Mr. Tsivin without making any promises to him. I do not know whether we maintain relations with the Russian socialists, and therefore I cannot judge whether it is desirable for us to have contacts with Mr. Tsivin. But judging by what Baron Henet told me about Zivin, it seems to me

there is a guarantee that through Tsivin we will be able to establish useful contacts with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. And there is no doubt that we could benefit from such contacts. Of course, it is difficult to predict what we can expect here, in addition to receiving all kinds of information about Russia, whether the people of Tsivin will be active. According to Baron Hennett, there is no reason to doubt Zivin's assertion that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party will be able to bring the end of the war much closer. Zivin himself says - and in my opinion, this speaks in his favor - that he cannot yet say with certainty what successes his friends will achieve and when these successes will be of decisive importance. It depends on the overall development of the situation. But I am quite sure that over time their activities will bring success. Since I am not sufficiently aware of the situation in Russia, I leave the decision on the need for

contacts with Mr. Tsivin to the discretion of Your Excellency. In any case, I would advise keeping in touch with Zivin, initially as an experiment, and see what results will be in a few weeks. Contacts with Tsivin have the advantage that he himself is an active member of the Russian Party, and no one suspects that he maintains relations with us, while agents whose connections with us are not a secret do not enjoy the trust of the Party and, therefore, do not receive up-to-date information and cannot influence the development of the situation. It would be a pity if we never managed to use the apparatus created with the help of Austrian funds, not to mention the fact that the absence of subsidies would lead to a significant reduction in propaganda in Russia, which no doubt serves

our goals.

Therefore, I propose to give Mr. Zivin the 25,000 francs he asks and tell him that the decision on permanent Contacts with him we will take later.

Since Mr. Zivin must urgently inform his agents whether they should stop their activities or not, I would ask you to make a decision as soon as possible.

I would also ask Your Excellency to consider this matter in confidence. Baron Hennett informed me of everything strictly according to

secret. Only the military bureau of the Austro-Hungarian mission and the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces are aware of the whole matter. Austro-Hungarian diplomatic authorities know nothing about all this. Also, it might be advisable not to make a request to the Austro-Hungarian High Command of the Land Forces, although Baron Hennett assured me that he had nothing against such a request. However, I have the impression that as a result of such a request, Baron Hennett and Colonel von Eiben might get into some trouble²⁸.

R O M B E R G²⁹

DRAFT TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO BETHMANN HOLWEG³⁰ His Excellency the

Reich Chancellor Herr von Bethmann-

Hollweg Berlin, August 30, 1916 For message No. 1885,

Zivlin will receive 25,000

francs, provided that it is a one-time payment. Within four months, we are authorized to pay

Zivlin 25,000 francs, but this must be a one-time payment. We reserve the right to [...]³¹ MESSAGES OF THE RUSSIAN AGENT WEIS Content:

Tsivlin's plan to go to Oslo to

publish a large newspaper there together with

Chernov. It should be transported to Sweden by the Italians. Bern, October 5, 1916 SECRET! Recently, our Russian agent Weiss gave me a copy of the notes in

no 2215

which reveals the nature of the activities of the Socialist Revolutionary Party during the war.

Then Mr. Weiss showed me a number of the revolutionary magazine Klich, which was published in the Volga region and mentioned in these notes. As far as I understood from the passages Weiss read to me, the magazine is vigorously opposed to the government, in favor of peace. Mr. Weiss assured me that this magazine was illegally widely circulated in Russia and that its provocative content had a considerable influence on readers.

Unfortunately, Mr. Vejas had to give the copy of the magazine he showed me to Mr. Bobrov; but he will try to get another copy for me. Unfortunately, so far, Mr. Weiss has not received the messages from Russia that he expected. He fears that Germany either did not let them through, or maybe they are simply delaying them. However, he expects that now the messages for him have already arrived in Norway.

As stated in the notes, in the near future a large newspaper will begin to appear in Norway under the leadership of the leader of the party [Socialist-Revolutionaries] Chernov. The newspaper

will speak for peace. As Weiss confided to me, according to his information, Chernov is now in Italy. He was supposed to leave for Norway some time ago. Weiss wrote to him that, in the interests of the cause, the departure could no longer be postponed. Weiss believes that the Italian socialists will help Chernov with a trip to Norway. By the way, the fact that Chernov really plays an important role and is generally an influential person was recently confirmed to me from another source.

Mr. Chernov's secretary, who was arrested some time ago in Italy and then released again, now in Norway.

Weiss himself intends to go to Norway at the end of this month and see to it that the said undertaking be carried out as soon as possible. However, in addition to this, he is going to discuss with his party comrades the possibility of quickly and

securely forward reports from Russia to Switzerland. He can't negotiate this while he's here. The difficulty is that they must never know that he's in touch with us. And in Norway, he could study the local situation and name a person, a local resident, to whom they could convey their messages. He could have told them that he had recruited this man and that he had the ability to send letters illegally to Switzerland. Of course, in reality this Norwegian must be sought out by the imperial mission in Christiania³²; he will relay messages from the mission, and the mission will relay them to me or Weiss. In this way, we will be guaranteed a regular and reliable

receiving messages from Russia.

Of course, Herr Weiss can only travel to Norway via Germany, as he fears arrest if he passes through the Entente countries. Since his party comrades may become suspicious if he gets permission to pass through Germany without any problems, he is going to hide behind the local socialist Greulich³³. Greulich must apply to us for permission to travel through Germany for his sick friend - Weiss really has seriously ill lungs. Weiss is going to stay in Norway for three weeks and then return to Switzerland again.

We will be able to clarify the details of this trip only after the physical condition of Mr. Weiss improves and only if Your Excellency gives consent to the trip. I think that Mr. Weiss will start to be useful to us on a regular basis after he has carried out his plans in Norway.

With Your Excellency's permission, I paid 25,000 francs to Mr. Weiss on the second of last month, emphasizing that this was a one-time payment and that we would decide on our further relations later.

As I said, at one time Mr. Weiss told me that "this amount is enough to work for three or four weeks." The last time he told me that he needed more money to continue working.

I propose once again to grant Mr. Weiss 25,000 francs, but on the condition that he take all measures, thanks to which we can receive regular messages from Russia and the most detailed information about the negotiations, intentions and successes of his party comrades.

Since Mr. Weiss will visit me again on the 13th of this month, I would be very grateful to Your Excellency for detailed instructions on this matter, whether Your Excellency authorizes me to pay Mr. Weiss the above amount. I must receive appropriate instructions no later than the 11th

date of this month to receive cash. It depends on this payment whether we will be able to maintain our contacts with Weiss, personally I expect very positive contacts from these contacts. results.

ROMBERG

THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN BERN TO THE CHANCELER

His Excellency the Reich

Chancellor Mr. Bethmann-Hollweg December 6, 1916 Contents:

Zivin's report on the events in Russia and the sharp growth of the revolutionary wave; a message that Chernov is going to Oslo, that a large central organization is being created there by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and that therefore it is necessary for him, Tsivin, to personally go to Oslo in order to talk with the delegates and give them appropriate instructions. He asks for more money. Bern,

December 6, 1916

Urgent!

Our Russian agent Weiss told me yesterday that some of the messages that were received in Norway from Russia have finally arrived in Switzerland and these messages are in his hands. Unfortunately, he has not received several important messages; however the materials he has available allow us to draw an unambiguous conclusion that we can be satisfied with the course of development of the revolutionary movement in Russia, As follows from these reports, the

factories of St. Petersburg now feel a significant influence of the revolutionary parties. In some factories, this influence has spread so widely that various revolutionary parties already arguing among themselves for influence. The very important Semyannikov factory in St. Petersburg, which produces a large amount of military equipment, is completely under the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party - more than 10,000 people work in this factory. The strong influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is felt in the government factories of Putilov and! Dobuko The government is watching the growth of this movement with concern and is already taking countermeasures, such as sending unreliable workers to the front. But this cannot stop the movement, it continues. In addition, it is very important news that various workers' organizations in St. Petersburg

have established contacts with the military organizations of various revolutionary parties.

The prisons of St. Petersburg are overcrowded due to mass arrests in recent times.

In Moscow, things are even better for the revolutionary movement, but, unfortunately, there are no detailed reports on the situation there yet. However, it is safe to say that the military organizations in Moscow have become especially

strong. Strikes have taken place in many cities of Russia, in some places they have not yet ended by the time the messages were sent. In particular, major strikes took place in Kharkov, Kyiv, and especially

Nizhny Novgorod. The Swedish press reported in sufficient detail about the riots in Arkhangelsk. Here, too, there were no SRs. In this connection, Weiss pointed out that a few months ago he had drawn the attention of Baron Hennett to the activities of the Socialist Revolutionaries in Arkhangelsk. Baron Hennett confirmed to me the correctness of his words. Weiss claims that in Arkhangelsk the damage amounted to more than a hundred million and that the destruction of the Russian port made a very big impression. Weiss went on

to say that a weekly periodical of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party under the title "Requests of Life" has now begun to appear in Voronezh in Central Russia. This weekly is published by the Economic Technological Society, all members of which are also members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. This magazine is very cleverly composed: economic news on the front pages, and then sharp criticism of the government and anti-war articles. Weiss hopes to provide us with a copy of this journal soon. In addition, Weiss

learned that one of the members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party arrived from Russia to Norway and then returned to Russia again with the task of visiting all the Socialist-Revolutionary organizations there. Soon; he will come to Norway again and give a detailed account of what he is

After reviewing the information received from Russia, Mr. Weiss came to the firm conviction that the revolutionary movement in Russia, whose main goal is to strengthen anti-war sentiment, has now passed into a new stage. This movement is very broadly organized and growing rapidly. According to Mr. Weiss, there is no doubt that at the right time the movement will lead to real success. When exactly this moment will come, according to Mr. Weiss, it is difficult to predict. He also thinks it doesn't make sense to do anything. there was speculation in it

direction. However, he is absolutely convinced that major revolutionary uprisings are to be expected in the foreseeable future.

Further, Mr. Weiss learned that the revolutionary parties had decided to declare on January 22 next year, the year of the anniversary of the revolutionary events of 1905-06, a general strike and organize mass demonstrations in St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Herr Weiss considers that there is only one danger for the revolutionary movement, namely, that a liberal government will come to power and carry on the war to a victorious end. But this danger should not be exaggerated. Such a liberal government will carry out its internal political program and issue a decree on amnesty. But in this case, the revolutionary parties will be reinforced by the influx of many thousands of their members from prisons, from abroad and from Siberia. In this way the revolutionary movement will become much stronger. In addition, from these reports, Mr. Weiss concluded that

conservative circles in Russia are generally opposed to the continuation of the war and are in favor of concluding a separate peace. Conservative circles are extremely concerned about the presence of liberal elements in the government. They are aware that the continuation of the war can have very unpleasant consequences, because if the war drags on, it will lead to the strengthening of the "liberal elements", increasing the influence of the people on the government and transferring the initiative to the masses. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that on many important

points Mr. Weiss's information coincides with what I heard about the mood in Russia from another source, and about which I have already reported to Your Excellency. Moreover, Herr Weiss has learned that the Progressive Bloc is

dissatisfied with the appointment of Mr. Trepov.³⁴ Representatives of this bloc are aware that Mr. Trepov will not unconditionally support their policy. In the opinion of Mr. Weiss, the appointment of Mr. Trepov should be regarded as a compromise between the Rights and the Progressive Bloc. True, for the Progressive Bloc, Mr. Trepov is a more acceptable candidate than Mr. Stürmer,³⁵ but the Progressives nevertheless expected to see another person more convenient for them in the place of Mr. Stürmer. Progressive Candidates --

Sazonov³⁶, Rodzianko³⁷ and Milyukov³⁸. Of course, in any case, Milyukov will remain in the background for the time being and renounce the ministerial portfolio.

Turning to his personal affairs, Mr. Weiss told me that now that his health had improved, he was ready to go to Norway. He hopes to meet Mr. Chernov there, who, as it has now become clear, was still in Paris on the 12th of last month, as he was unable to come to England. However, there are well-founded hopes that Chernov, with the help of his party comrades, will still be able to obtain permission to travel to England, and from there to Norway. Mr. Weiss wants to visit me again on the

20th of this month, to leave for Norway via Germany at the beginning of next year. He is going to stay in Norway for 4-6 weeks and then return to Switzerland via Germany. As I have already explained in one of my previous reports,

the Socialist-Revolutionary Party should not suspect that Weiss is connected with us. Therefore, he needs an excuse to get a visa to travel through Germany. He wants to explain to his party comrades that he received this permission thanks to the assistance of his acquaintance - a high-ranking person who enjoys the confidence of the German government - under the pretext that he does not play any role in political life, enjoys a good reputation and only wants to visit his sick father. He will tell his comrades that the German government has repeatedly given in such cases permission to pass through Germany to ordinary Russians, and he hopes that his comrades will believe him. He will receive from his Russian friends a passport in a different name, and I will put the necessary visa on it. Of course, there will be a special note in the passport that Weiss can only pass through Germany. Of course, I will notify Your Excellency in advance of the specific date of his arrival.

As I already reported in my previous report, in Norway, Mr. Weiss intends to get acquainted with the activities of his local friends and to contribute to these activities with all his might, but first of all, to take the necessary measures so that messages received in Norway from Russia are reliably forwarded to him in Switzerland. Here I would like to return to the proposal that I had the honor of

to do in one of his previous reports, which was as follows: the imperial mission in Christiania should name a reliable person, preferably a Norwegian, so that Weiss could tell his comrades that he had recruited this person and that he could reliably forward messages to him in Switzerland. I ask Your Excellency to inform me of the name and address of such a person before the 20th of this month. In this case, Mr. Weiss could come to this person after his arrival in Christiania, he could show him his passport or tell him the password. After that, Mr. Weiss will introduce one of his people to this Norwegian, and he will be able to discreetly transmit messages to him. As I have already explained, the Norwegian will be able to transmit the messages received from the agent of Mr. Weiss to the imperial mission in Christiania, and there they will take care of forwarding the received materials to me or to Mr. Weiss. Mr. Weiss, to whom I paid 25,000 francs on the

basis of the authorization I received, told me that he badly needed this money and would immediately send it through various channels to his friends in Norway, Denmark and Sweden. Of course, for

in order to continue to successfully carry out their activities, they also need monthly financial support in the future. He understands perfectly well that we need evidence that he uses the money he receives from us for its intended purpose. After his return from Norway, he expects to provide us with more convincing evidence of the adequate use of the funds provided to him than hitherto. However, we must understand that he would not like to meet his friends in Norway in January empty-handed. Therefore, he would be very grateful if we would give him another 25,000 francs. He fears that if he does not bring anything to his friends, they will be very disappointed. And he would not like that, because he expects a lot from the negotiations he is going to conduct in Norway, in particular, the expansion and promotion of the activities already under way. Once again, I most humbly appeal to Your Excellency with a request to authorize me to make another payment to Mr. Weiss. I have -- as well as Baron Hennett,

who has been in touch with Mr. Weiss several times of late,

the impression that he is not going to deceive us, and the funds provided to him will be used for their intended purpose. Mr. Weiss emphasizes - and, perhaps, rightly - that, given the huge nature of the work ahead in Russia, the funds provided to him are, in essence, not very large. But he himself cannot apply for larger sums, because receiving such sums would arouse certain suspicions in his party. Even now it is very difficult for him to explain the origin

this money.

I kindly ask Your Excellency to inform me before the 18th of this month whether you authorize me to pay Monsieur Weiss 25,000 francs.

ROMBERG Addendum: Weiss
report The

Socialist-Revolutionary Party is
one of the strongest parties in Russia. It has hundreds of thousands of members (active and passive). Basically, these are peasants, although there are also representatives of the workers and the intelligentsia.

The war split the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, like all the socialist parties of the world, into two parts. This is a patriotic and internationalist direction. In the first year of the war, the internationalist wing of the party was insignificant and did not exert any noticeable influence. But already in the summer of 1915, the defeat and retreat of the Russian army in the Carpathians disturbed and made the whole country

think. From that time on, the patriotic wing began to lose its influence, while the internationalist wing, on the contrary, strengthened its position. Of great importance was the speech of the spiritual leader of the party, Viktor Chernov, in the journal Life, who openly and unequivocally spoke out against the war and called for the overthrow of the government.

This magazine, which had to play such an important role in the revolutionary movement, united around itself all the opponents of the war abroad. Until the autumn of 1915, the magazine practically did not arrive in Russia. There were not enough funds to organize the shipment. Only in the autumn, finally, it was possible to get the necessary funds, and the magazine, along with a large number of other revolutionary publications

begins to arrive almost regularly in Russia. At the same time, people from Switzerland, France and England were sent to Russia.

At present, the situation is as follows. In more than 50 provinces of Russia there are organizations of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party of an internationalist direction. In June of this year, a conference was held in Russia at which it was decided to wage a vigorous struggle against the government in order to put an end to the war as soon as possible. All party committees appealed to all Russian revolutionaries to put aside all differences and, with united forces, begin an open struggle against the government, a struggle for peace. In the factory organizations of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the workers adopted resolutions against the government and against the war and refused to take part in it. On the other hand, strong unrest

is beginning among the peasantry, and this unrest is so serious that the question arises in the Party of the possibility of issuing weapons to the peasants. The Volga region is now completely covered by the social-revolutionary movement, where the party journal Call, the first issues of which have recently arrived from Russia to Switzerland, is published illegally. In addition, there are now two very strong military organizations: one in Petrograd - the "Northern Military Organization", and the second - in Moscow. The "Northern Military Organization" publishes a small magazine, seven issues of which have already arrived in Switzerland. There are other military organizations, but much less powerful and influential. A direct connection with Russia has been established through Norway and Arkhangelsk. Here we are helped by soldiers who are under the influence of the party. Everything we send (with the exception of one consignment that was confiscated by the Russian authorities) reaches Russia safely. Unfortunately, messages from Russia do not

reach Switzerland on such a regular basis, and many things disappear altogether. England and France do not let anything in, but Germany now often delays transport with newspapers

and letters. It is becoming more and more difficult to send people to Russia, since England does not allow transit through Norway, but directs travelers directly to Arkhangelsk. However, most of the best members of the party moved to Russia last year, and those who still remained will be able to

get to Russia through Germany with the help of the Italian Socialist Party or with the help of the Swiss socialist Greulich. In the near future, a large newspaper will begin

to appear in Norway, headed by Chernov. This newspaper will vigorously advocate for the immediate conclusion of peace. It is interesting that in Russia, along with the illegal movement of socialist-revolutionaries, the legal movement is increasingly developing. For example, in Siberia, the newspaper "Sibir" is published, in Petrograd - "Russian Notes". They exert a colossal moral influence thanks to the names of their collaborators: Peshekhonova³⁹, Myakotina⁴⁰, Korolenko⁴¹ and others. Nikolai Sukhanov⁴² from the Yearbook is very close to the Social Revolutionary Party. He writes large educational articles about the senselessness of the war with Germany. His articles are published in special editions, of particular interest is the article "Why are we at war?", in which he considers England as the only serious competitor to Russia, the only state with which it would still make sense to wage war.

It should also be said that the Socialist-Revolutionaries are also supported by the Bolsheviks (Social Democrats), headed by Lenin, who now lives in Switzerland. Their joint activity every day brings more and more fruits and has a destructive effect on the patriotic movement. In this respect, the newspaper Golos, published in Samara, is characteristic. At first, it stood exclusively for the defense of the fatherland, but gradually the internationalist trend began to occupy more and more space in it, and now individual voices of defenders of the fatherland, such as Gvozdev⁴³, almost drowned in it. The danger of the revolutionary movement has also been realized by the reactionary parties, which motivate their demands for the conclusion of peace with Germany by the growth of the revolutionary movement. Unambiguous proof of the truth of this statement are mass arrests in Petrograd and other cities.

In addition, revolutionary propaganda among the prisoners of war in Germany and Austria poses no small danger to the reactionary forces in Russia. To this end, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party publishes the magazine "In a Foreign Land", which regularly arrives in Germany, which, unfortunately, cannot be said about Austria.

AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE SECOND 25,000
FRANKS TO ZIVIN

No 920 Berlin, December 12, 1916

pay Weiss 25,000 francs. (signature
illegible) THE GERMAN
ENVOYER IN CHRISTIANIA -- TO THE MFA
GERMANY

Christiania, December 15, 1916, 2 hours 30 minutes. Received: 7 hours 20
min.

Transcription Concerning telegram No. 287
Secret

Correspondence from Russia for a Russian revolutionary can be
addressed to the local printing house Kirste and Siebert, Stensbergsga de
29. Since this firm also prints the newspaper of the church community,
which is published by Pastor Tünter, it maintains constant contact with
Günther. Kirste will pass on the correspondence from Russia to Gunther,
who is on the mission. Kirste is a German and Norwegian citizen by birth,
Günther's information is reliable, and since his firm receives many
manuscripts for printing, it will not catch anyone's eye if correspondence
from Russia also comes there.

It will be good if the Russian from Bern comes to the mission himself
and identifies himself, then I can introduce him to Gunther, who in turn will
take him to Kirste to discuss the details. In this way it will be possible to
avoid Kirste's contacts with the mission, since Gunther will be away until the
20th of this month, so the Russian would have to stay in Christiania until
November 20th. Please let me know when he arrives

and how he can be recognized. MICHAELLES PLANS AND
DOCUMENTS

· FOR ZIVIN'S JOURNEY No 2978 Bern, December 30,
1916 Mission of the German
Empire Top secret! Urgently! I
have the honor to inform Your

Excellency that I am enclosing herewith the notes of the secretary of
the embassy von Schubert⁴⁵ on negotiations with the Russian agent Weiss
for further instructions at your discretion.

BETMAN-HOLVEG

To His Excellency the

Chancellor of the Reich, Herr Bethmann-

Hollweg, I informed Herr Weiss in the spirit of instructions received from other

channels. In the event that nothing happens, Herr Weiss intends to leave from here on January 10 to Sweden via Basel-Otterbach and Sassnitz, from where he will immediately go to Christiania and there make a presentation in the imperial mission.

Mr. Weiss told me that he had changed his original plan to go to Germany with a Russian passport and our visa. He fears that his party comrades may look suspicious if he receives a visa from us to travel through Germany without any problems.

But Mr. Weiss found another way out. He managed to get the passport of a Swiss from Tessin named Ernest Kohler, which he put at his disposal for several months. He will stick his photo card on this passport. By chance, the personal data of this Swiss coincide with those of Weiss. Now the difficulty lies in the fact that Weiss does not want to risk crossing the Swiss-German border with this Swiss passport, while he has no such doubts about leaving Germany for Sweden, as well as about using it when entering Sweden and on the territory Sweden and Norway. In order to remove this difficulty, I agreed with Mr. Weiss on the following.

The local passport office will give Mr. Weiss the papers he needs to travel to Warsaw and back. These documents will be in his real name: Yevgeny Tsivin, and they will have an entry and exit visa valid for two months. On January 10, Mr. Weiss will cross the Swiss-German border with these documents. In the meantime, the local

passport office will put a transit visa for Sweden on a Swiss passport in the name of Ernest Kohler. I will have the courier deliver this passport to Germany on January 10th. Then the courier will escort Mr. Weiss to Freiburg, discreetly give him a Swiss passport there and take away the Warsaw documents.

Next, Weiss will travel to Sweden with Swiss documents. Of course, the border guards in Sassnitz must be informed in advance of the departure of Mr. Weiss and instructed accordingly so that they let him through without delay. Of course, everything depends on the fact that Mr. eyes. I have the honor to enclose five photographs of Mr. Weiss. In the meantime, the courier will bring back Mr. Weiss's Warsaw papers for me. Then we will send these documents to Berlin and Warsaw. Mr. Weiss will go back in much the same way. Recently, the Swiss authorities

have been very strict in checking documents, especially for persons whose documents were issued in Warsaw. Therefore, it is imperative that Mr. Weiss's Warsaw papers, which will also bear a visa for a two-month round trip, have all the necessary seals to show that Mr. Weiss was indeed in Warsaw.

Before returning, Mr. Weiss must obtain a transit visa for Switzerland from the Imperial Legation in Christiania. With this passport he will be able to enter Germany. On the train between Freiburg and Basel, he would meet again with the courier, who would take his Swiss passport from him and again hand over the duly completed Warsaw papers. With the Warsaw documents, Mr. Weiss will again enter Switzerland and hand them over to me here. From me he will receive a Swiss passport, which, if necessary, he can show to his Russian friends. Here they will make sure that Mr. Weiss's Swiss

passport contains the necessary stamps confirming that he has crossed the German-Swiss border twice. I would also like to point out that it would be expedient to make

available to the Imperial Mission in Christiania and to the frontier authorities in Sassnitz one photograph of Herr Weiss.

SCHUBERT

IMPERIAL CHARGE DAFTER-- TO THE MFA OF GERMANY No
1417 Berne, December 31, 1916, 2 hours --
min. Received: 9 o'clock.
40 min. Transcription Concerning telegram
No. 822 Top secret

Weiss will probably leave on January 10 via Basel-Otterbach-Sassnitz to Sweden, and from there to Norway. He will present a Swiss passport in the name of Ernest Kohler at the imperial mission in

Christiania and give the password: "I am a citizen of Switzerland and have come on behalf of the administration of power plants." Then he will present a photo

and give a message. In order for Weiss's visit to the mission in Christiania to go as unnoticed as possible, he must be missed immediately. Please urgently provide the number by which he should report his arrival.

BETMAN-HOLVEG

Of course, I consider that at the present moment, in view of the completely incomprehensible situation in Russia, a meeting between me and him is ruled out. But since Dr. Helphand has said that Kolyshka should be taken seriously, I would like to know if it is possible to send Erzberger here, or, if this is really absolutely impossible, someone else. According to Gelfand, these should be people who occupy a certain position and whose names are known in Russia (like Erzberger), people who, on the one hand, have some authority abroad, and on the other, are not officially obliged to the imperial government in any way and can be disavowed at any time. Baron von der Ropp, who had a detailed conversation with a certain Polyakov,

Milyukov's confidant, is convinced that in the liberal circles of the Russian Duma there has been a sobering up in relation to England and a tendency to establish contact with us. Therefore, it would probably be useful, in the event that a radical trend wins in Russia, in an unobtrusive, but at the same time not superficial form, to inform a person like Kolyshko about our political position towards Russia. Please send instructions by telegraph⁴⁹. RANZAU THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM -- TO THE GERMAN MFA

Telegram Stockholm, March 20, 1917,

13.20

Received: 17.15

Secret!

Mr. Wallenberg⁵² informed me that, according to his information, the friends of the world, belonging to the extreme left, have now won a victory in Petersburg. Therefore, he said, it would be good to let them know that we will meet them halfway in the question of the Dardanelles, which is the main objective of the war and therefore constitutes an obstacle to peace. To my objection that, after all, Mr. Neklyudov⁵³ already knew this, the minister replied that it was unlikely that the extreme Left could have obtained this information from Neklyudov. The Social Democrat

Janson, who is currently here,⁵⁴ through his Copenhagen friends will come into contact with Kerensky's wing in the Duma. LU TSI US⁵⁵ THE GERMAN ENVOYER

IN

COPENHAGEN -- TO THE MFA
GERMANY

Telegram No. 476 March 21, 1917, 1255

Received: March 21, 4:00

pm Dr. Helphand, with whom I discussed events in Russia, explained that, in his opinion, the conflict took place mainly between moderate liberals and socialist wing. He has no doubt that the latter will win. However, the victory of the Social Democrats in Russia would mean peace. Those now in power would obviously like to continue the war. The leaders of this policy are Milyukov and Guchkov. They both try to delay the convening of the National Constituent Assembly, because they know that the moment it gains any influence, the continuation of the war will become impossible.

When I asked what the Army's point of view was, Dr. Helphand replied that among the officers there is a desire to continue the war, especially among the senior officers, but the rank and file want peace, and, what is extremely important, ordinary soldiers, without exception, fraternize with the workers.

Dr. Gelfand believes that once the law on amnesty for political prisoners, it will be possible to fight effectively against Milyukov and Guchkov through direct contacts with the socialists.

BROCKDORF-RANZAU

to the tsarist regime, but that she is hostile to the revolutionary government. You must state that your

His Excellency has already declared in the Reichstag that Germany does not interfere in Russian internal affairs and does not seek to destroy

Russia. The Socialists stressed that they wanted to work for the sake of peace, while the Octobrists and most of the Cadets, as you know, were in favor of continuing the war.

At the present time, the socialists represent a more significant force. LUCIUS

ROSENBERG'S NOTE

March 31, 1917

Final Communication Is it

possible to hand over the enclosed reply to Colonel Tunstsheff in Sofia in person? He arrives at 12 o'clock.

ROSENBERG, March

31 Appendix

We are very grateful to His Majesty the King and the Minister, President Radoslavov⁶⁰ for their valuable advice on the Russian question and will continue to remain in close contact with the allied Bulgarian government in solving this problem. In his speech to the Reichstag on March 29, Herr Reich Chancellor took into account the wishes he had received by telegraph from Sofia. He hopes that his speech was in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty the King. To the best of our knowledge, the speech met with a favorable response in the neutral countries, especially in Scandinavia. The full text of the speech was transmitted from Stockholm to St. Petersburg on the night of March 30 through a representative of the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency.

As the Reich Chancellor said, we decided to take a calm look at the new order in Russia, without interfering in any way in the affairs of the Russians. We have not the slightest reason to be hostile to the struggle of the Russian people for freedom or to desire the return of the autocratic old regime. On the contrary, we want, to the best of our ability, to help our eastern neighbor in building a happy future and getting rid of English dominance. Germany has always been and remains ready to conclude an honorable peace with Russia.

We believe that Herr Radoslavov will now address the Assembly, just as Herr Reich Chancellor did in the Reichstag, and we think that we should then wait for the consequences of his statement. We use this time to emphasize again and again through the press, leaflets and other suitable means our good intentions towards Russia. If in the future it turns out to be expedient to involve a Bulgarian agent,

we will turn to Mr. Radoslavov for advice on this matter. We, as before, believe that in the situation in Russia there are germs of processes favorable for

us and for the cause of peace. In the enemy camp, on the contrary, according to our information, the initial satisfaction was replaced by skepticism. Socialis

The political and radical forces are beginning to play an increasingly significant role in the events in Roy Sioux, and this does not suit our opponents. If the Milyukov government holds on to power, it will certainly have to meet the wishes of the people and make peace. Any other government that wants to come to power should be recommended the same recipe. It is difficult to predict only the pace of development of events. lives in Stockholm. Our

conversation went on, with little breaks, twelve hours. Below I present the results of the conversation.

Revolution

At the urging of the British Ambassador Buchanan⁶¹ and with his assistance, the postponement of the convocation of the Duma became the signal for revolution. But the Duma did not set itself the goal of creating a parliamentary government on the model of England. The strike of workers in the arsenals in St. Petersburg was the beginning of the revolution. The Cossack regiment sent to suppress the uprising immediately went over to the side of the rebels (the regiment consisted of recruits, not old Cossacks). A squadron of the Life Dragoon Regiment, sent with the same task, refused to fire on the workers. The regimental commander gave the order to shoot the squadron - the regiment responded by killing the colonel and then united with the rebels. Gradually, there were no reliable regiments left in St. Petersburg. The revolution took place only in St. Petersburg, and then by telephone spread to Moscow and other large cities. There was no systematic training on the sca

outstanding members of the Duma took the lead of the movement and formed a new government headed by Milyukov, Guchkov and Kerensky. A few days later, a certain sub-government was formed - a committee of the soldiers' and workers' parties. This state continues to this day and is reminiscent of the Young Turk revolution in Constantinople. Milyukov is a theoretician, a lover of lengthy discussions; from the descriptions he reminds me of our former Foreign Minister, Baron von Burian. Kerensky is a young St. Petersburg lawyer, leader of the "Green Socialists", that is, the Socialist Peasant Party. He is supported by a small group in parliament, but he is a transmission link between his party and the Social Democratic Labor Party and maintains contact with it. The most powerful person in the government is undoubtedly Guchkov: from a political point of view, he is a very unreliable person - at first he was chairman of the Duma, flirted with the right for some time, then went over to the Octobrists, has good connections with the Cadets for the Boers, against England. At the beginning of the war, he was a delegate of the Red Cross and in this capacity visited all the commanders at the front. Then he was put at the head of the commission for the supply of the army and in this post he achieved the expansion of rights for the workers. Guchkov is a careerist, recklessly sweeping away any obstacles in his path. Some compare him to Napoleon. If Russia needs a dictator, then Guchkov will undoubtedly be the most suitable candidate. Guchkov was a member of the Duma delegation, which was to

to negotiate with the king on the creation of a parliamentary government. He insistently demanded that he be included in this delegation, since he believed that Nicholas II had seriously offended him, and wanted to take revenge. At the sight of Guchkov, the former tsar was dismayed and immediately announced his readiness to abdicate the throne. So the Duma delegation achieved more than it intended. The revolution continued as England and the members of the Duma wished it

to. The current situation in Russia Forces in today's Russia fall into four groups: a) Defeatists. This group unites reactionaries of all stripes and shades. They want peace - even at the expense of their fatherland,

then to tell the people that through the fault of the new government, Russia has lost significant territories. They hope in this way to win over the masses and achieve the restoration of tsarism, if not in the form of an unlimited autocracy, but in the form of a constitutional regime. This group is not currently influential. Its members are scattered throughout the country. The force on which they relied - the secret police - was destroyed in the first days of the revolution, with the deaths of 4,000 members of the Okhrana. b) liberals. These groups

believe that with the revolution their goal in the war has been achieved. They want peace, although some of their representatives use a different phraseology in everyday life. The new government does not repeat the broadcast promises of the old. But the liberal group will soon have to come out for peace, otherwise it will inevitably be destroyed by the Social Democrats and Anarchists. In any case, she can only join the honorable world and thereby strengthen her position.

c) Social Democrats: today they are in favor of "peace at any price", and today they do not care that Russia will lose significant territories in this case. But this mood is just a pretext for strengthening the peaceful movement. If the Social Democrats come to power, they will abandon the slogan "peace at any cost" and together with the British and French Social Democrats will put forward the demand: peace without annexations. The French Government, hitherto forbidding its Social Democrats from participating in the international conferences of this party, has now lifted its ban, and several French delegates will soon arrive in Stockholm to negotiate, under the leadership of von Branting,⁶³ an invitation to the conference of socialists. The slogan "peace without annexations" will conquer the whole world and will find a response in Germany itself. However, it may also happen that the Social Democrats do not come to power throughout the country, that in some areas powerful opposition arises and their own

government. Then the war in the East will bog down, and there will be no end to it. It is also unclear whether even one government will be active enough to advocate for peace. Whoever desires the speedy conclusion of peace should not count on the fact that the Social Democratic government will help to bring this moment closer.

d) Army: it has representatives of all three groups. It is currently unknown which group has the most influence. However, all three groups in the army are unanimous that a disgraceful peace should not be made.

Thus, only Germany can hasten the conclusion of peace. For this purpose, it would be best if the Reich Chancellor expressed the following ideas in the Reichstag: 1. Germany does not interfere

in the internal affairs of Russia. The Russian people, having now won political freedom, need not fear Germany. 2. The German government does not wage war

against the Russian people
as such.

3. Germany does not impose shameful peace on Russia. At least in this situation, one should not push the idea of a separate peace too insistently, rather one should work in a different direction: in order for Russia to come to the conclusion that it will receive an honorable peace, then it will have a conversation with its allies. And then everything else will take care of itself. The peace movement in Russia is best promoted through

the Reich Chancellor. The Chancellor must speak frankly with the Russian people. The sooner this happens, the better for the whole work of deliverance. It would be a major mistake to think that Germany could achieve a more honorable peace through a Social Democratic government than under the present Liberal government. The liberal government is ready to make peace, because it knows that in doing so it can best strengthen its

power.

Conditions of

peace Herr von Kolyshko called the renunciation of major annexations as the main condition for concluding peace. It can only be a question of correcting the boundaries. The new government, he said, wants to maintain friendly relations with Germany, but annexations hinder friendship and push Russia into the arms of England. After asking him additional questions, I found out that when he talks about correcting the borders, he means changes that may affect large areas. Russia wants to keep a part

conquered by her region (Western Galicia), she will in no case agree to lose Vilna. Accession to Germany

Courland and Lithuania will also present considerable difficulties. The Polish question, according to Kolyshko, Germany greatly complicated by its proclamation. But when I pointed out that Russia was the first to raise the Polish question, and explained that the Polish proclamation was not an insurmountable obstacle and that the German program towards the Poles was known to the whole world, Herr von Kolyshko agreed that it was possible to reach an understanding. I asked him to transmit the Russian program.

Russia may be in favor of lifting the capitulations in Turkey, but it must receive guarantees of Germany's good intentions in settling the issue of the Dardanelles and the Armenian problem. Russia will not pay compensation for war losses, but a peace treaty could stipulate long-term trade agreements between Russia and Germany. Then Mr. von Kolyshko

inquired about Germany's military goals in relation to other belligerent powers, emphasizing that the current Russian government does not attach much importance to the restoration of Serbia, only the tsar was personally interested in Serbia. As regards France and Belgium, I referred to the public statements of the Reich Chancellor that we would not annex Belgium. As for France, here we can talk about the correction of borders and reparations for the return of the occupied territories. With regard to England, it is primarily about the return of the colony, freedom of navigation and the settlement of a number of issues that equally concern not only Germany, but all countries. Herr von Kolyshko stubbornly insisted on the demand that Austria cede Trieste and Trient to Italy. I

explained to him that it was impossible. Of course, I said, it is very worthy of him to stand up for an ally, but then let him not refuse me the same. Germany cannot be required to defend a traitor, and Italy is a traitor, and then it would be a dishonorable world. Not wanting this for itself, Russia has no right to demand it for Germany and Austria either. After a long discussion of this matter, he stated that I had convinced him and that he, with

for its part, will advocate with all determination that these areas should not be ceded to Italy.

Mr. von Kolyshko promised, in accordance with the wishes of the new government, to go directly to Petersburg soon, and by April 20 to arrive again in Stockholm in order to continue negotiations as an authorized person. In conclusion, he reiterated that, in his opinion, nothing better to strengthen the peace movement than the public statement of the Reich Chancellor, already mentioned above. Then it is still necessary to agree on the delivery of the speech of the Reich Chancellor to Russia, it can be delivered to the Russian front through German soldiers and practiced.

Herr von Kolyshko also expressed his desire to conduct further negotiations with me, and he would by no means want to do business with Mr. Stinnes⁶⁴, who had already visited him more than once and offered him 15 million for the creation of Russian newspapers.

GERMAN MESSENGER IN
COPENHAGEN

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
FOREIGN

AFFAIRS April 2, 1917 Dear Mr.

Secretary of State! I turn to! Your Excellency with this personal letter, because current events, and especially events in Russia, seem to me so important in connection with the decision on the direction of our entire future foreign policy that I consider it inevitable that radical decisions should now be made if we are to ensure our success in decisive hour. Your Excellency knows

that I am not a talker or a blind admirer of authority. I myself have formed my own independent convictions and I believe that, taking into account my deep respect for you and the unconditional trust that you have always shown me, I have the right to speak frankly. I ask you to personally receive Dr. Telfand, who will arrive

in Berlin tomorrow evening (Tuesday). I am aware that Dr. Helfand's character and reputation are assessed differently by his contemporaries, and that your predecessor (Yagov) especially liked to go over him. In reply to this I can only say that Gelfand achieved very useful political results and that in

In Russia, he was one of the first who quietly and modestly began to work to achieve the goal, which is now our goal. Some circumstances, perhaps - and all, would have turned out differently if Jagow had not neglected his advice two years ago! The connections that Helphand

has with Russia, from my point of view, may now turn out to be a decisive factor in the development of the general situation. Moreover, he is so close to the Social Democrats in Germany, Austria and Scandinavia that he can influence them at any moment at the right time. side. He is sincerely grateful to Your Excellency, as he knows

that it was your intervention that helped him settle in Germany at a time when his position was especially precarious. And now he feels like a German, not a Russian, despite the revolution in Russia, which should have rehabilitated him. Therefore, I ask you to accept it, especially since I am convinced that, if properly handled, it can be

extremely useful, and not only in matters of foreign, but also internal policy of the empire.

I do not need to emphasize once again that I do not agree with all of his thoughts. But I think we should use opportunities like his where we need them.

Your Excellency will understand what prompted me to write this.
letter.

I have nothing more to add, except that Helphand never once asked me to recommend him to you and that I decided to write this letter only a few hours ago, at ten o'clock in the evening, since I learned that a special courier was going to Berlin tomorrow morning . I ask therefore to excuse me for the fact that the letter was written in haste, and for possible errors in it - the result of this haste.

Yours BROKDORF-RANTSALK

Documents of the _____

of the revolution and the aspirations of the extreme Russian forces. The British managed to achieve a split in the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Part of the Soviet stands for peace, while others - among them Mr. Chkheidze - stand for the continuation of the war. True, this has nothing to do with the trip of Minister of War Guchkov to the front, from where he brought soldier delegates,

speaking in St. Petersburg, in contrast to the local workers' and soldiers' deputies, for the continuation of the war and work in military factories. According to White, the British are doing everything to sow mistrust among the local Russian emigrants. They will also do their best to nullify the efforts of the German socialists who have come to Scandinavia.

Stefan got the impression

that the Entente would be all try to prevent the return of the local pacifist revolutionaries by force, either by forcing the provisional government to forbid them from returning through Germany, or by offering the revolutionaries passage through the Entente countries, where they will be detained⁶⁶.

ROMBERG vii. Since I'm not sure of his agreement, I'll say it's my own idea for now.

TROITLER⁶⁹

CHANCELLER TO THE GERMAN

EMBASSY IN VIENNA Telegram No. 225

Berlin, April 13, 1917 For Herr

von Stumm⁷² The statement of the Provisional Government was followed by a resolution of the representatives of the St. Petersburg garrison, published on April 10 by the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, which states

"We are in favor of continuing the war to a victorious end, since the army is aware that even a peace that restores the old borders and a peace treaty without the consent of the allies will be a shameful peace that threatens the new freedom of Russia and is a betrayal that will excommunicate us from free England, republican France, from Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, who made great sacrifices for the sake of their friends. Therefore, it seems very doubtful that Prince Lvov, even with the

best of intentions, will be able, on the basis of his program statement, to enter into successful negotiations with us, in particular, I very much doubt in connection with the above statement that it is currently possible to conclude peace without a full restoration Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. I share the opinion of Count Chernin⁷³ that the statement

The Provisional Government needs to react, but I would like to believe that the immediate goal, namely the strengthening of peaceful propaganda and the process of decay in Russia, will be achieved to a lesser extent by official and useless policy statements than by the corresponding articles in the official newspapers of both sides, which were based on I would like to put the thoughts contained in telegram No. 22474. Colonel Ganchev today, after a conversation with Crown Prince Boris⁷⁵, warned, apparently on behalf of King Ferdinand⁷⁶, against excessive confidence in Lvov's statements. He strongly advised not to show any activity, but to calmly wait for further developments in Russia, which so far fully meets our interests. Under these circumstances, I would recommend most seriously not to make hasty decisions not conditioned by the political situation without prior agreement with us and our allies.

Mr. Grünau⁷⁷ sent me the following telegram today... 78

SECRETARY

OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
TO THE MESSENGER IN

BERN Telegram No. 429 Berlin, April 16,
1917 Continuation of telegram No.

428 Scheidemann and Ebert warn me in the most serious manner against Grimm⁷⁹, saying that he is a clear supporter of the Entente. Therefore, if Your Excellency has not yet done anything about Grimm's passage through Germany, I ask you not to do anything.

ZIMMERMANN

THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN COPENHAGEN -- STATS TO
THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Telegram No. 595 April 17, 1917, 1.35

Received: 8.00

am To telegram No.

25080 Dr. Helphand returned today from Stockholm, where he was negotiating with Russian emigrants from Switzerland. He was summoned to Berlin by telegram from the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party. He will arrive tomorrow and stay for a few days. His address is Keithstrasse 14. He will be waiting there for Your Excellency's invitation.

BROCKDORF-RANZAU
ERZBERGER TO LANGWERT82

Berlin, April 21, 1917 Dear

Herr Baron! Enclosed I am sending
you a report of my conversation that took place on Thursday in
Stockholm. With

deepest respect, M.

ERZBERGER,
member of the
Reichstag APPENDIX

No 1 Report on the conversation on April 19, 1917
in Stockholm The conversation with Kolyshko and Gurevich83 lasted from 10 o'clock i
until half past seven in the evening. Below are the results.

I. German peace action

Kolyshko said: at a meeting in March, he said that Germany could make
peace with Russia at any moment, everything depends on the Germans.
Today he must admit that the situation has changed. Now the decision must
be made by Russia. For the past three weeks, the Germans have been
pursuing a very clever and effective policy. The speech of the State Chancellor
in the Reichstag was excellent and met the aspirations of the Russian friends
of the world. It was a smart strategic move to allow passage for Russian
emigrants living in Switzerland. On the Russian border, the emigrants were
detained by English officers, but they said that they could not recognize any
authority for the British officers on Russian soil, and with the help of Russian
soldiers made their way to Russia. The statement of the "Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung" of last Saturday is of historical significance. Such a
statement was expected, it is very important, because it expresses agreement
with Russia on all fundamental points, because it openly says that no one
suspects Russia of treason, and because the attack on Stokhod found an
explanation there that also satisfied the Russians. Now it is the turn of the
Russian government to respond. Because of the Easter holidays that have
just ended, the Russian press has not yet had time to take a stand on this
statement.

However, the Russian government will not necessarily give an open
answer; now it is necessary to start secret negotiations. Here

one omission is striking: the German press does not actively support the action of its own government, together

then, in order to form a solid front around her government, she indulges in unnecessary details, which are unclear to her due to her lack of political experience. Statements like the one made by the German government last Sunday should be hammered into the head of the whole world by constant repetition, so that the whole world can see that Germany takes this statement very seriously.

I asked him if this might not create the impression in Russia and elsewhere that Germany is weak and is cramming Russia into friends. To this, Mr. Kolyshko replied: "The strength of Germany is known all over the world, but the statements of the German government are not trusted enough, because they do not have a strong echo in the people and public opinion." In

addition to this apt remark, I would also like to suggest that a secret meeting of the chief editors of the major German newspapers be convened as soon as possible in order to induce them to act as unitedly as possible in favor of the government. Kolyshko has repeatedly expressed his complete satisfaction that Germany is so resolutely in favor of peace.

II. The situation in

Russia Further, Kolyshko told the following: England in the past three weeks has made a lot of efforts to combat pacifist currents, she is spending huge money on this matter and is using terrorist methods. As an auxiliary force, it uses the chauvinist socialists of all countries. Branting, immediately after his return from Petersburg, went to Christiania to report to the British and bring the French Minister of Armaments Thomas to Stockholm. From England and France, socialists, ardent supporters of the war, went to Russia. With their help, and through other pro-British elements, the rumor is spreading that Germany is already negotiating peace with England, and that the two Powers have, in fact, reached full agreement on everything. At the same time, Germany allegedly seeks to ensure that Russia pays in full for everything. This is how mistrust is sown in order to suppress the desire for peace. I replied to Kolyshko that this statement is completely inconsistent

reality. We discussed countermeasures in the press to influence public opinion. As an intermediary, a certain respected Swedish figure should be chosen in order to obtain the necessary funds. The members of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies are in great need of money and take even more than the previous government. In the coming weeks, a powerful action against England should be launched, similar to the one that has already been successfully launched by Prince

Bebutov⁸⁵, who published two articles directed against England. Meanwhile, Prince Bebutov is under house arrest.

Further, Kolyshko said: If we look at the various currents and trends in their totality, we can say that for the time being an indefinite mood prevails, which is explained by Miliukov's constant hesitation. A certain amount of support was given to Milyukov by the pro-war socialist Plekhanov⁸⁶, who enjoys greater prestige than Chkheidze and Lenin. Lenin is more of an ideologue than a practical politician. In the last three weeks in Russia, there has undoubtedly been a tilt to the left. Kerensky is growing stronger every day, and with him the peace movement is getting stronger, which received strong support in the form of a statement by the German government, published in the *Norddeutsche allgemeine Zeitung*.

III. Armistice as preparation for peace

I asked Mr. Kolyshko what practical steps, besides influencing public opinion, should be taken next. I would consider it expedient for him to leave for Russia as soon as possible. Kolyshko replied that he would certainly leave on the next Sunday and be in Petersburg as early as Wednesday. But he can promise complete success only if he knows further guarantees for the conclusion of peace, in addition to the declaration of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. The first prerequisite for the conclusion of peace would be the announcement of a truce on the eastern front. The German attack on Stokhod caused great damage to the cause of peace in Russia. The pro-British forces said that Germany had shown her true intention - to lure Russia into a trap. The political damage of the German victory at Stokhod far outweighs its military significance. In the liberal press every day they keep talking about the attack on Stokhod. If such military actions are repeated, the peace negotiations will be

impossible. The peaceful movement in Russia can only win if it is not hindered by military actions from outside.

After a lengthy discussion, we have decided to draft the attached statement, dated but not signed. I have my handwritten copy. The copy for Kolyshko was copied by his wife (German). The statement refers only to Germany, but emphasizes that Germany must ensure that its allies accede to this agreement. During the conversation, I paid great attention to the fact that we should receive an answer from Russia as soon as possible. At the latest, four weeks, that is, three weeks after Kolyshko's arrival there. He also promised to contribute to the acceleration of this matter, since all parties are interested in this. He considers a six-week cease-fire to be sufficient. But during this time, Germany must, under any circumstances, leave its troops in the current positions, since otherwise Germany will attack France and Russia will be accused of treason. In addition, such a condition would facilitate the basis for a general truce.

At the meeting it was said that during the armistice both countries should exchange products in which they have a surplus: German coal for Russian wheat, German chemicals for Russian manganese ores, etc. But it would be unreasonable to state this in advance in a statement. As for the individual points of the application, it should be noted here

following:

Point 1. Under the point "correction of the borders" it should already be understood from the last meeting in March that these should be carried out on a Russian scale. One cannot talk about annexations, even if the correction of the borders will lead to annexation. With the skillful conduct of business, the wishes of Germany can be fulfilled to the maximum extent. Kolyshko demanded to write down that Russia was also receiving correction of borders, but I explained to him that there was no need to specifically stipulate this, since we were talking about corrections of borders, that is, multiple

number.

Items 2, 3, 4 were established according to the March meeting and cannot give rise to any doubts. As for harmonization in Poland, under the influence of the church, which will certainly manifest itself if

Poland will not retreat back to Russia; we must firmly count on a favorable result for Germany. Item 5.

Kolyshko said: the new Russia under no circumstances wants to conclude new treaties, not wanting to be reminded of the old system. Therefore, it is also impossible to extend the old trade agreement for many years, it is necessary to find a middle path, which is set out in the statement. I attached great importance to establishing right away that Russia cannot raise the duty on the export of goods. Kolyshko and Gurevich unanimously explained that Russia could not agree to such a condition. In order to preserve its financial economy, it must, under all circumstances, impose a duty on the export of wheat. If Germany wants to exempt some other goods from duty, then this can be discussed later.

Points 8, 9 and 10, in the opinion of my Russian interlocutors, are an indispensable condition for the victory of a peaceful mood in Russia. It is these guarantees that will make the work for peace incredibly easy. In paragraph 9, Kolyshko wanted to go much further and already dreamed of a performing court for an arbitration court, but I rejected this. Such an arbitral tribunal will arouse great enthusiasm for Kerensky. We have agreed that the arbitral tribunal will consist of three people: the King of Spain, the President of the Swiss

kings and popes. Point 10 is especially needed so that Russia can now tell its allies that it does not want to take any separate action. Germany is completely free to choose the conditions and prerequisites for concluding an armistice. But world peace can come sooner if a harmonious conclusion of peace in Europe can be reached. We also agreed on how to establish an absolutely

reliable connection during Kolyshko's stay in St. Petersburg, and in the very near future. However, this is not for writing.

In the final conversation, Kolyshko and Gurevich said that they were completely confident in the conclusion of a truce, despite the inevitability of a fight with the British side. Russia achieved a major success in this war by eliminating autocratic rule. No country has achieved so much in the war. But now Russia needs peace, otherwise its huge achievements will be in jeopardy. But both of my interlocutors did not hide the fact that the renewal of their country was threatened

serious dangers. The most terrible danger is undoubtedly the growing indiscipline in the army. As an example, they told the following: General [N. I.] Ivanov, who took Lvov, and during his arrest he was treated like a dangerous criminal. The soldiers refused to carry his suitcases from the station to the car and ruthlessly pushed him with butts, although his guilt was not yet

proven.

Today we can say that the provinces support St. Petersburg, since all circles expect improvements from the new order. But full clarity has been established only very recently, and now one can begin energetic work for peace. In general, it can be said that much has already been done, since both governments are of the same opinion on the most important issues. It remains only to develop the technical side. Here, difficulties may arise related to the creditworthiness of one or another party or mutual trust. Therefore, in both camps, care should be taken to increase mutual trust. With the following statement in hand, he can certainly work successfully in Petersburg in the name of peace.

APPENDIX No 2 From ...

May, from six o'clock in the morning until ... June, six o'clock in the morning, a six-week truce of all armed forces between Germany and Russia with Romania is announced, while leaving the ground forces in the positions in which they were on the day the agreement was concluded.

The purpose of this truce is to prepare a long and honorary for both sides of the world on the following grounds:

1. The border of Russia will be restored as of August 1, 1914, corrections of the borders are excluded. 2. The border of the new

state of Poland is established by Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary.

According to the results of the vote of ... June 1917 of the population of the state of Poland, the male over 25 years old, it will be decided whether Poland will remain under the Russian protectorate, or whether it will develop as a free republic or as a hereditary monarchy. 3. Russia agrees to the abolition of capitulations in Turkey, for which Germany

agrees to a compromise in resolving the issue of the Dardanelles and the Armenian problem.

4. All private legal relations between citizens of Russia and Germany, as they existed on August 1, 1914, come into force again. If they cannot be restored in reality, a full replacement should be provided, if this is not possible, then in a disputed case, the amount of the monetary reward is established by the Swiss court in Lausanne. 5. The trade agreement between Germany

and Russia, which was in force on August 1, 1914, is extended until a new trade agreement comes into force. Both states cannot establish export and exit bans and impose transit restrictions.

6. Each of the parties waging war pays its own military spending and damage caused by the

war. 7. All other issues will be settled in a peace treaty. 8. Russia and Germany undertake to advocate for an international arms limitation.

9. Before each of the two countries decides on wartime measures (martial law, mobilization, etc.), it must submit disputed issues to arbitration. 10. At the request of Russia, Germany is ready at any moment to

conclude an armistice with other warring countries in order to prepare for the conclusion of a general peace. The duly signed documents on this treaty should be exchanged as soon as possible, no later than four weeks later, that is, on May 18, 1917 in Stockholm.

Stockholm, April 20, 1917

APPENDIX No 3

Statement on the relationship between Kolyshko and

Stinnes In a conversation dated April 19, Kolyshko stated in the most definite way that he had not seen Father Stinnes⁸⁷ for several months, had not spoken to him and had not been in correspondence with him . With Stinnes son

who is 19 years old and spends a lot of time in Stockholm, he does not carry on any political conversations, because he considers this gentleman too immature. The intermediary in this matter was Mr. D. 88, but he constantly demanded annexations, and this is in flagrant contradiction to Kolyshko's convictions. After Erzberger's last stay in Stockholm in March, Stinnes son said

Peg that Erzberger is in Stockholm and he wants to introduce him to Peg. To this Kolyshko replied that he had already spoken to Erzberger. Then Stinnes the son asked what Erzberger had said. Kolyshko replied: Erzberger spoke very little, basically he pulled everything he could out of me, and when he spoke, he very strongly defended his opinion. But Kolyshko got the impression that Erzberger was in a different position than Stinnes as father and son. He said nothing more. Since then, he has not spoken to Stinnes, neither with his father nor with his son, has not entered into any agreements with them, and if they claim otherwise, then this is not true. And to say that he is in solidarity with Stinnes in matters of peace is a blatant lie. From now on, he breaks off all relations with Stinnes. Stinnes again told him about 15 million marks, which he wants to give to the creation of a newspaper. It is quite natural that from now on Kolyshko will discuss all questions of the world only with Erzberger and will not pass anything on to Stinnes. Kolyshko was extremely indignant at the behavior of Stinnes.

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT THE
STATE - IN THE GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 592

Headquarters,

April 25, 1917, 22.05

Received: 23.15 To telegram No.

583 General Ludendorff89 transmits: I received the following message by telegraph from Baden about the conversation of an officer of the Supreme High Command of

the Imperial Army with Count Chernin: "The event of the socialists with hopelessness90. it is enough the Stockholm conference is will seem to be promoted a general peace in which we are not at all interested. The Minister of Foreign Affairs [Austria-Hungary] agrees to cross the Russian front, even asks for it and hopes, if successful, to increase the authority of the army, which would be extremely important. In my opinion, the following conditions are necessary for this: a) the termination of all non-binding

negotiations,

replacing them with negotiations between authorized senior officers;

b) a clear statement of conditions;

c) the rapid achievement of an agreement between Germany and the monarchy on these conditions, and it should be borne in mind that with

In a separate peace with Russia, different conditions arise than in a general peace. The minister must come up with a ready-made program.

It would be expedient for the representatives of the Supreme High Command and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both sides to come to an agreement in Berlin on these matters as soon as possible. Today there will be a conversation between the Chief of the General Staff and the Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Thus, there are no obstacles to an agreement with Austria soon on military objectives in the east on the basis of the Kreuznach conferences of 23 April.

Let me also note that General Ludendorff told me today that he attaches great importance to the speedy conclusion of an agreement with Austria. GRUNAU

THE

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT THE
STATE -- IN THE GERMAN MFA Telegram No.

599 Headquarters,

April 27, 1917,

9.35 Received: 10.40 Confidential! Mr. Secretary of
State, Foreign Affairs

personally. To telegram No. 598 As a result of the Erzberger case, a heavy, thunderous atmosphere reigns today along the entire line, with periodic discharges. The Supreme High Command, in my opinion, unscrupulously set the Kaiser against the move to restore the status of "quo ante bellum" in relation to borders and "correct borders", pretending that it was really only about correcting borders in the usual sense, and not about the veiled acquisition of new territories. The Kaiser was furious and read out to the members of the cabinet and to me the draft of his telegram to Herr Reich Chancellor,⁹² which I was to send. At first there was nothing to think of any calm discussion of the question. Sitting at the table next to the Kaiser, I tried to explain to him what the term "correction of frontiers" means as applied to Russian standards, and to prove that it was not a question of a project drawn up

by Erzberger and Kolyshko, but only a statement of what Kolyshko considers a suitable premise for negotiations through which he could induce his friends to take further action. Due to my clarification

political leadership, while "exhausting him mentally and physically" He also pointed out that he could have taken the field marshal's report differently if he was informed accurately and timely, and not deafened by unexpected news from the other side. This applies not only to this, but also to other cases.

GRUNAU
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN DEL --
STATE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN STATE Telegram
No 758
Berlin, April 27, 1917 Secret!
For a report to His
Majesty On telegram No. 598 Erzberger's meeting with Kolyshko was
prompted by the latter's repeated, urgent requests to organize a conversation as
soon as possible. As I already indicated in telegram No. 741, I instructed
Erzberger only to listen to the Russian agent and inform me of what he had
heard. Erzberger's information trip to Kolyshko, who boasts of close relations
with Kerensky, made it possible to find out Kerensky's wishes in a non-binding
way and to keep the latter from using the mediation of the
German socialists, among whom there are strong tendencies towards
rapprochement with the Russian socialist

leaders. In favor of Erzberger was the fact that he was an opponent of socialist aspirations and that Kolyshko, being a Catholic, treated the envoy of the [German Social Democratic] center with special confidence. Erzberger exceeded his powers, wishing to serve the Kaiser and the Reich. To my accusations of violating instructions, he immediately asked in the most direct way to immediately disavow him and leave him to the mercy of fate, if it was in the interests of the Reich. I do not think that he has done any damage to our interests, since he, according to his repeated assurances, convinced the Peg that he had no assignments and that he did not have any powers, and if the Peg returned to these matters, nothing prevents us from simply refuting everything Erzberger said. For me, Erzberger is important not as a collector of information, but as an intermediary. If serious proposals or requests come to us from the enemy side, I will, of course, immediately send a message to His Majesty and wait for the highest orders. However, I consider it my duty not to bring to the attention of His Majesty all obviously false, dubious and unverified reports. ZIMMERMANN SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN STATE Telegram No. 771 Berlin, April 28, 1917 At today's meeting of the Reichstag Committee of Social

FOREIGN

DEL

--

the democratic side asked whether members of the radical minority had received permission to travel to attend the Stockholm meeting. So far I have given an evasive answer. But the Home Affairs Committee demanded a full answer by Monday, April 30. There is no need to enumerate the reasons why members of the minority should not be allowed to leave, I mentioned them again at today's meeting. But there are good political reasons why a complete denial seems unreasonable. The Social Democratic majority rightly argues that if there are no representatives of the minority in Stockholm, they will be called tools of the German government and they will not be able to do anything. The socialists of England will benefit from this, and the sharp protests of the minority,

which will undoubtedly still be heard in the German Reichstag, will further increase the propaganda value of the Entente cause. From the domestic political point of view, such an aggravated democratic and radical struggle against our government is also unprofitable for the lamas. On the other hand, if one representative of the minority is given permission to leave, the German Social Democrats will have a trump card in their hands against the Entente countries, which, most likely, will release only Social Democrats loyal to them.

For these reasons, it seems reasonable to me to grant permission for a member of the minority to leave. As a suitable candidate, they named the famous Ledebour⁹³, who is reliable ... ⁹⁴

The "government socialist" David⁹⁵ urged me to privately apply for permission to travel to the members of the working commission. He thinks that in Stockholm he can take their side. Issuing permission later, when most

of the principal causes of violence no less will be forced to go with the minority, will force the representatives of the majority to listen more sensitively to our wishes, and not meet them with sharp opposition, as is the case now. I ask that a report be made to General Ludendorff in this regard, that he be advised to issue travel permits to the members of the working committee and tell them that I have also contacted the Minister of War on this matter. The Minister of War not only not... ⁹⁶
ZIMMERMANN STATE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
THE GERMAN

TO THE MESSENGER IN

STOCKHOLM Telegram No. 622 Berlin,

May 1, 1917 According to the Petrograd telegraph agency, a demonstration of the "wounded and maimed" directed against Lenin took place in Petrograd, in which more than 50,000 people supposedly took part, demanding the continuation of the war. Please

provide details as soon as possible. ZIMMERMANN

THE GERMAN

MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM

-- TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

Telegram No. 742 May 2, 1917, 2:00

pm Received: May 2,

6:56 pm Reply to

telegram No. 622 Herr von Heidenstam considers that the report apparently corresponds to reality, since both the political line pursued by Lenin and his peace propaganda is completely independent, and it is thus in sharp opposition to the government. According to a report received today from the telegraph agency, he was summoned on this occasion to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. There were large demonstrations for peace, organized

by students at the Kazan Cathedral, where harsh speeches were made against England and the United States and more moderate ones against France. The assassination of General Kachalinsky is considered a significant event, as he was a representative of the new government. Anarchy is on the rise. LUCIUS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

FOREIGN

MINISTRY

AT STATE -- IN THE GERMAN MFA Telegram No 687

Headquarters, May 7, 1917, 12.15 Received:

13.30 Urgent! For

Herr

Chancellor In addition to the

telephone report. Commander-in-Chief to the Supreme
Eastern armies telegraphed
to the High Command:

Report of Army Intelligence Officer Eichhorn⁹⁷

on a conversation with two Russian delegates south of the

Dvina Both delegates said that on May 4 two couriers had been sent to Petersburg in order to force Steklov,⁹⁸ Chkheidze's first deputy, to come to the front, since the latter could not leave the city. Steklov, they say, is inclined to compromise, and therefore he considers it important that our side also expel a member of the party. When

asked how our propaganda is perceived, the deputy replied that they could not agree to annexations. If the Germans agree with this, then the Russians have no need to pander to the Entente - they will then conclude a separate peace. For the surplus of prisoners of war, Russia requires monetary compensation.

In response to the intelligence officer's remark about our large occupation area and the large number of Russian prisoners, it was quite obvious at the request of the delegates that Russia would not strictly adhere to the point put forward at the beginning about the unacceptability of annexations on our part. He had in mind that in the course of diplomatic negotiations at the conclusion of peace, a unity of opposing opinions could finally be achieved. Further, questions were discussed about a general peace conference, the convocation of which Russia should take care of. The deputies asked if the intelligence officer would follow the invitation to Petrograd under Russian protection, to which the intelligence officer remarked that all important meetings should take place on no man's land so that each representative could communicate with his government. To the Austrian proposal, the deputies replied that the parties were unanimous that Galicia, of course, should be released. The deputy went on to say that the confiscation of German private property begun under the old government had been suspended by the new government. The Committee will see to it that the civilian population deported from Germany is sent back to their homeland and that, until then, their conditions

of captivity are eased as much as possible, since "they were only doing their duty."

Addition of the Commander of the Eastern Front: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take this point into account: by the exchange of internees, we will prove the seriousness of our aspirations to improve relations. Further, the delegates said: In Russia, the question of who started the war first has receded into the background. The only topical issue for the entire country is the speedy conclusion of peace. To my assurances that we had no intention of launching an offensive, the delegate replied that the Russian side was also not planning anything of the kind. The drawdown of Russian troops is purely preventive in nature and is being done in opposition to the drawdown of German troops, of which they have received a message. When discussing this issue, it again became obvious that the enterprise in Stokhod aroused distrust on the Russian side. The liaison officer asked for clarification regarding the radio transmission of April 30 about Alekseev's promise to Hay (Alekseev promises the Englishman that the Russian army will launch an offensive).

The intelligence officer further remarked that an agreement could only be reached when both great nations understood that they themselves must regulate their internal affairs, without the interference of outsiders. The Delegate fully agreed with this statement and said:

"If we wanted to achieve the overthrow of the Kaiser, then logically we should have achieved the same in England and Italy. As one Russian said: if I have a grumpy wife who is sick of me, I drive her away, but I can't demand from a neighbor that he drive away his wife, with whom he lives in harmony and harmony.

In discussing the issue of a separate peace, the delegate expressed his doubts about Japan. After discussing this issue, the delegate said that Russia should get peace, and not start a new war.

The deputy asked to come only at the written invitation of the Council. Recent attempts to negotiate with officers with white flags, he said, serve only to satisfy curiosity, and therefore undesirable.

The deputy of the Russian army, Romm, who does not want to negotiate with the Germans, is not familiar to the deputies. They do not like his statements in leaflets, but they said: "Our opinion does not matter, there will always be such people."

The MP also said that the attitude towards Germany is getting better every day. General

Ludendorff asks Your Excellency to appoint a reliable Social Democrat and a member of the National Party (as a counterweight, for example, a Conservative) to participate in the negotiations. On the military side, the candidacy of the former military attaché in Paris, Colonel von Winterfeldt (now Chief Quartermaster in Mitau), who enjoys the full confidence of Your Excellency, is being considered as the leader of the negotiations. Perhaps Your Excellency will give him a young diplomat who would be in the know. As for the place for negotiations, the general considers that neutral territory is excluded. You can

consider Mi-tava, Riga, or some place between the front lines, where telegraph communications would be laid for negotiations.

I communicated Your Excellency's considerations regarding the incorporation of Lithuania and Courland with their own duke to General Ludendorff. He will contact the Colonel about this. The word "annexations" should be replaced by the word "correction of borders".

The General wants to know Your Excellency's opinion. LERSNER101
Telegram No. 848

CHANCELER TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT STATE Berlin,
May 7, 1917 To telegram
No. 687 I agree with the

appointment of Colonel von Winterfeldt as the head of negotiations. I also fully agree to involve a Social Democrat, presumably Deputy David, who showed understanding in the problem of "correcting the ~~beginning~~ ^{beginning} in relation to Russia" and a member of some bourgeois party. Measures related to this have already begun. Herr von Winterfeldt will be assigned Privy Councilor von Rosenberg as an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In choosing the place of negotiations, I would rather prefer Mitava or some place between the front lines than Riga, since there our representatives would be exposed to unnecessary danger of assassination attempts by British agents. The aim of the negotiations should be, in addition to the points already established in previous exchanges of opinion, the settlement of trade relations (for example, by coming to an agreement that the old German-Russian treaty is extended for an indefinite period, until the conclusion of a new treaty by both parties), as well as the settlement of the issue of compensation losses. For this purpose, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposes provisionally the following wording:

"Each party to the treaty shall indemnify the other party for losses which have been caused to it in its territory during the war, in respect of life, health or property, in violation of the rules of war; the indemnification shall be made through the intermediary of a mixed commission composed of representatives of both parties, under the direction of neutral person." The question of the exchange of civilian prisoners is under consideration. Proposals at the talks will be made by a representative of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. An appropriate message will be made.

In order to avoid the use of the word "annexation" and the equally unpleasant expression "correction of borders" in communication with the Russians, it seems to me reasonable to consider the consideration proposed by telephone: to gild the Russians for the rejection of Courland and Lithuania, making them supposedly independent states that will receive internal autonomy and own government, but militarily, politically and economically will be attached to us.

BETHMANN-HOLVEG

ZIMMERMAN

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT STATE -- IN

THE GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 706 Headquarters,

May 9, 1917, 14.15

Received: 15.40 General

Ludendorff telegraphed to telegram No. 848 to the commander of the Eastern Front: "1.

Russian proposal to negotiate with Steklov 2. Mitava or a place in the area of the 8th

Army between the front lines was offered to the Russians as a place for negotiations. Negotiations in a neutral place could probably be influenced. A place on the Russian front line should be rejected because of the risk of English attacks At the place of negotiations, you can make a telegraph [communication] for

communications from both sides with their governments.

3. On the German side, the head of the negotiations is Colonel von Winterfeldt and the command of the 8th Army, the participant in the negotiations is the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the delegate of the Social Democrats David and the representative of the bourgeois party, who has yet to be chosen. These three negotiators will leave immediately and report their arrival to Mitava to the command of the 8th Army. 4. The basis of the negotiations

are the directives of April 29, 1-3016 secret. 5. In addition, the following issues will be

discussed: a) settlement of trade relations; supply of German grain at a reduced price; b) damages settlement;

c) termination of the confiscation of German private property by Russia and compensation for losses; d)

compensation for the maintenance of prisoners of war and the exchange, taking into account their need for the Germans before

world peace; e) exchange of civilian prisoners. More detailed proposals will be made by a representative

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6. The Russians should make it easier to give up the lands of

Courland and Lithuania in the following way: a) referring to the fact that otherwise Russia will be required to pay compensation for more than 1 million prisoners of war still with us.

b) emphasizing, in the process of their accession to Germany, our intention to continue to respect the national aspirations of Lithuanians and Courlanders. Lithuanians should not be divided. The

definitions "annexation" and "rectification of borders" should be avoided.

7. The

question of convening a general peace conference is not subject to discussion. Germany and Russia themselves will come to terms with each other as

soon as

possible."

TO BERGEN AT THE GERMAN

MFA May 9,

1917 Dear Mr. Bergen¹⁰², Mr. von Romberg would be very grateful to be informed whether your Russian connections are limited to Lenin and his group alone, or whether they include the leading Socialist-Revolutionaries (Chernov and his colleagues) . If you yourself are not sufficiently informed on this matter, Mr. von Romberg would be grateful for immediate inquiries. He is extremely interested

in a speedy reply and asks to be telegraphed¹⁰³. Yours and others.

SCHUBERT

MEMORANDUM OF

THE GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE

MISSIONS IN BERN

May 9, 1917

The following report has been received from Chiasso from Mr. Bayer¹⁰⁴ on support for the peace movement in Russia, dated 4 May.

I had the opportunity to talk in Zurich with various groups of Russian emigrants. What I heard and saw there confirmed the report I sent the other day after conversations with Dr. Shklovsky¹⁰⁵ and P. Axelrod¹⁰⁶ and added new information. I cautiously probed a number of

representatives of various groups of the pacifist wing of the socialists, and they said that it would be highly desirable that a systematic, intense and effective agitation for peace be supported by some well-known neutral comrades. After

they showed a clear, and I would say, joyful readiness to accept financial support precisely for work in favor of peace, I said that, for my part, I would be happy to provide a significant amount for such a noble, humane and international goal. Moreover, the Russian Revolution has made such a splendid impression and awakened such noble impulses that others I know will be only too happy to donate large sums to support the Russian Revolution, helping to bring about an immediate peace. All these proposals were accepted with great pleasure. The complaint was repeated that the parties and groups opposed to the war had less money at their disposal than those who supported the war, since the latter controlled the public finances. English gold plays an important role, and the Entente spends colossal sums to support the war effort and to bribe influential people. Therefore, they would be happy if large sums could be provided to the supporters of peace from wealthy comrades and friends. As regards peace, almost everyone with whom I spoke was less interested in a general peace, concluded simultaneously and with the consent of the other countries of the Entente, than in an immediate peace at any cost, i.e., a separate peace with Germany and Austria. After that, the question of ways and means by which support for peaceful propaganda would be obtained by Russia and implemented for the intended purpose crystallized and a number of specific points: 1. The identity of the donor ensures that the money comes from a source that does not arouse suspicion; 2. The donor or person transferring money, according to official or semi-official recommendations, must be

allowed to enter Russia with this money; 3.

Since the money will have to be used immediately, it is necessary to have them in cash, and not in the form of letters of credit, which will be difficult to sell without attracting attention. The Swiss currency would be the easiest, most efficient and least visible to convert into any liquid and useful form. The question of the

distribution of funds among the various parties, groups and individuals to whom a share of the subsidy for campaigning for peace should be given has already been discussed. They all

showed that there is a willingness to accept support for the goal under discussion and that, on the one hand, since the proposal comes from me, this removes all their doubts and objections, despite the fact that, on the other hand, it was clear that my personal

contacts with officials in local government circles are considered a great advantage in the practical implementation of the project.

NASSE107 SECRETARY
OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO GERMAN Y IN STOCKHOLM Telegram
No 227 Berlin, May

9, 1917 Dr. Helphand, well known during the Russian Revolution of 1905 under the pseudonym "Parvus", rendered us a number of important services during the war, especially working under the imperial aftermath in Copenhagen and putting pressure on the Danish trade unions in a direction extremely favorable to us. Since that time, Dr. Gelfand has been given Prussian citizenship. He is now traveling via Copenhagen to Stockholm, where he plans to arrive in the next few days to work in our interests at the upcoming socialist congress. He will try to establish contacts with the Swedish trade unions as well. I would ask Your Excellency to be kind to Dr.

Helphand, who will telephone the embassy, and to render him all possible assistance.

GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN THE HAGUE TO THE CHANCELER
Report No 2026 May 18,

1917 Among the Russians living in Holland, there are about 2,600 peaceful refugees and 300 soldiers from German prisoner-of-war camps in Rotterdam alone - there is noticeable discontent

local Russian administration, and a certain part of these people sympathize with the Russian revolution.

An opportunity has now presented itself to establish contact with representatives of this group, and it seems that, as we thought, in this case the current situation can be used to advantage to achieve our political goals. We are talking about a

certain Vladimir Futran. He apparently escaped from the POW camp in Deberica. He is a revolutionary of the Lenin group and, although he does not have a complete education, gives the impression of an intelligent person. Of course, it is

impossible to immediately determine how sincere his revolutionary convictions are, what are the motives for his actions and what proportion of them are self-affirmation and material interest. In general, he gives the impression of a political fanatic, thirsting for revenge for injustice against himself or the class to which he belongs.

During the first confidential meeting between him and Dr. Wiechert, which took place on no man's land, Footran had some very useful ideas, which, if we add our considerations to them, add up to a definite plan:

1. Futran, in cooperation with like-minded people, organizes the "Russian Peace League in Holland". This League will openly agitate for the immediate commencement of peace negotiations by the Russians and, accordingly, oppose the British policy of continuing the war, against British imperialism and against British interference in Russia. All this will be carried out through the Dutch press, as well as through leaflets and other literature in Dutch and Russian.

2. The ten Russian revolutionary agitators who will not be engaged in the planned activities in this country will, after taking all the necessary precautions, be allowed to go to Stockholm for the conference, and from there, perhaps further to Russia. These people will need to keep in touch with the Peace League in Holland and supply it with the necessary materials.
3. Agitation among Russian prisoners of war

in Germany and Austria can begin with the Peace League. Such agitation may be aimed at helping those elements within Russia who

are of interest to us at the moment; for example, the Lenin group. On the other hand, agitation can be carried out with no less benefit without a specific task, simply counting on the role that two million returning prisoners of war will play. It will be necessary to carefully develop ways to implement campaign ideas, disseminate them and control them. At present, it does not seem necessary to address this issue in detail.

In the meantime, Futran presented the first evidence of his abilities as a journalist and propagandist. The article from the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (May 14, 1917), which I enclose, ends with a violent attack on England; it was immediately reprinted by the Hague newspaper Het Vaterland (May 15). This article is the direct result of the relationship that has developed between the author and your obedient servant. We strongly encourage Mr. Futran to take further actions, but at the same time we

keep him dependent on us so that we can influence the above-mentioned aspects at our discretion.

plan.

If, after this promising start, he achieves a position in the Dutch press and sets the Peace League on its feet, then the game will already be worth the candle. And the aforementioned plan probably opens up even more possibilities. In view of the circumstances described

above, I venture to propose to Your Excellency the following: to give me the authority to take advantage of the opportunity presented and to give the money necessary for Mr. Foutran to carry on agitation among his compatriots in Holland (which, if possible, should include as many people as possible) and for his work in the Dutch press. It is unlikely that more than 600 guilders will be needed for the first month, and this month will be considered as a trial period. However, these actions may well reach an unexpectedly large scale quickly, and that is why I would be grateful for a large amount of money from the very beginning - say, 3 or 4 thousand guilders.

I will have the honor to report to Your Excellency at regular intervals on the further development of this matter and on the practical implementation of it after the trial period.

ROSEN
THE GERMAN MESSENGER
TO BULGARIA -- TO THE GERMAN
MFA Telegram No5 May 21, 1917,
20.40 Received:

22.55 This afternoon [General] Dragomirov confirmed in writing the receipt of a letter from the commander of the eastern front. There is nothing more to be expected from him in the coming days. The deputies who wanted Steklov's visit seem to have achieved nothing so far. Therefore, Colonel von Winterfeldt and both of our delegates are leaving tomorrow or the day after tomorrow for Mitava or Berlin. I will be at the Foreign

Ministry on

Wednesday afternoon. ROSENBERG
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE IMPERIAL COURT

Telegram No. 1010 Berlin, May 29, 1917 said that if things went on like this, we would have to decide whether we should just remain spectators or go on the offensive.

Radoslavov also talked about this with my Austro-Hungarian colleague, who informed me that he agreed with Radoslavov and that, if, of course, we had sufficient forces at our disposal, we should announce to Russia the deadlines after which we would cease to consider our peace guarantees binding on myself.

Dobrovich, the head of the Privy Council (he is believed to express the opinion of His Majesty), when I turned to him for clarification, advised me to adhere to the line of active action, saying that Russia had been enjoying a truce for quite a long time and would not be tempted to offer a separate peace.

King Ferdinand and M. Radoslavov will probably raise these questions during their forthcoming visit.

"But I still am of the opinion that we should not attack, since this will rally all the elements in Russia in the struggle against us. On the other hand, I seems to be worth deciding whether to stop

for a while, negotiations between the trenches on the front lines, citing the Russians as a reason that we do not expect any result from these negotiations, since the Provisional Government, under pressure from France and England, decided to continue the war. This must be told to them in such a way that they do not suspect us of our intention to go over to the offensive. ZIMMERMANN Telegram No 938
CHANCELER -- AT THE

GERMAN

FOREIGN MINISTRY

Bern, May 29, 1917, 23.30 Received:

May 30, 4.45 Top secret! Councilor of State Hoffman
today read me a telegram

from Councilor Grimm from St. Petersburg, forwarded to him through the Swiss envoy. "Influential circles in St. Petersburg understand that for reasons of a political, military and economic nature, peace

must be concluded. France is slowing down this process, England is hindering it. In the near future, one should count on increased pressure on the peace movement. The question of a working conference in Stockholm is developing Only the advance of Germany can prevent the development of affairs in Russia towards peace. Therefore, he, Grimm, asks adviser

Hoffmann to inform him of our military goals (if Hoffmann knows them), so that he can continue his activities in St. Petersburg on the basis of these data He will stay in St. Petersburg for another ten days."

Councilor Hoffman asked me to ask Your Excellency to give him any information regarding our military objectives that he could give to Grimm. He considers it useful to continue not to break the thread that Grimm extended to significant figures in St. Petersburg. Regarding the offensive, I told Counselor Hoffman that I

I believe I can assure him that we do not think of such a thing.

Please reply by telegram. BETMAN-
HOLVEG GENERAL

LUDENDORFF -- FOREIGN AFFAIRS

TO STATE SECRETARY

Telegram No. 19930 Stavka, May 30, 1917 I am sending

Your Excellency Colonel von Winterfeldt's report on the conversation with Reichstag member David. I believe that the Privy Councilor of the mission, von Rosenberg, had the same impression.

Most likely, Your Excellency will be able to verify by this report that Mr. David is an unsuitable candi

datura to negotiate with the Russians for peace. Above all, he lacks confidence in our future. LUDENDORFF APPENDIX M 1 Headquarters, May 27, 1917 To Mr. Chief of the General Staff of the

Army: I am enclosing Colonel von Winterfeldt's report on the conversation with Reichstag member David. David, here in Brest-Litovsk, took the opportunity to present the same ideas to me. I, just like Colonel von Winterfeldt, tried to prove to him the need to keep him here on

east, land for settlers.

I think that the study tour, reports from the leadership, inspection of sawmills and other establishments had an impact on Deputy David. HOFFMANN APPENDIX M 2 Mitau, May 24, 1917 Conversations with Reichstag Deputy David

Confidentially, Deputy

David, on the last day of our joint stay, in addition to previous conversations, exhaustively explained to me in the presence of Privy Councilor von Rosenberg and Deputy von Winterfeldt-Meyken his point of view and goals and trends within his party. At first, he stressed that his statements were strictly confidential. He assumed that Privy Councilor von Rosenberg would report the content of his statements to his superiors, and I would report to the army command. But if his statements, in which he, given the importance of our meetings, are much more frank than would be expected in normal

circumstances for the leader of the party in relations with representatives of other political currents, will become known to a wider circle, and especially among his party comrades, or will be used for propaganda purposes, then his place and influence within the party will be under serious threat.

Before summarizing Dr. David's remarks, I would like to explain what impression I have had of his position on the question of peace

days of our fellowship. I believe that Dr. David personally sincerely desires the conclusion of peace on terms favorable to the future of the German people. He is a very intelligent man and seems to be less hypnotized by dogmas and slogans than is common among members of his party. But he wants the goal for which he is ready to act to be achieved in a form consonant with socialist principles, so that he can account for his position to his party. Therefore, of course, he would like to expand the lands in the east in favor of Germany, provided that Russia does not have any claims in this regard that could affect our future relations, and that the population of the regions separated from Russia would be granted an opportunity in some form, reminiscent of the right of peoples to self-determination, to declare their agreement with the new order of things. Probably, Dr. David places great hopes on a close alliance between Germany and democratic Russia, so that with the help of the bloc thus created, he will be able to resist England. But in general, Mr. David is full of doubts about the future position of his party, as well as the future steadfastness of our allies; he highly appreciates the means of coercion and the will to win of our opponents, expresses skepticism about the practical consequences of the successes of our submarines, our economic situation seems to him very alarming, especially in terms of raw materials, and he fears that if the war drags on, next winter we can wait the worst. Therefore, in his opinion, time will not work for us in the coming months, and he considers it necessary to conclude peace as soon as possible. If the expansion of territories, to which we aspire and which he also welcomes, interferes with the achievement of this goal, then from this, according to him

opinion, should be abandoned so as not to disrupt the conclusion of peace. Therefore, in such a pessimistic frame of mind, one cannot expect Dr. David to defend our claims selflessly. He will fight like a general who thinks about retreat from the very beginning of the battle and can fall as soon as significant difficulties arise.

About the situation within his party, Dr. David spoke as follows: he personally and the leaders of the Social Democratic majority still today adhere to the position taken by v. the beginning of the war, to defend the country in the hour of danger, but to immediately extend a hand to the enemy to conclude peace, if such a peace guarantees the existence and future of the German people. Therefore, we must agree to war loans, avoid strikes and unrest, explain to the working masses the need for steadfast behavior! But he did not hide from us that as the war progressed, due to the deterioration

economic situation and

With the growing difficulties with food, it becomes increasingly difficult for the leaders of the party and trade unions to justify their positions. The voices of those who believe that the war has dragged on too long, that only the passion of certain circles for conquest frightens off our enemies and hinders peace, are heard louder and louder, but that it can't get any worse anyway, and therefore it is necessary to conclude peace as soon as possible, even at risk. make concessions and make some sacrifices. At the same time, one must also take into account the views of those who associate the collapse of the present system, the bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie, and thereby with the unfavorable outcome of the war for Germany. fulfillment of their socialist aspirations. In the face of this state of affairs, we must strive to immediately seize every opportunity for peace and in no case break off the thread of negotiations that has just begun by putting forward demands unacceptable to the enemy. But if it turns out and becomes known to the Social-Democrats - and this will undoubtedly happen along the St. Petersburg-Stockholm line - what. If there was an opportunity for peace that we destroyed by making unacceptable demands, the leaders of his party would no longer be able to keep their people in line. The party will fall apart, the leadership will leave the stage and

as a result, strikes, disturbances will begin, all this will come to the front, and as a result, the matter may end in a revolution.

Both during previous conversations and at the conclusion of our meeting, my colleagues and I tried with all our might to convince Dr. David that we have good prospects and that the most promising thing is at the decisive moment, at the moment when we are at the top, to strike our worst the enemy to the very heart, ahead of time to knock the weapon out of his hands. If, on the other hand, we overemphasize our desire for peace and our readiness for any compromises and concessions in the name of concluding peace, then our opponents will undoubtedly regard this as a sign of weakness and this will devalue all our victories. We tried to prove to Dr. David that a bad peace, even if Germany was outwardly established within its former borders, would in fact not restore the "status quo ante", but would create a weakened Germany, the possibilities of development of which would be sharply limited. Therefore, the most important task of the leaders is to explain to the workers and party members that such a situation, from a purely practical point of view, regardless of any patriotic motives, is fraught with the most terrible dangers for everyone. Now every German must decide whether he wants to provide himself and his loved ones with work, bread and prospects, or is he ready, under the pressure of a merciless enemy, to take on his shoulders the bleak fate of a people whose wings are broken. In this regard, we asked Dr. David to think also about

that, besides the members of his party, there are millions of Germans who think differently and who most of all want to achieve a peace that would ensure a happy future for Germany and would be worthy of the sacrifices made.

Although in conversations with Dr. David we discussed in detail all points and highlighted all the contradictions between the positions of both sides, these conversations, nevertheless, were conducted with observance of all formalities, in an atmosphere of mutual courtesy and goodwill. Therefore, I do not consider these negotiations completely useless. How much our arguments influenced Dr. David and how much the impressions of his trip through the occupied regions set him up in a spirit of usefulness, we will soon be able to see, at the latest in Stockholm, where Mr. David intends to depart at the end of the month.

THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN BERN TO THE GERMAN MFA

Telegram No. 956

Bern, May 30, 1917 Sent: May 31, 0.30 Received: 7.50 To telegram No.

938 Top secret!

Councilor Goffman told

me that he doubted very much that Grimm should be given positive information about our military objectives, as Grimm would then have to act as an official messenger, which his position does not favor. On the contrary, he recommended to Grimm some general guidelines that he could use to strengthen the peace party in Russia. ROMBERG SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS - TO THE MISSION IN BERN Telegram M 641 Berlin, May 31, 1917 Top secret! Reply to Telegrams Nos. 938 and 956

Your

Excellency will communicate to Councilor Hoffman in strict confidence the following

general points of our peace program with regard

to Russia, leaving him to

consider the appropriate use of these

communications with Councilor Grimm. Perhaps it would be desirable for Hoffmann to refer not to the official statement of the imperial government, but to his own impression, which he learned from numerous conversations with Your Excellency and other prominent figures in Germany. In the event that now it would come to the conclusion of peace with

Russia, we are ready to confine ourselves to the following conditions:

1. For both sides - an honorable peace as the basis of strong friendly relations between Germany and her eastern neighbor. Financial assistance to Russia in the restoration of its economy; close trade and economic ties. 2. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of Russia. 3. A

friendly agreement on Poland, Lithuania, Courland,

taking into account national characteristics, language, culture and religion of the population. When adjusting the western border of Poland, the return

occupied regions of Russia, which, in turn, returns the occupied regions to Germany's allies.

4. No opportunities for securing England on the island of Sarema, in Dago or other points in Russia. 5. Speedy exchange of prisoners of

war. Calculation of the costs of both parties to their content.

6. Exchange of civilian prisoners. free return exiled Russians of German origin.

7. Restoration of the rights of citizens of both states. Compensation for lost private property. 8. We and our allies are at any time ready to enter into

negotiations with Russia's allies at the request of the latter.

9. To ensure a detailed elaboration of the conditions for concluding peace, immediately declare a truce. We will not take the offensive as

long as there is opportunity for a peace treaty with Russia.

STATE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE AMBASSADOR IN BERN

Telegram No. 658 Berlin, June 3, 1917 To telegram

No. 967110 Secret reports

indicate that the governments of the Entente countries continue to show great concern about Russia. The spread of the idea of peace did not stop even after the recent - and only temporary - consolidation of the Provisional Government. The desperate advance of the Russian troops cannot hide the growing disorganization and unwillingness of the Russian army to fight. Lenin's peace propaganda is intensifying, and the circulation of his newspaper Pravda has already reached 300,000 copies. Military factories are either idle or produce very little products. The transport crisis is deepening and the food supply of cities is suffering as a result. Therefore, the Entente cannot count on any help from this side. ZIMMERMANN CARL I TO WILHELM II Luxembourg, June 7, 1917 Dear friend! Various authentic reports coming to me from the Russian front leave no doubt that Russia

will cease hostilities as soon as it is sure that Germany, like Austria-Hungary, will accept the status quo ante bellum. Your government's demand for a significant expansion of the borders on Russian territory caused a violent reaction in Russia and, unfortunately, rekindled military passions. I know that you, like me, want the end of this accursed war, and I am sure that you would be ready to neutralize Russia at any cost, as this would guarantee us a certain victory. Unfortunately, I cannot hide from you that the situation here is getting more and more complicated and the population of my state - especially the non-German majority - is becoming more and more perplexed why we do not end the war. While people thought that we could not end the war, they put up with it, but now it seems to them that there is a possibility of reaching an agreement with Russia, and that Germany's demands rule out this possibility.

Dear friend, you know me and my intentions, you know that I desire one thing, to bring the war to an end acceptable to both our states, but I would be disingenuous in front of you if I did not openly say that this new phase of the resumption of the Russian war inspires me with serious concerns. You and I discussed the topic of the dynastic moment and the European revolution and, it seems to me, we understood each other perfectly. I once again call on you, in the name of the dynastic principle, to do everything together with me to end the war, and I ask you to convey to your government that together with us it can make an offer to Petersburg to make peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum.

If Russia makes a separate peace or unofficially withdraws from the war, Italy will soon follow. But then I will have a large number of troops freed up, which I can use in Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey, while you could again draw up significant forces to your western front. Peace with Russia is the key to the situation. After

its conclusion, the war will quickly come to a favorable end for us. I am sending you with this letter Captain Fleishman, seconded to the Eastern Department. I kiss the hand of the Empress. With the most cordial greetings,
your devoted friend KARL

STATS SECRETARY

FOREIGN

DEL

--

HINDENBURG112

Berlin, June 7, 1917 Top

secret Concerning

Message No. 19930 of May 30 I

have the honor to return to Your Highness the message from Colonel von Winterfeldt and the message from the Commander of the Eastern Front about the conversation with Reichstag Deputy Dr. David. The statements of Colonel von Winterfeldt agree

with my own point of view and with the impressions given to me by Privy Councilor von Rosenberg. It follows from them that Dr. David is inclined to emphasize, in judging our situation and in evaluating our prospects, the least favorable moments. In particular, he is disturbed by the consideration that the disruption of the possibility of concluding peace due to incompetence

Documenting

hard German demands could lead to a break with our allies and, coupled with economic difficulties, create anti-war sentiments among workers whose leaders are no longer able to cope with them. On the other hand, it is significant that Dr. David strongly welcomes the expansion of power and territories, if it is possible to carry them out without continuing the war. He only wishes that socialist aspirations, in particular the right of peoples to self-determination, be taken into account as far as possible. But this desire is explained not so much by doctrinaire considerations as by the assumption that the implementation of our demands in this way is quite possible and will not complicate our future relations with neighboring states. For Dr. David, the interests of the fatherland are undoubtedly more important than the interests of the party and its doctrines. He knows that the future of the Reich, and not least the well-being of the working class, depends on the outcome of the war, and he is clearly prepared to do everything in his power to promote a favorable outcome. Therefore, I believe that of all the delegates of the Social Democratic Party, it is with Dr. David that the least inconvenience will be associated with the peace negotiations.

Whether the participation of socialists in peace negotiations is generally desirable is another matter. In principle, I would answer this question in the negative, and I already expressed my point of view on this issue in mid-April to the government of Austria-Hungary. When Your Highness in a telegram of May 7 asked me to name a Social Democrat for talks on the Eastern Front, I put aside all my doubts, since the Russian deputies on the Desna stressed that Steklov allegedly wanted to talk with a German party comrade. However, judging by the state of affairs, negotiations with Steklov are unlikely to take place, so that the mission of both of our deputies sent to the Eastern Front can be considered completed for the time being. If the Russian side makes serious attempts to start negotiations, I would recommend thinking about whether it is possible to do without the participation of deputies if possible. In case this fails, if - at the request of the Russians - we have to involve parliamentary representatives, it is unlikely that we will be able to do without the Social Democratic Party. In this case, I would recommend, for the above reasons, to return to the candidacy of Dr. David. ZIMMERMANN THE GERMAN ENVISOR IN STOCKHOLM TO THE STATE

SECRETARY

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS June

15, 1917 Scheidemann was received

yesterday by the envoy,
who, for his

part, also wanted to meet him. I saw Mr. Lindman¹¹³ immediately afterwards, and he expressed to me his deep respect "for this wise and intelligent man." Lindman believes that the most important thing is the continuation of negotiations; It doesn't matter whether in Petrograd or here, with the Scheidemann group or with the minority. I now, like Janson, Baake and others, think that direct contact between our socialists and Russian representatives is necessary. In fact, it doesn't matter that the Russians—which is quite natural—prefer to talk to Kautsky¹¹⁴ & Co. Since Branting, as might be expected, behaved in a hostile manner during the discussions, it would be wise to exclude him altogether from future negotiations in which the majority party will participate. We will convince both the Russians and our

socialists in that Branting is not really a socialist at all, but a capitalist in disguise, that he has a lot of money, he loves champagne and leads a wild life. The local Russians and Germans can see for themselves at any moment.

A representative of the Russian Council of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies has finally arrived here - and this is very good. His name is Weinberg¹¹⁵. Our socialists postponed their departure because of this. Probably a small delegation will stay here anyway. I think that the French and the British, seeing that we are really negotiating with the Russians directly and without the mediation of third parties, will get worried and will do everything possible to, in spite of all obstacles, take part in the conference. I cannot believe that the French government will manage to keep its socialists out of the conference, here or in Petrograd, by refusing their passports. The strikes in France have already taken on a revolutionary character, and the propertied classes are beginning to show serious unrest. Wallenberg, with whom I am in direct contact because of his excellent connections with the highest banking circles in London and Paris, is fond of saying that a Frenchman would rather let himself be shot than give up his money. According to Lindman, the most unfavorable factor is the situation in England. Lloyd George¹¹⁶ is absolutely indifferent to the fact that the continuation of the war may lead to revolution and the overthrow of the monarchy. Lindman even believes that Lloyd George yes

strives for this, and not only in England, but in all other monarchical states.

Your Excellency will receive detailed information about the events here from Janson. Although there has been little progress in the preliminary talks, I am sure that the machine is spinning and we will establish direct contacts with the Russians, and Branting will not be able to prevent this. [...]¹¹⁷

Yours, etc., LUCIUS

Feld did not reach an agreement. The Bolsheviks, who reject any proposal of cooperation with the "social patriots", are outraged that the German left socialists want to negotiate with the "social patriots" - supporters of the Entente. The newspaper commented on this as follows:

"The participation of German social patriots in this 'work for peace' is, of course, very unpleasant for them, but in order to have the pleasure of meeting with the fathers of the Russian offensive, they are ready - protesting, of course - to agree even to this misfortune. The Russian workers would like to know what is the attitude of the Spartak group to this decision taken by the independents.

According to reports from Petrograd, in the local newspapers, and also from other sources, it is clear that the influence of Lenin's group has unfortunately diminished. In voting on the decision of confidence in the Provisional Government - a decision that more or less put an end to discussions in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies - the Bolsheviks, with the support of the Social Democrats, internationalists and Ukrainians, collected only 126 votes, while the majority had 543 votes. The weakening of the influence of the Bolsheviks is caused partly by the offensive, and partly by the unusual demands of the Lenin group. These demands, the most extreme of which is the expropriation of large capitalist concerns (especially all banks and large industrial and commercial enterprises) and large landed property, are aimed at separating all the peoples that were part of the empire from Russia and forming them into independent republics. However, it must be added that the Bolsheviks have somewhat changed their position on the Ukrainian question and now they demand only greater autonomy for Ukraine, but not complete separation. "Pravda" of June 28 writes:

"The failure of the policy of the Provisional Government and its coalition cabinet is more obvious day by day. The "Universal", published by the Ukrainian Central Council and adopted by the All-Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress on June 11, is documentary evidence of this failure. This act says: "The Ukrainian people must have the right to dispose of their own life in their own country, without separating from Russia and without breaking away from the Russian state. Only our Ukrainian Assembly has the right to adopt laws guaranteeing order in Ukraine, laws relating to the maintenance of order in the entire Russian state must be adopted by the All-Russian Parliament. "This is a very expressive statement. It clearly says that the

Ukrainian people at the present time do not want to secede from

Russia. He demands autonomy, but in no way disputes the necessity or sovereignty of the "All-Russian Parliament".

It is noteworthy that the Petrograd Council of Cossacks spoke out against the secession of Ukraine. Although most of the Cossacks come from Ukraine and although they have always attached importance to a certain degree of autonomy, they nevertheless understand that historically they are an integral part of the Russian army. Moreover, they have played such an important and glorious role in the struggle against the liberal and democratic forces that staged revolutions that one can hardly expect them to sympathize with the parties that seek to divide Russia. I

have the honor to enclose a clipping from the Helsinki newspaper Volna, which sharply criticizes STOBBE's offensive.

revolutionaries. He says that the influence of Lenin and other peace groups continues to grow,

despite all the statements to the contrary appearing in the press of the Entente countries. The offensive took place only because the Americans and the British made it a condition for the provision of money and raw materials, in particular cotton. The soldiers were succeeded in rousing them to the offensive only by saying that they can see for themselves that the negotiations that began immediately after the revolution did not lead to the conclusion of peace, while a successful offensive can quickly and definitely lead to this goal. Disappointment has already set in, and it will result in further disintegration of the army, which has already reached such a degree, even before the offensive, that the military, through the mouth of Brusilov¹²⁵, assert that the complete disintegration of the armed forces can only be prevented by an immediate offensive. To this it should be added: this year there was a poor harvest. Russians living in Stockholm claim that only 30% of the area cultivated before the war was sown this year. Gelfand considers this an exaggeration, but thinks that the real figure is unlikely to exceed 50%.

Helphand also told me, asking me to keep it a strict secret, that at the congress, which will begin in Stockholm in mid-August, the Russians will not allow the question of those responsible for the war to be discussed. They want not to argue, but to do useful work for the preparation of the world. Likewise, they don't want to be pulled in

into a discussion of French claims to Alsace-Lorraine, and hope that this issue can also be circumvented. However, at the moment we must try very hard so that the British do not sniff out anything in advance and do not interfere with the presence of the French Helphand was

summoned for 18 hours, according to

instructions 126 52751 of the Operations Department,

Lieutenant Colonel von Heften, I ask you to

convey to General Ludendorff the following: the execution of order 1a 4000 given to the command of the Eastern Front and the Mackensen army group¹²⁷ will mean a new offer of peace to Russia or in the end will be interpreted as such by the Russian press and Russian public opinion. I don't think the moment is right for such a move. If our counter-offensive is strong enough to make the current rulers of Russia fear its continuation, then they - or, if they fall, their successors - will themselves try to negotiate with us. If it is not strong enough, then these steps, taken in extreme haste, can only hurt. Therefore, I would be very grateful if the statement being prepared would be temporarily postponed and if General Ludendorff would give me an opportunity to express my opinion before he formulates new principles for conducting propaganda at the front. We must be very careful that the literature with which we seek to intensify the process of disintegration within Russia does not give exactly the opposite results. This is especially true of separatist movements, which are looked at very sideways. Ukrainians, for example, reject the idea of a complete separation from Russia. Any open statement in favor of an independent Ukraine coming from us will undoubtedly be used by enemies to discredit existing nationalist movements as being inspired by the Germans.

MICHAELIS
THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN
COPENHAGEN -- TO THE GERMAN MFA

Telegram No. 1044 August 10, 1917 Sent:

August 11, 12:40 pm Received: August 11, 5:45 pm

m.

On July 20, the Russian newspaper Rech announced that two German officers of the General Staff named Shigitsky and Lubers had told the Russian ensign Yermolenko¹²⁸ that Lenin was a German agent. It also says that Yakov Furstenberg [Ganetsky] and Dr. Gelfand (Parvus) are also German agents acting as intermediaries between the Bolsheviks and the German imperial government. I consider it necessary, first, to find out whether there are officers Shigitsky and Lubers in the General Staff,¹²⁹

and then, if at all possible, to categorically refute the report of Rech.

Rech also states that, according to telegraph reports from Copenhagen, Haase, a German Social Democrat and member of the Reichstag, said in a conversation with a Russian journalist that Helphand was an intermediary between the government and the Russian Bolsheviks and gave them money.

Please inform me by telegraph. BROKDORFRANZAU

NOTA TRAUTMANN

August 15, 1917 Today I

suggested to Herr

Ebert that he send a man to Stockholm to take advantage of a possible disappointment: the Russians. He agrees with me and will get down to business immediately.

Ebert informed me that a general conference of the Social Democrats of the Central Powers would be held in Vienna and that they would jointly issue an important message. Ebert does

not have much confidence in the firmness of the position of the social democratic parties of our opponents with regard to their governments, and also to the French. But he hopes that in these countries too the wave of the peaceful movement will irresistibly overwhelm the i-parties as well.

In today's article in Vorverts,¹³⁰ our Social Democrats declared their readiness to negotiate with the Russians in

non-representative parliament. T.
RAUTHMANN

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE GERMAN MESSENGER
IN COPENHAGEN Telegram No. 608 Berlin, August 18, 1917 To

telegram No. 1044 At our instigation, the suspicion that
Lenin is a German agent is
vigorously refuted in Switzerland and Sweden. Thus, the impression of this
message, allegedly coming from German officers, is destroyed. The claim allegedly
made by Haase is denied. BUSCHE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN FOREIGN

REPRESENTATIVES OF

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN STAFF Telegram No. 1610
Berlin,

September 29, 1917 For the information of the Supreme DEL --
High Command of the Army The military operations
on the Eastern Front, prepared on a large scale and
carried out with success, are greatly aided by intense subversive
activities within Russia, organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs affairs. We
are interested, first of all, in the greatest possible development of nationalist and
separatist aspirations and the support of revolutionary elements. We have been doing
this for quite a long time in full accordance with the instructions of the Political
Department of the General Staff in Berlin (Captain von Huelsen131). Our joint work
has brought tangible

fruit.

Without our constant support, the Bolshevik movement could never have
achieved the scope and influence it now has. Everything points to the fact that this
movement will continue to grow, as well as the Finnish and Ukrainian separatist
movements. According to the latest reports received here, the situation in Russia is
such that a country whose economic life is shaken, and which is held together
only by the efforts of British agents, can fall apart as a result of any sufficiently strong
external shock. A specialist from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is very
knowledgeable in the Russian question, said that the influence

England depends on the condition of the railway between Petrograd and Haparanda, which can only be used by passenger trains and mail. As the Supreme High Command knows, preparations

for the Finns' uprising are in full swing and receive significant support. However, it is unlikely that the Finns will last the whole winter if they become disillusioned with us in the autumn and again become dependent on Russia due to the lack of food expected in the spring.

On the other hand, given the weakness of the Russians, it can be expected that the Finnish uprising will break out now and be successful if we keep the confidence of the Finns in our help (a feeling that serves our interests), by occupying the Åland Islands, dominating the Gulf of Bothnia, and forcing the Russian Supreme the high command to withdraw part of the troops stationed in Finland, increasing pressure on them at the front¹³². KYLMANGAE THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM -- TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY Telegram No 1796

November 8, 1917,

17.05. Received: November 8, 20.10

expenses. Ritzler. LUCIUS THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM-- TO THE GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 1794

November 8,

1917, 17.45 Received: 21.45 I strongly recommend that no statements of friendly agreement with

Russia be

published in the German and Austrian

press. Friendly relations with the imperial countries

cannot become the slogan of the Bolsheviks. They

can justify peace

with Germany only by relying on the will of the people and considering the desperate situation of Russia. Moreover, I am assured from all sides that, in view of their present position, the Russians will be able to explain the expressions;

friendship on the part of Germany [two words deleted] by the weakness of our position before the British. It would be wise for the press

showed restraint, especially because the extent of the victory of the Bolsheviks is still not exactly known, since the Telegraph Agency is in their hands. LUCIUS

SECRETARY

OF FOREIGN STATES TO THE REPRESENTATIVE DEL --
OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE AT STATES

Telegram No. 1748 Berlin, November 9, 1917. It is believed here that the greatest restraint should be exercised. The press received instructions. In view of received; messages, it would be imprudent of us to make proposals for peace at the front. In the case of proposals of a general nature put forward by the enemy, they should be accepted and nothing else. According to further reports from Stockholm, the Bolsheviks stated that the new

government could only remain in power if it achieved a ceasefire in the near future. If such a message comes from the front, I would ask you to inform me immediately; of course, the Supreme High Command of the Army will immediately receive a message about similar proposals received through other channels. I suggest that any cease-fire negotiations by the army be conducted in the presence of a representative of the Foreign Office and, accordingly, any preliminary peace talks by the Foreign Office be conducted in cooperation with the army. Please let me know if this offer is accepted. Kühlmann STATE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS --TO THE MINISTER

FINANSOV

Berlin, November 9, 1917

Based on discussions with Ambassador von Bergen and Ministerial Director Schroeder, I have the honor to ask Your Excellency to grant the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the sum of 15 million marks for political propaganda in Russia, attributing the costs by par. 6 section 2 of the special budget. Depending on the course of events, I reserve the right to apply to Your Excellency for further sums in the future. I would be grateful for an immediate reply134.

KUHLMANN

FOREIGN MINISTER REPRESENTATIVE AT STATES IN THE
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY Telegram

No 1628 November 9, 1917,

20.00 Received: November 9, 20.30 General Ludendorff sent the
following telegram to the command of the Eastern Front and to Generals
Mackensen, von Seeckt¹³⁵ and von Cramon (for

General von Arts)): "According to intercepted radiograms, a revolution
broke out in Petrograd, during which, it is believed, the Soviet of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies won. The Soviet, apparently, is trying to prevent the
withdrawal of troops from the front to Petrograd. Nevertheless, the victory of
the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies soldiers' deputies is desirable
from our point of view. Therefore, I ask that the intercepted radio messages
be used to promote this victory." LERSNER FOREIGN

MINISTER

OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY --

TO THE CHANCELER OF GERMANY

Vienna, November 10,

1917 Your Excellency, the revolution in Petrograd, which,
albeit temporarily, gave power to the hands of Lenin and his followers,
erupted earlier than we thought possible. Whether the Bolsheviks will
be able to establish themselves and hold on to power for some time, at least
like Kerensky, will become clear in the coming days. However, many things
lead me to believe that the answer will be in the affirmative.

If Lenin and the Bolsheviks manage to hold on to power, they
will have to vigorously carry out the program they have formulated.

The first place in this program is occupied by the promise to give
Russia a "democratic peace"; therefore we have evidently reached a
turning point in the question of peace.

Since I am much younger than you, I am far from thinking of taking the
initiative in my own hands or making proposals to Your Excellency, who has
much more experience. However, after many discussions of all the nuances
of the issue of peace, I have the courage to assume that Your Excellency
will consider how best to use the changed situation in Russia for our
purposes, and I consider it my duty to highlight in this letter my point of view
on the emerging

situation and present to you the conclusions which, it seems to me, from this flow out.

Whether Lenin and his colleagues will be able to hold on to power more or less for a long time is probably a question that no one can answer. That is why it is necessary to seize the moment and offer any necessary assistance so that the question of peace becomes a fait accompli. If the Leninists had succeeded in carrying out only the promised truce, even then, it seems to me, we would have won an almost complete victory in the Russian sector, since if a truce comes, the Russian army, in its present state, will rush deep into the country to be in place at redistribution of the land. Under existing conditions, a truce would cause the disappearance of the army, which could not return to the front in the near future.

From what I know about Lenin's ideas and intentions, it follows that they are primarily aimed at resuming attempts to conclude a general peace, and then, if the Western powers do not allow this, to conclude a separate peace with us. According to reports from Petrograd, Lenin had already appealed to the Western powers to obtain their consent to the conclusion of a general peace and, according to my information, gave them a very short time to respond. If, as is logical to assume, the Entente countries refuse, Lenin will have to put into practice his decision on a separate peace. However, he will be willing or able to do this only if we accept his formula "peace without annexations and indemnities."

We would, of course, contribute to such a course of events if we again announced in a sufficiently friendly manner to the people in power in Russia that we continue to adhere to the principles of peace that we formulated, that is, those that were adopted by the

Reichstag in the peace resolution. , in Herr von Kühlmann's speech, in my various speeches and in our responses to the Pope's message for peace. On the basis of these declarations by the Central Powers, and after renouncing peace without annexations and indemnities from the Western Powers, Lenin could have easily approached a separate peace with us as part of his program, and then an armistice. Since the Bolshevik program includes granting rights to the non-Russian peoples of Russia, fate of Poland, the question of the ultimate self-determination of the Courland, Lithuania and Finland can be calmly

resolved in peace talks. Our task will be to ensure that the desire to secede from Russia and move closer economically and politically to the Central Powers is expressed by these peoples themselves. Based on what I have said, I believe that we could have a useful influence on the development of events in Russia if we made appropriate statements as soon as possible and thereby allowed the Bolsheviks to enter into negotiations with us without fear.

As for me, I would consider the possibility of an interview, as reports from Petrograd give enough grounds for an exhaustive answer.

In view of our major military successes on the Italian front, there is now no reason to consider such statements as a sign of our weakness, and I do not see any other harmful consequences that could result from such a step. One further advantage must be added: we would cut the ground from under the feet of our socialist parties, with whom Lenin is now trying to establish relations. Lenin's desire to enter into peace negotiations with the socialist parties of the Central Powers is nothing more than an attempt to kindle a social revolution in these countries and thereby protect Russia, deprived of its now useless military apparatus. However, if we, as governments, accept the basic condition of a peace without annexations and indemnities, we thereby deprive the ground of the new socialist conference before it meets; and it seems to me important to make such a meeting superfluous.

I would be very grateful to Your Excellency for a careful consideration of the ideas I have developed and for your prompt communication of your opinion on the matter presented. In my opinion, we should not miss such a moment and miss any opportunity to end the war in the east. For the second time, we have the opportunity to quickly end the war. I doubt that this opportunity will be repeated under such favorable circumstances. I don't need to enumerate all the benefits, both military and political, that we would get, especially Germany, if we managed to finish the Russians now. On the other hand, I would like to emphasize the economic factor: breaking with

Western Powers, Russia will be forced to turn to the Central Powers for help, which will enable them to penetrate into the economic life of the country and engage in its reorganization. The implications of this for the future need no further comment. Yours, etc. CHERNIN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR FOREIGN

AFFAIRS --

TO THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM

Telegram M 1526 Berlin, November 10, 1917

To telegram M 1526136 For Rietzler

Half of the required amount will be taken on Sunday by the courier. The rest is on Tuesday. Additional amounts are available if needed. If you need to send more war loans, please let me know in small or large denominations. Send the receipt to Bergen. BUSCHE COUNSELOR OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN

COPENHAGEN

-- TO THE GERMAN

MFA Telegram No. 1329137 Copenhagen, November

10, 1917 Sent: November 11, 1917, 00:00 30 min. Received:

November 11,

1917, 5 o'clock. 10 min. In

response to telegram No. 812 of November 3, L[evenshtein]138, who has already received 2,000 crowns = 5,000 marks, asks urgently for another 20,000 marks; most of this amount is needed for the trip of two agents to St. Petersburg. This trip is necessary, as the postal connection with Ts[ivin] is too unreliable at the moment. It is necessary to speed up

the whole thing, inaction can arouse

suspicion. Please send instructions by telegraph. In addition,

L[evenshtein] asks

to telegraph his assessment of the situation: "For the implementation of his program, Lenin needs the support of Germany. basically coincide with the goals of the Maximalists, Lenin will be able to call on the Allies to start negotiations on this basis, and in the event that they

reject this proposal, remove from Russia obligations in relation to the Entente. If the countries of Central Europe put forward more difficult conditions than those spoken of by right-wing socialists, then this will violate Lenin's plans for the conclusion of peace. As a result of this, he will turn to the right, or this will lead to a new coup. Just at the moment, reports of plans to seize Poland and Lithuania from Russia have weakened confidence in the policy of the German government; therefore, it would be desirable to make a reassuring statement. "L[evenshtein] will be grateful for a

telegraphic message as to what to say to him on these issues and how to instruct those sent to Russia. WITTGENSHTEIN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO

THE GERMAN MISSION IN COPENHAGEN Telegram No. 840 November 11, 1917 To telegram No. 1329 We approve

the spending of 20,000 marks on

Blau He can send a

message to Russia that the imperial government continues to stand on the positions of the Reichstag resolution If necessary, this can be confirmed publicly when possible. — TO THE CHANCELER Report No. 1413 November 12, 1917. It is said that the local

Bolsheviks received the news of the victory of their friends with great excitement, and some even lost sleep. They probably believe that they will soon become ambassadors of the new Russia, and pretend that they know everything down to the smallest detail, but in fact they had not yet received any instructions from Petrograd

At the present moment, I do not think that the government in Petrograd, assuming that it will sufficiently consolidate its power and hold out for at least a few weeks, will use Radek, Fürstenberg [Ganetsky] and Vorovsky as intermediaries. We do not have a clear idea of the relationship between the representatives of the Bolsheviks here and the leaders of the revolution in Petrograd. The real leaders of the Petrograd movement are Lenin, Zinoviev¹³⁹ and

Trotsky¹⁴⁰, of course, must be directly in the thick of things, where the need for them arises literally every minute, but it is possible that if the Bolsheviks manage to form a government, they can give important instructions to their local representatives. The most energetic and talented of them

is the Pole Sobelson, usually speaking under the pseudonym Karl Radek, well known to the German Social Democrats for his past activities in Germany. As a student, he seemed to steal books and other things, and friends awarded him the nickname Kraddek. In Russian newspapers, he still appears under this name, and he took it as a pseudonym. He is characterized as an absolutely immoral, but very intelligent and unusually capable journalist. They say that despite all his ideological principles, he is able to listen to the opposite point of view. At the present moment, his efficiency and knowledge of German politics - he even knows its hidden sides - will surely attract respect in Petrograd for his ideas and proposals.

Of the Petrograd leaders, the most significant are Lenin and Trotsky. Both spent many years in the West, as individuals they are much brighter and more interesting than their social-patriotic opponents, both are practical revolutionaries. Lenin, a Tatar, his real name is Ulyanov, obviously the organizer and leader of this movement, is a theoretician in the sense of ends, but in choosing means he prefers direct practice. Trotsky's real name is Bronstein, he lived in France before the start of the war, but was expelled from the country, presumably because he knew about the

participation of Izvolsky¹⁴¹ in the murder of Zhores¹⁴². From Switzerland he fled to Spain, from there, with the help of the Spanish socialists, to America. After the revolution, he set off on his return trip, but the English forcibly removed him from the ship and threw him into prison, so that it is said that he took out a burning Hatred of the British from the journey. If, despite the opposition of the entire administration, the incumbents manage to form a real government, he will most likely receive the post of foreign minister there.

Obviously, both Lenin and Trotsky enjoy great personal prestige among their supporters. They probably can

maintain order in his party and establish and maintain dictatorial power. Unlike the Mensheviks, as early as 1906 the Bolshevik theoreticians abandoned the idea of a parliament, putting forward the revolutionary dictatorship of a small committee of experienced leaders as the only possible alternative. Consequently, if a new government is formed at all and manages to break the resistance of the entire bourgeois world, it will not have to defend its position and freedom of action, speech and assembly, even from its own supporters, to the extent that their predecessors did. Even if Bolshevik rule in Russia lasts only a few weeks, terror will

almost certainly be established in the country on a scale far surpassing the French experience under Marat. The Bolsheviks criticized the Social Revolutionary Party for trying to persuade the peasants not to burn the houses of the landowners and not to seize the land by force. Having come to power and hoping to keep it, having given the land to the peasants, they will not be able to stop the rebellions, which they themselves called for quite recently. The peasants will seize the land promised to them by force, the soldiers from the trenches will rush home to be in time for the division. If they succeed in capturing Kerensky, Milyukov and Tereshchenko,¹⁴⁴ who have led the problems of peace and land to a dead end, the former ministers will face a swift and terrible judgment. Most likely, the Bolsheviks will try to hand over all the former leadership to the local Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies for reprisal and completely destroy the existing administrative mechanism. If they succeed even for a few weeks, and even if a truce is not reached in that time, the country will no longer figure in the military and economic calculations associated with the world war, and the old regime, which in this case will most likely be restored, will take years. in order to restore order.

If the present civil war, which has not yet really broken out, ends in the defeat of the Bolsheviks, its slogans "peace and land", once thrown to the masses, will have an enormous effect on the people and will force any new government that

will not want to face the Bolshevik uprising again sooner or later, at least to pretend that in these two matters it follows in the footsteps of the Bolsheviks.

RITZLER
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS -- AMBASSADOR
MUNICH

Telegram No. 102 Berlin November 13, 1917

To the Imperial

Chancellor I thank Your Highness for yesterday's letter and its attachments. As

Your Highness already knows, on November 9 the Petrograd Telegraph Agency published the conditions under which the Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies agreed to consider the peace proposal. This statement was published in our press on Monday, after the Supreme High Command of the Army withdrew its initial objections to publication. As early as Saturday, Count Chernin strongly recommended that discussions be started in our semi-official bodies on the Russian statement, using roughly the same terms as those used in the commentary published in his foreign bulletin. In response to this, I objected that, judging by the reports received, the struggle for power between Lenin and Kerensky was not yet over, that the Bolshevik regime could by no means be considered stable, and that, having prematurely seized on an unofficial Bolshevik statement transmitted only by a telegraph agency, we run the risk of appearing weak. I'm not ready to drop this objection just yet. I have just received the following private message from Stockholm (not yet confirmed): "According to authentic reports, Kerensky,

together with Kornilov¹⁴⁵ and Kaledin¹⁴⁶, occupied Petrograd. Lenin and his supporters settled in Smolny. Informed Russian circles believe that the Bolshevik uprising has now been liquidated and that whatever new government is formed in Russia, it has no choice but to pursue a resolute peace policy." According to reports from our mission in Stockholm, according to the calculations of the powers of the Entente, the Bolshevik government will hold out for no more than two or three weeks. The refusal of the Russian mission in Stockholm to recognize the current government confirms this assumption. In these circumstances

In other respects, I think it would be wise, first of all, to wait to see how events develop in Petrograd. If the Bolsheviks manage to hold on to power, we will at any moment have time to accept the Russian proposal for peace or an armistice and use the opportunities enumerated by Count Chernin better than at the present time. Haste and nervousness in this matter will only spoil the matter, and besides, we will be condemned by the German public. KYULMANN THE GERMAN MESSENGER

IN BERN TO THE GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 1833 November 15, 1917 Sent: November 16, 1.00

Received: November 16, 4.55 For Bergen, Bayer asks to tell

Nassa147 that from Stockholm the following telegram was received: "Fulfill, please, your promise immediately. Based on it, we have bound ourselves with obligations, because great demands are made on us. Vorovsky." Bayer let me know that this message makes his trip north all the more necessary. ROMBERG DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT STATE

Telegram No. 1804 Berlin, November 16, 1917

Hristo Rakovsky, 148 a Romanian socialist originally from Bulgaria, publishes a Russian socialist newspaper in Stockholm. He used to be associated with us and worked for us in Romania. Rakovsky asks if his wife, who is now in Bucharest, can get permission to visit him in Stockholm. This request, supported by the Ambassador of Bulgaria, has been granted. BUSH 149 THE

GERMAN

MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM

TO THE GERMAN MFA Telegram No.

1854 November 19, 1917, 15.50 Received:

November 19, 19.20 Parvus

received an urgent summons to Switzerland from Adolf Müller, apparently for negotiations with Italian socialists. He refused. He believes that Muller was informed that he opened a connection with Petrograd and in the near future

sees opportunities for negotiation. He promises "promotion [one word deleted] in relation to Russia." Ritzler. LUCIUS MISSION IN

STOCKHOLM

TO THE MFA OF GERMANY Telegram No 1870 November

22, 1917, 3:05 pm For deputy Erzberger and

adviser Nadolny¹⁵⁰ The local Russian colony learned of Parvus'

affairs ahead of time and treated them disapprovingly. Even circles close to the Bolsheviks object to the fact that he is entrusted with such a delicate mission, saying that the German Social Democrats will give the opponents of the Bolsheviks a powerful weapon by "choosing" a man like him as a courier, while the other side says, that the Bolsheviks would hardly have been in power without the financial support of Parvus. Many believe that the appearance of Parvus in Petrograd will jeopardize the expected formation of a democratic

coalitions.

Yesterday, immediately after my arrival, I had a detailed discussion with our people, in the spirit of the memorandum I gave to Herr Erzberger on Sunday. Our people, for their part, contacted the Bolshevik leader Vorovsky. According to the Russian press, Vorovsky has been appointed representative and is awaiting official confirmation any minute now. Meanwhile, some Bolsheviks are asking the police what they will do if the Bolsheviks arrest the Russian envoy here who refuses to leave his post. The police, of course, refused to answer this question. Very typical of the Bolsheviks.

WUKHERPFENNIG¹⁵¹

THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN BERN TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN

MINISTER Telegram No 1862 November 22,

1917 Sent: November 23, 2:00 Received: November 23, 4:00 A

reliable, well-informed agent reports the following in absolute secrecy: "The planned transfer of emigrants includes all the remaining Bolsheviks and internationalists in Switzerland, many of whom travel with their whole families, with their wives and children. The internationalists are the left wing of the Mensheviks, represented in Zimmerwald by Martov¹⁵² and who are fighting for the development and strengthening of the "Russian revolution on the basis of an independent class

self-consciousness of the proletariat. One of them, Bagotsky¹⁵³, is the chairman of the Russian Committee of Emigrants in Zurich.¹⁵⁴ Bagotsky is a Pole who has been educated in Russia; he will remain in Petrograd. an eminent politician who stayed behind to earn a degree in chemistry.

According to the decision of the Central Committee, only "illegal", that is, genuine emigrants who were active revolutionaries, will be transported to Russia: this time there will be no exceptions for those who only sympathized with the "illegal".

Emigrants can travel within seven days of receiving travel permits. They

have done nothing to obtain Swedish entry or transit visas, as they do not know if this is necessary or only desirable."

MP Adolf Müller strongly supports this statement and recommends that a travel permit be issued as soon as possible. Panov has not yet come to me. ROMBERG DEPUTY

SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT STATE

Telegram No. 783 Berlin, November 25, 1917.

The Committee of Russian Emigrants in Zurich applied through the intermediary of the Supreme Judge Zgragen for permission for 50-100

Russian emigrants (including women and children) to pass through. Germany under the same conditions as for previous trains.

Since most of them are most likely Bolsheviks, we gave permission. At the moment, emigrants have been told that they must first obtain a Swedish entry visa. According to a report from the imperial legation in Stockholm, the Swedish ambassador in Petrograd sent a telegram that, given the condition of the railways, emigrants should not be sent to the frontier. To avoid the accumulation of returning emigrants in the country, the Swedish government has suspended the issuance of entry visas.

I would ask Your Highness to find out from the Supreme Command of the Army whether the trip of emigrants can take place if they are provided with Swedish visas. If so, then

The political department should receive appropriate instructions¹⁵⁶.
BUSH

COUNSELOR OF THE MISSION IN STOCKHOLM TO

THE CHANCELER Communication No 1484

Stockholm, November 26, 1917

Content: The situation in Petrograd The Bolsheviks here, admiring the courage and determination of the Bolshevik government, are in the most optimistic mood. However, one should not take on faith their words that this government can hold on. For example, since the moment of Lenin's victory, local representatives have been saying every day that efforts to create a coalition with other socialist parties will undoubtedly be crowned with success in the very near future and that this will become the guarantee of the existence of the new government and will be the basis of its activity. So far, these attempts have not only remained unsuccessful, but the very question of creating a coalition has caused sharp disagreements and a split among the Bolsheviks themselves. To show the uncertainty of the position of the Bolshevik government, I draw your attention to a telegram dated November 23 from the Haparand press department. At the present moment we are dealing with what is simply the violent dictatorship of a handful of revolutionaries, whose rule all of Russia regards with the greatest contempt and tolerates it only because these people have promised immediate peace and it is well known that they will keep this promise. Common sense dictates that the power of

these people will shake the entire Russian state to its very foundations and, in all likelihood, not more than in a few months, when the "sense of existence" of the new government will disappear, and the war against other peoples will finally stop, it, this government, will be swept away by a wave of all-Russian hostility. It is in the light of this situation that the usefulness

of Goldberg's activities, initiated by Deputy Erzberger, should be assessed. While the policy of agreement set out in the Reichstag on July 19 as a continuation of the line of Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg is correct, one should not take too seriously the idea that the rapprochement between the German and Russian peoples - in the sense of friendship

between the peoples - should be achieved through negotiations between the parties of the majority and delegates of the parties now in power in Russia. Namely, this idea was nurtured by Goldberg from the very beginning. Even an attempt to link the future of Russian-German relations with the fate of the people who are now in power in Russia would probably be a serious political mistake. During the time that this government will hold on to power, it will be possible to achieve only a truce, or perhaps a formal peace. In these circumstances, and in view of the serious upheavals that Russia is probably facing, we will not be able to establish really peaceful ties and friendly, good-neighbourly relations very soon, and it will be possible to start working on this only when some order is restored. . And then the moment will come to start working on agreements with the Russian people and with the new Russian government - not with the one that Goldberg has in mind. Until then, the matter can be limited to a careful discussion of trade issues with representatives of the current government, and only actions of this kind will enable us to move on to good relations, even with the new government and non-Bolshevik Russia.

RITZLER

THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM TO THE
CHANCELER Communication No 1482

Stockholm, November 26, 1917 Contents:

Conversations between Deputy Erzberger and the Bolsheviks
Based on my observations in the past, and especially after my conversation yesterday with a Bulgarian colleague who has excellent connections with the Russian socialists of all nuances, I can only subscribe to the communication which Your Highness received from Counselor Ritzler¹⁵⁷, where he says that the long conversations here between Deputy Erzberger and the Bolsheviks created considerable uncertainty and damaged the general negotiations. Erzberger, known for his ambition, decided to achieve personal success at all costs, and some time ago he made it clear to the Bolsheviks that the German people wanted peace and that he, Erzberger, as the representative of the parties of the majority, would also force the imperial government to do so. This und

in political affairs, the misconception has been created that there is a great desire for peace in Germany and that there are disagreements on this issue between the representatives of the people and the government, and the point of view of the latter can be simply ignored. Such a view inevitably not only complicates the task of Councilor Rietzler, but also reduces the authority of any government statement. On the basis of the information I have about Erzberger's negotiations, for example, with

Kolyshko, which, incidentally, Hugo Stinnes is well aware of, I believe that he is completely unsuitable for negotiations with the Russians, to whom he has already managed to communicate extremely dangerous secret information about our internal and external affairs. For example, as a result of many hours of conversation with Vorovsky, organized by a secret agent on behalf of Erzberger, Vorovsky soon after ironically remarked to some German that in Petrograd now everything is known about the mood of all German parties and that the Germans, they say, also need peace. LUCIUS THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN BERN TO THE GERMAN MFA Telegram No.

1895 November 26, 1917 Sent: November 27, 14.30 Received:

November

27, 16.10 For Bergen, Bayer postponed his departure for a week on the advice of doctors. Nasse also stays for a while. In the meantime, the requested financial assistance is being distributed through reliable channels.

Telegram No. 1367 Berlin, November 28, 1917. To telegram No. 1895

According to the information received here, the government in Petrograd is in enormous financial difficulties. Therefore, it is highly desirable that money be sent to them. Bergen. BUSCHE THE

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT THE STATE --
IN THE GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 1771

November 29, 1917, 19.25 Received: November 29, 19.35

Attention Secretary of State! If

peace talks with Russia take place in the foreseeable future, His Majesty asks that Your Excellency, no matter what, try to achieve some kind of alliance or friendly relations with the Russians. He said that after the Russo-Japanese War it would be easier than we believe. He has already convinced The Supreme Command of the Army to start up the Russian railways, if it turns out to be possible, and for this purpose to place at the disposal of the Russian officers the staff of the German railways. In the more distant future, the

emperor also hopes to establish close trade relations with Russia. LERSNER
STATE SECRETARY FOREIGN FOREIGN MINISTER REPRESENTATIVE AT
STATE

DEL --

Telegram No. 1925 Berlin, December 3, 1917 The

collapse of the Entente and the subsequent creation of political combinations beneficial to us is the most important military goal of our diplomacy. Russia turned out to be the weakest link in the enemy chain. Therefore, the task is to gradually loosen this chain and, if possible, remove it altogether. This was the purpose of the subversive activities that we carried out in Russia behind the front lines - primarily the support of separatist tendencies and the Bolsheviks. It was only when, through various channels and under various pretexts, that we ensured a constant influx of funds for the Bolsheviks, they were able to carry out energetic propaganda in their main organ, Pravda, and significantly expand the previously very weak basis of their party. Now the Bolsheviks have come to power, how long they will be able to hold out is impossible to say. They need peace to strengthen their own position, on the other hand, it is in our interest to use this period while they are in power (and this period may be short) to achieve first an armistice and then, if possible, peace. The conclusion of a separate peace would mean achieving the intended goal, namely, a rupture between Russia and its allies. The tension that such a break is bound to cause will determine the degree of Russia's dependence on Germany and its future relations with us. As soon as the former allies abandon her, Russia

will have to seek our support. We will be able to help Russia in many ways: first, by restoring the railways (I mean the German-Russian commission, under our control, which will take care of the rational and coordinated operation of the railways in order to quickly restore the movement of goods), then - - by issuing to it a significant loan necessary to maintain its state machinery. This may take the form of an advance against the provision of grain, raw materials, etc., etc., which Russia will supply to us under the control of the above-mentioned commission. Help

on such a basis - the scope of which can be increased as needed - will, in my opinion, contribute to the rapprochement between the two countries. Austria-Hungary

will treat this rapprochement with distrust and disapproval. I would regard Count Chernin's excessive zeal to come to an agreement with the Russians as a desire to get ahead of us and prevent Germany and Russia from establishing close relations that would be undesirable for the Danubian Empire. We have no need to woo the Russians. We are strong enough to wait quietly; our position gives us much more opportunity than Austria-Hungary to offer Russia everything she needs to restore her state. I am optimistic about the development of affairs in the East, but I believe that it is now important to maintain a certain restraint in our relations with the Austro-Hungarian government in all matters, including the Polish question, which concerns both monarchies, in order not to bind ourselves to any obligations.

I dare to hope that the above considerations do not go beyond the directions given to me by His Majesty. I ask you to report accordingly to His Majesty and inform me by telegram of His highest instructions. Kühlmann
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY

AT THE EMPEROR'S COURT -- IN THE MFA
GERMANY

Telegram No. 1819 December 4, 1917, 19.30

Received: December 4,
20.25 To telegram No. 1925

His Majesty the Kaiser agreed with the considerations
Your Highness regarding the rapid rapprochement with Russia.
GRUNAU

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT STATE Telegram
No. 1943 Berlin,

December 5, 1917 In response to message No. 1040, the Swedish
government informed us that visas to Russian emigrants could be issued
only after they had been guaranteed permission to enter in Russia.

Since information on this matter cannot be obtained through other
channels, and since the emigrants in question are close to Lenin, I ask you
to contact the Supreme High Command of the Army with a request to find
out from the Russian government by radio or telegraph or through the
Russians negotiating a ceasefire: will emigrants who want to return from
Switzerland through Germany be allowed to enter Russia, and if they agree,
will the Russian government refuse to inform the Swedish government about
it? Alternatively, the possibility is not ruled out that we will allow the emigrants
to cross our front line and the Russian front line. BUSCHE DEPUTY
SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
OF THE GENERAL
STAFF

(BERLIN) December 5, 1917 We are
sending a copy 160 to the
Political Department of the General Staff in
Berlin with
reference to

instructions on the return of Russian emigrants from Switzerland, sent
directly to the Political Department by the Supreme High Command of the
Army. According to a report from the Imperial Legation in Bern, the Russian
author Karl Buchholz, who, according to a letter dated September 3 from the
Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was denied permission to travel from
Switzerland to Sweden via Germany, intends to join the aforementioned
emigrants. Since Buchholz seems to be on good terms with Lenin, and since
he now wants to go not to

Sweden, but to Russia, it seems reasonable to allow him and other emigrants to pass through Germany.

Please let me know the decision on this matter as soon as possible so that the imperial mission in Bern, BUSCHE can be informed accordingly

THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN BERN TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN
MINISTRY Telegram No 1949 Bern, December 5,
1917 Sent: December 6, 0.40 Received: December 6, 5.20 At
the attention of Herr von Bergen,

Bayer recovered enough to leave on Saturday, in a pinch , on Sunday. I urge instructions on whether this trip is desirable¹⁶¹. In view of the extraordinarily strong effect which, as far as can be judged from here, the interview published in the Freie Presse¹⁶², I believe that Bayer, with his strong influence on the Bolsheviks, will be able to smooth out the hostile outbursts caused by this interview, which are not

slow to show up.

ROMBERG

FOREIGN DEPUTY ERZBERGER -- TO STATE SECRETARY

Berlin, December 7, 1917

Your Highness! I have the
honor to enclose a

copy of the report just received from

Stockholm from Mr. Zise. Your

ERZBERGER

Supplement

Stockholm, December 5, 1917

According to the latest news from Petrograd, Lenin and Trotsky intend to severely punish those Russian envoys abroad who do not recognize the power of the Bolsheviks, primarily by suspending all payments to them. This measure applies not only to accredited ambassadors in countries

Entente, but also ambassadors in neutral states. The local ambassador Gulkevich¹⁶³ also no longer

receives money. His position is desperate. He can't pay his staff and no one lends him money. But soon the situation will become even more

difficult: Lenin and Trotsky will send Bolshevik envoys to neutral countries. If they are not recognized there, Trotsky intends not to recognize the ambassadors of the respective countries in Petrograd. This will be extremely unfortunate for us, since it would be to our advantage if neutral ambassadors continue their work in Petrograd, especially the Swedish mission, which energetically represents German interests there. Therefore, it is most beneficial for us to support the Bolshevik government, since it strives for peace, just like we do. Therefore, it would be very good if we could persuade the neutral governments to recognize the Bolshevik government and the Bolshevik envoys in their countries as soon as possible. I would ask that this case be considered in the most serious manner and as soon as possible, since it seems to me extremely important and since such an action will serve to significantly strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks inside Russia¹⁶⁴.

The situation in Russia is the most unusual. Here a number of different, independent republics were formed. The newest of them is the Republic of German prisoners. In various places where there are large camps for prisoners of war, German prisoners, seeing the chaos around them, took over the supply and leadership and now feed not only themselves, but also the population of the surrounding villages. The local population is extremely pleased with this and, together with the German prisoners, formed something like a republican administration, where the prisoners run everything. This, of course, is a completely unusual phenomenon in world history. Russia, even more than America, is a country of unlimited possibilities.

THE GERMAN MESSENGER

IN STOCKHOLM -- IN THE GERMAN

MFA Telegram No. 1987 December 8,
1917, 23.55 Received:

December 9, 2.45 I have just had a private conversation with Vorovsky, who gives the impression of an honest and reasonable person. He thinks that his government is compelled, out of fear of internal political enemies, to leave open the possibility of Allied participation in the negotiations and can justify a separate peace only citing the refusal of the allies to participate in the negotiations. However, he said that appeals to that effect were just as meaningless as

as calls to the people to start a revolution. If these appeals prove unsuccessful, the Russians will open direct negotiations for a separate peace. The question of peace was evidently discussed at the first session of the Constituent Assembly on November 11, and probably aroused sharp objections from the Cadets. If the front does not agree to a method of negotiation, he is ready to offer his government some suitable method. I explained to him that in the face of attempts to sabotage or delay negotiations (and we must reckon with such attempts), only businesslike and practical negotiations between the governments in power can bring results. He is still toying with the idea of an inter-parliamentary conference, hoping that it will make a favorable impression on the West. However, he acknowledges that this path could delay negotiations or threaten their outcome. He believes that his government would have preferred the negotiations to be held in a neutral country rather than in a war environment. Ritzler. LUCIUS [Külmann's note:]
Immediately telegraph

Lucius165:

he must tell Vorovsky

that only Brest can be considered as a place for a preliminary truce, since everything is ready there. Choosing a neutral location will drag out the negotiations and cause a lot of problems related to international etiquette. A temporary peace may be concluded very soon. The question of the mode and place of more detailed negotiations, which can be held in a neutral country, will be the subject of immediate agreement. If Trotsky or Lenin personally come to the talks, I will also go there, and this will give us a guarantee of a speedy completion of the matter. Ask Lucius to continue along the lines outlined in his telegram today. An inter-parliamentary conference is currently impossible; it would lead to the failure of all our efforts to conclude peace. KYLMANN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS - TO THE MISSION IN STOCKHOLM Telegram No 1674 Berlin, December 9, 1917

Recognition of the Russian Bolshevik Government, through the official recognition of its diplomatic representatives as neutral states, will greatly strengthen the position of this government negotiating with us. Since, in the event that the neutral states refuse to recognize the diplomatic representatives appointed by the Bolsheviks, there is a danger that the Russian government may break off relations with the ambassadors of the respective neutral countries in Petrograd, and since, moreover, we attach exceptional importance to the continuation of the activities of the Swedish ambassador / in St. Petersburg, I I would like to ask you to discuss this matter confidentially with the Swedish government and recommend that it recognize the Bolshevik representatives as soon as possible. Send your answer by telegram. KYLMANN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE MISSION IN STOCKHOLM Telegram No. 1675 Berlin, December 9, 1917 For Rietzler, Scheidemann left today for Stockholm via Copenhagen. He obviously intends to try to persuade the Bolsheviks to negotiate peace with a majority of the Socialists or the

Reichstag. We

believe that negotiations should be conducted only between governments and preferably at some point on the

front. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks are already being persuaded by

Goldberg's promise to direct negotiations over the head of the German government. Therefore, it is desirable to persuade Scheidemann not only not to strengthen them in this intention, but even, as far as possible, to cure them of this idea and advise them to quickly start negotiations with the government. Therefore, please detain him immediately upon your arrival and try to convince him of this point of view before starting his negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Use these arguments: 1. The Bolsheviks appealed to governments and

peoples. Moreover, they had already exchanged telegrams and

ceasefire negotiations with the German government and, according to statements in the press, expressed satisfaction with these

negotiations. Therefore, they have no reason to act around the government.

2. Actions bypassing the government may be considered unconstitutional here and will not only cause difficulties in the government and in general in the country, which may make peace with Russia difficult, protracted or even endangered, but also damage the reputation of the government in the eyes of foreigners or at least in the eyes of the Entente. Since the government is guided by the principles of the Reichstag resolution and the response to the Pope's note for peace, and since the peace treaty can only come into force after it has been ratified by the Reichstag, there is no reason to distrust the latter or to circumvent it. Therefore,

Scheidemann will contribute most of all to the speedy conclusion of peace if he inspires the Bolsheviks with as much confidence as possible in the government and convinces them to start negotiations soon.

Please draw his attention to the fact that neglecting or delaying the usual methods may lead to the fact that there will actually be a conference with the social democratic minority, which someone is obviously trying to organize.

The mission in Copenhagen was instructed to find out the date of his arrival in Stockholm and to communicate it to you by telegram. Ledebour and Kautsky, who also wanted to go to Stockholm, are detained here, while Goldberg and Wuherpfennig are here at the moment. Send the report by telegram.

KYLMANN

THE GERMAN MESSENGER

IN STOCKHOLM -- TO THE GERMAN

MFA Telegram No. 2011 December 12,

1917, 13. 45 Received:

December 12, 19. 52

To telegram No. 1684 The order was executed. Vorovsky transmitted the message directly to Petrograd, but since he has not yet received the code, the time of arrival of his reports is unknown, if the answer [one word erased] comes. Therefore, I recommend the same treatment in the ceasefire negotiations. Ritzler.

LUCIUS
DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

AT THE KAISER COURT Telegram No 1986

Berlin, December 13, 1917 In response to instructions from the Foreign Office to recommend to the Swedish government to recognize the representatives of the Bolsheviks and thus strengthen the Bolshevik government, the imperial envoy in Stockholm on December 11 telegraphed the following:

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is ready to receive Vorovsky and discuss current affairs with him. I let the latter know about this. The Secretary of State said that General Brandstrom had already recognized the Bolshevik government in Petrograd by the fact that the ambassador politely acknowledged the receipt of the Russian note and is currently doing current business with the government through the embassy staff. Formal recognition of the new Russian ambassador in Stockholm, who even in today's Dagens Nyheter interview called himself only "commissar of the Bolshevik government", is unlikely to happen until the Constituent Assembly establish the position of modern government." The

Secretary of State fully shares Your Excellency's opinion that recognition will strengthen the government's position, and he seems, after all, quite ready to recognize Vorovsky as ambassador.

BUSCHE

DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS --
TO THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM

Telegram No. 1717 Berlin, December 13, 1917

To telegram No. 2011 For Rietzler

Our envoy in Copenhagen reports that he heard from reliable sources that Vorovsky wrote to his secret agent in Copenhagen that it would be desirable to transfer negotiations from the front to neutral territory (possibly to Stockholm).

Vorovsky justifies this desire by saying that, acting on neutral territory, it will be easier to persuade the Entente countries to participate in negotiations and thereby create a bridge from separate negotiations to general ones. Vorovsky also writes that Lenin and Trotsky

they want negotiations to be conducted by parliamentarians, as this would exclude pressure from the armies.

I repeat that, from our point of view, negotiating a temporary peace on no man's land is highly undesirable and should be avoided as much as possible. The same applies to the inter-parliamentary conference. According to reports received from our representatives in the command of the Eastern Front, the Russian delegates also prefer to negotiate at the front and they did not express any wishes regarding the participation of parliamentarians.

BUSSCHE THE GERMAN
MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM TO THE
GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 2036
December 15, 1917, 12.30
Received: December

15, 11.35 To telegram No. 1717 Indeed, Vorovsky would like the negotiations to be conducted in Stockholm. He also told his friends that the contradictions between the Reichstag and the Supreme Command of the Army should be exploited. Parvus, who wants to play his part, is also acting to ensure that negotiations take place in Stockholm. I am making the most persistent efforts to thwart these plans. Vorovsky assures me that he communicated my objections to Trotsky. In a conversation that lasted several hours, I persistently argued to Vorovsky that Stockholm was the most unsuitable place for negotiations, and explained why. In addition, I warned him against experimenting with internal German affairs, telling him that no German side would support such an experiment in the face of official opinion. I said that the opponents of the Bolsheviks insisted that the German government should not make peace with them, as they would have to make peace again with those who would replace them. Opponents of the Bolsheviks propose that the German government declare that the Bolsheviks are not authorized to negotiate. The German government has rejected these proposals, but it cannot run the risk of negotiating in almost hopeless circumstances. Vorovsky admitted

that the refusal of the Germans to negotiate could lead to the fall of the Bolsheviks, and asked that Berlin take into account the fact that the Bolsheviks

that they should negotiate under democratic control, and ensure that the results can be published immediately, and that, in addition, they should leave room for Allied participation in the negotiations. They will not try in any way to influence the composition of the German delegation. After my repeated questions, he admitted that he did not have exact instructions from Petrograd regarding the form of negotiations and their conduct. It seems to me that his point of view reflects the opinion of Parvus and Goldberg rather than his government, and that, if there is no other possibility, Trotsky, in particular, will agree to negotiations in Brest, provided that the Bolshevik methods of negotiations are at least externally preserved (this condition Even he can't break it. Vorovsky admitted that my arguments were sound, although he himself had not yet completely abandoned Goldberg's idea of broad negotiations between peoples, which, in his opinion, would lead to more acceptable terms. He sends another report to Petrograd, in addition, a courier has been sent with a serious and honest report for Trotsky. Ritzler. LUCIUS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE AT THE STATE -- IN THE MFA OF GERMANY Telegram No 1895 December 16, 1917, 9.15 Received: December 16, 9.50 Case settled¹⁶⁷. After the meetings on December 6 and 7 in Berlin, General Ludendorff handed over to the command of the Eastern Front the following conditions for peace negotiations: 1. No interference in the internal affairs of Russia. 2. No monetary

war

reparations, only financial compensation for the maintenance of more than 1 million prisoners of war. German annexations of

Lithuania and Courland (including

Riga and the islands), since we need land to feed the people. We intend, to a certain extent, in terms of the conditions of the annexations, to respect the national demands of the Lithuanians and Courlanders. This is valid if

the British do not occupy the Åland Islands, Finland, Estonia or Livonia.

3. The exchange of prisoners of war, recognizing that their work is important for Germany until the conclusion of a general peace. Exchange of civilian prisoners.

4. Independence of Poland and its unification with the Central Powers. Determination of the eastern borders of Poland, including the return of the occupied territories of Russia. 5.

Recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination. Evacuation of Russians from Finland, Estonia, Livonia, Moldavia, Eastern Galicia and Armenia 6.

Offer of assistance in resolving the issue of the Dardanelles and other problems outside

Europe. 7. Reorganization of the Russian communications system with German help. Financial support for Russia's recovery and close economic ties. Establishment of trade relations. Deliveries of grain, oil, etc. to Germany at reduced prices. 8. Restoration of

the legal rights of representatives of another nationality on German or Russian territory. Compensation for loss of private property, which happened through no fault of the victim. 9. In the event that the Russian representatives

express fear of the threat of a Japanese attack on Russia, ensure that Germany does not attack Russia from behind if she has to defend herself against Japan. 10. We are ready to enter into an alliance with

Russia after some time. LERSNER DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO THE

GERMAN MESSENGER IN COPENHAGEN Telegram No 956
Berlin, December 17, 1917 Parvus must come here as

soon as possible. On the way, he must report
to Your Excellency. Please ask him, by influencing his friends, to urgently help the success of the peace negotiations that will begin in a few days. The Bolsheviks, according to reliable sources, are fighting against growing internal difficulties and are therefore in every possible way interested in strengthening their positions by making peace as soon as possible. BUSCHE AMBASSADOR IN STOCKHOLM -- TO THE
GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 2065 December 18, 1917, 19.15

Received:

December 18, 21.55

Parvus would like, if there is no particular urgency, to stay here until Christmas because of negotiations with Radek and Furstenberg, who will return from Petrograd. Please wire instructions. Ritzler. LUCIUS DEPUTY SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS --
TO THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN
STOCKHOLM

Telegram No. 1750 Berlin, December 19, 1917 To
telegram No. 2065 For Rietzler It is very
important that Parvus be expelled from Stockholm immediately in connection
with preliminary negotiations that will begin in a few days. Please try again to
secure his passage here via Copenhagen. BUSCHE GERMAN MISSION
ADVISER IN STOCKHOLM TO

AMBASSADOR BERGEN IN THE GERMAN
MFA December 24,
1917 Dear Mr. von Bergen! Parvus could not
get a ticket for
several days, so he is leaving only
today. I am enclosing a memorandum on his participation in the development
of events. At the present moment, when our interests again coincide with him, he
has again acquired
great importance for us, and I would strongly recommend that you
confidentially ask him for an informal meeting in Berlin in order to consult, in
particular, on the Romanian question (the future role of Rakovsky, etc. .). He is
indeed a very significant person, and he has brilliant ideas. It is likely that
we will soon realize that it is beneficial for us to gain a foothold in Russia in wider
circles than Lenin's immediate environment, in which case he will be for us

very important.

On no account should he be allowed to suspect that in Stockholm we simply
wanted to get rid of him. I have nothing against his
return, especially given the favorable development of affairs in Brest.
However, I think that

outside Stockholm we can make better use of it, since Stockholm will soon cease to be of any importance in connection with Russia due to poor communications with Petrograd - that is, again, with favorable developments in Brest. Let's hope everything goes right. From here it is difficult to judge, but it seems that Radek and Co. spinning their own international revolutionary web. With best Christmas wishes, Your
RITZLER

APPENDIX Secret memorandum Arriving here
in mid-
November,

Parvus was at first
convinced of the possibility and necessity of a socialist conference. The Danish proposal to convene such a conference, which has so far produced no results and has been forgotten, must be considered the fruit of his efforts. This also explains the initial readiness of the German Social Democrats to work on convening a conference. Various aspects of his activities are not clear to us until now. In addition to wanting to convene a socialist conference, he also hoped that negotiations would take place here or in Copenhagen and he could use his influence to control them from both sides. How strong his influence on the Russian socialists is not clear. He himself at first eagerly waited for reports on this subject, and now he believes that Trotsky is actively and openly opposed to him, Lenin takes a neutral position, and figures of a smaller scale are on his side. His assumption about Trotsky is absolutely correct, but it is possible that Lenin is also against him and that he overestimates his influence on others, just as he overestimated the trust of Vorovsky and Radek in him. He says the two don't do anything without telling him. But I found out for sure that he was wrong. Vorovsky refers to

him with the greatest suspicion and says that Parvus cannot be trusted. Now Dr. Gelfand is working to strengthen his position in Russia with the help of "non-commissioned officers", in defiance of Lenin and Trotsky and even, if necessary, against them. In these circumstances, trying in every possible way to maintain trust with him

relationship, I was forced to remove him from all questions concerning the methods of negotiations.

On all other issues, where his interests coincide with ours, he is exceptionally valuable to us, because he has great practical political talent, exceptional knowledge of revolutionary Russia, and is a strong personality. His advice and help can be of great value to us.

REPORT TO

NASSE Berlin December

26, 1917 Undoubtedly, there are forces in the current Russian government that are trying in every possible way to prevent the peace negotiations that have begun from ending too quickly. One of the reasons is the desire not to exacerbate relations with the Entente too much, the second is the hope for a revolution in Germany, which can put the question of peace on a more favorable basis for the Bolsheviks. The

desire to maintain decent relations with the Entente has intensified recently for several reasons: the influence of the Entente among the Russian bourgeoisie and partly also among the right-wing socialists.

The Russians should be constantly pointed out that in this respect the Entente also pursues selfish goals and that only Germany, due to its geographical position, is able to help Russia quickly and effectively restore the economy.

Further, the Russian government must be made to understand that it will only hurt itself if it hesitates and drags out the negotiations, since all the above Entente measures will be carried out in parallel with the restoration of the bourgeois government. In any case, the Bolshevik government understands that the Cadets and right-wing socialists are conducting active subversive activities against them. Radek told my agent in Stockholm that they knew everything about their activities and that at the right moment they would certainly take tough measures, Kerensky's weakness was not characteristic of them. The government understands that such movements can cause him great harm even with a well-organized police force and a strong will to suppress the counter-revolution, especially if foreign policy

position is not very secure.

The second factor that makes them drag out time is the hope for a speedy revolution in Germany. It is difficult to say how much the Bolsheviks really believe in this possibility. Some of Radek's remarks about the German Independents may indicate that he himself does not rely on them too much. But even here they may wishful thinking. It should not be forgotten that the Bolsheviks often proclaimed peace as their goal, but not peace with bourgeois governments, concluded through negotiations, but the path of inciting revolution in our country, which would also naturally lead to peace. According to my information, the independents managed to send a message to Stockholm insisting that the peace talks would have a devastating effect on their hopes for a revolution and should therefore be cancelled. And if Radek and his friends regard this attempt as a sign of weakness, it is impossible to foresee what effect this may have on the decisions of the Russian government.

Of course, I took the trouble to explain to my personal agent that he must use all his influence in this matter and not only show that these attempts by independents are harmful to the true interests of the Petrograd government, but also explain that, according to his information, the situation in Germany leaves no hope for a revolution soon. Radek told my agent that Germany insists on

peace for two reasons: she wants to launch a major offensive on the Western Front in February 1918 and liberate her entire rear at once, but the main reason is that she understands the hopelessness of her situation. This became clear not only from the fact that the Central Powers were so willing to enter into negotiations with the Bolshevik government, but also from the way they joined the negotiations. Employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs arrived in Brest-Litovsk in large numbers, from this fact the Bolsheviks can draw important conclusions. The Austrians in particular were so nice, so polite, and so obliging that they even aroused the suspicion of their German friends. A Prussian stood behind every Austrian to make sure that the Allies did not go too far in their offers and promises.

The renewed attempts by the Russians to transfer the negotiations from Brest-Litovsk to some neutral country are due mainly to the influence of Radek and his friends, who have two aims here. On the one hand, they hope that if, for example, Stockholm is chosen, they will be able to have more influence, because then those people who for many months were representatives of the Bolsheviks in Stockholm will be able to play a more significant role in the negotiations. On the other hand, they probably hope that the negotiations will drag out; in Stockholm the influence of the revolutionary social democracy, especially the

German group, will be felt more strongly than in Petrograd, not to mention Brest-Litovsk. It is worth mentioning in this connection that Radek's interest in fomenting revolution is of a completely different sort than that of Lenin or Trotsky.

It is interesting to note the following statement by Radek: he said that he knew what was promised to the Lithuanian delegation in Berlin not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by some general who read the telegram from Hindenburg to the delegation, where they agreed to grant independence to Lithuania, but proposed to have a joint army and railroads. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS --
TO THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN STOCKHOLM

Telegram No. 20 Berlin, January 4, 1918

For Ritzler

The latest reports from the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency force a serious conversation with Vorovsky. They contain appeals to our people, touching on the theme of the revolution, and calls to our soldiers to disobey orders and lay down their arms. This should be seen as a gross and intolerable interference in our internal affairs. At the same time, we are labeled and portrayed as slave owners and oppressors of the workers. We are accused of putting the leaders of the German workers in concentration camps, that we are satisfying the hunger of women and the elderly with lead and weapons. The source of this lie is obviously the Austrian Radek. Of course, the government, which is conducting peace negotiations with us, cannot resort in its press to such expressions about us, therefore

doubts arise whether the Bolshevik government really wants to reach an understanding with us.

Instead of providing peace for Russia and the necessary conditions for further development, the Bolsheviks, delaying the conclusion of peace, simply work for the Entente and harm their own country, wasting precious time on fruitless revolutionary agitation. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN THE EASTERN FRONT COMMAND Telegram No. 114 Berlin, January 9, 1918 For the Secretary

of State for Foreign Affairs in Brest-Litovsk
Chernov, to a friend in Copenhagen. This letter says that the Bolsheviks are now in moral and political isolation. The entire economic system and the state apparatus are completely disorganized. Making peace will not help the Bolsheviks retain power. The forces they can rely on are only a few hundred thousand soldiers. Moreover, they have no support either among the intelligentsia or among the democratic parties. Lenin tried at the last moment to unify by adopting the land program of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party that had already existed for 60 years. However, the Social Revolutionaries remained true to their old principles and were convinced that social reforms in all aspects of the Russian system could not be carried out by force. For this reason, the Socialist-Revolutionaries will openly oppose the Bolsheviks as soon as they have moral and physical

opportunities for this.

Only the Constituent Assembly can save Russia, and a conflict arose over this very assembly. The intelligentsia, the Social Revolutionaries and even some of the soldiers will go to the end in this conflict, even the army, in any case, its socially conscious core will leave Lenin.

People who have spent thirty or forty years in Russian prisons and Siberian exile are again thrown into prison by the Bolsheviks because of their political convictions. Even the members of the Constituent Assembly, which is now elected and who, of course, should enjoy the right of immunity, were in prison. Laws are announced

invalid, in Russia now there is no criminal code. Tribunals consisting of Bolsheviks act as courts. The entire press is under pressure. Those newspapers that are still published are censored before publication, this applies even to the organs of the far left. Many newspapers were simply closed down and their printers, paper and capital confiscated.

Chernov holds exactly the same views and stands in the center a movement that prepares to speak out against the pain

Shevikhov. The next task of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and of all Russians, except Bolsheviks, is to hold meetings of soldiers, and this is being done as far as possible. In addition, special newspapers, leaflets and weekly bulletins should be published.

All of Russia is following with keen interest the progress of the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, but there is no agreement with the leadership. The German interpretation of the formula "peace without annexations and reparations" is unacceptable to all non-Leninist elements in Russia, because thinking democrats, that is, democrats of the future, understand the subtext of the dictates of the defeated Russia in the negotiations.

The organization of a plebiscite in the occupied territories is considered as part of the internal affairs of Russia, not Germany. The Russians were under the impression that the delegations from Lithuania and the Baltics were simply following orders. The conclusion

of peace on the present terms can mean only one goal for the Russian democrats, namely, mobilization, since Russia cannot exist without the Baltic provinces. The Balts themselves also want to remain Russian, and 9% of the Germans cannot play a decisive role in this matter.

Democratic peace must not be concluded by Lenin alone, it can alternatively be concluded by him (that is, by Lenin as the personification of socialist demagoguery) in cooperation with democratic elements. If the German people really want to establish fraternal relations with

the Russian people, they must give up all diplomatic and selfish interests and conclude an honest peace. Otherwise, Russia will be forced to declare a re-mobilization and in thirty years a new war will break out.

The author of the letter, an old Socialist-Revolutionary, understands that the Germans will not agree with his views, since he is not on the side of the Bolsheviks. Therefore, he thinks that at the present moment he cannot do anything that reflects both the wishes of the Germans and his own aspirations.

If we share his views, this Socialist-Revolutionary will probably be ready to make an active attempt to help the realization of our common goals. In his opinion, the Bolsheviks will fly off at the first blow and he does not need large sums to carry out this blow.

In connection with the statements of this man, it should be noted that after the rise of the left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, headed by Spiridonova, Chernov lost a significant part of his influence. If Your Highness approves, I intend to tell him that at the present moment, being at the stage of negotiations with the Bolsheviks, we, to

Unfortunately, we cannot establish relations with other Russian parties. Please communicate your point of view by telegram¹⁷¹.

BUSCHE

THE GERMAN MESSENGER IN

COPENHAGEN AT THE GERMAN MFA

Telegram No 37 January 11, 1918, 0.30

Received: January 11, 5.18

A telegram arrived here today from the Danish envoy to Petrograd approximately the following content:

On Monday the British ambassador left, saying that he was no longer in able to understand anything and that he is a completely finished person.

Rumors about the French ambassador's departure are, at least, premature. However, indeed, a conflict arose between the representatives of France and the Bolsheviks. A young French officer spread a rumor that the Germans had demanded the surrender of the Black Sea Fleet, and this message caused a great stir. The French ambassador announced that the officer would be removed from his post. Disagreements

also arose with the Romanian representatives. Trotsky complains about the harsh measures taken by the Romanian government against Bolshevik propaganda. Representatives of Germany and Austria

are under constant surveillance. They can only move in the streets accompanied by soldiers, and their letters are censored¹⁷².

This is probably explained by Trotsky's fear that the German representatives would come into contact with counter-revolutionary circles, which definitely sympathize with the Germans.

The Austro-German Commission has no intention of achieving any positive results. Negotiations here have taken the form of meetings at which all sorts of issues are discussed. BROCKDORF-

RANZAU

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY IN PETROGRAD -

TO THE CHANCELER

Report No. 26 Petrograd, January 24,

1918. A similar report was sent to the Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs Judging by purely external signs, the power of the Bolsheviks has strengthened to some extent in the last few days. How long this positive trend will last is unclear. Since political life here is carried on exclusively by convulsions, one should not think about the future. For the moment, however, the government's major

planned measures at Smolny have been successful. Since it depends on the support of the Red Guard and the sailors - more than on the support of the army itself - and they exercise control in the streets, it was not too difficult for the government to dissolve the Constituent Assembly a little more than a day after the opening, all the more it was starting to look like to a farce, and instead of this body, unacceptable to them, to create a Council that unconditionally supports the government.

In all other areas, the government also follows the tried and tested formula: "He who is not with us is against us." The press is forced into silence. With the exception of the party organs Pravda and Izvestia, all newspapers are subject to strict censorship and, if necessary, severe punishments. With political opponents, too, the conversation is short. Politicians, deputies, editors and other members of the opposition live in constant fear of losing their freedom or something worse. Among those arrested last week is Shamansky, chairman of the Red Cross. It is impossible to know how many people shared this fate, as only a small part of the cases become known to the public and the entire work of the government, apparently, is kept secret.

The big sensation of the last few days was the assassination of former ministers Shingarev¹⁷⁴ and Kokoshkin¹⁷⁵. For health reasons, they were transferred from the Peter and Paul Fortress to the hospital, where sailors shot them the same night. They shot Kokoshkin immediately, but Shingarev died only a few hours later. At first glance, this is a typical political assassination, but the government declared that it had nothing to do with it and that it was the work of the opposition, who wanted to get weapons against the Bolsheviks in this way.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN THE EASTERN FRONT
COMMAND

Telegram No. 478 Berlin, February 2, 1918 Dr.

Helphand, who spoke here at a discussion on the situation in Russia, believes that we should build relations with the Bolsheviks with the greatest caution. He thinks that the influence of Bolshevik ideas in Russia is growing and that the (Ukrainian) Rada will not last long.

He said that only the German army could drive out the Bolsheviks now that they had occupied the Donets Basin and Kharkov, the industrial center of Ukraine. Helphand

thinks that there is a possibility of a coalition between the Bolsheviks and the left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

BUSCHE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS --
TO THE STATS SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (IN
BUCHAREST) Telegram No 99 Berlin,

March 7, 1918 Count Redern wishes to supplement his latest demands for credits, which he will present to the Reichstag next week, with a few remarks on foreign policy to lighten the atmosphere a little, and he would be grateful to Your Highness for instructions. Perhaps you can give me the necessary instructions?

BUSCHE

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS -- IN THE MFA
GERMANY

Telegram No. 88 Bucharest, March 11, 1918, 11.45

Received: March 11, 12.45

To telegram No. 99

The general situation is so uncertain that I would advise against making any comment on foreign policy unless absolutely necessary. In connection with the latest reports from Russia, and in view of the resistance that exists here to the ratification of our treaties, I would especially recommend extreme restraint in assessing the positive results achieved in Brest. One can probably say that gaps are appearing on the eastern side of the sky, but it is better not to say yet that the transition of the war from two fronts to one is guaranteed. KYLMANN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW TO THE CHANCELER Report

No9 April

30, 1918 Moscow, the holy city, the symbol of royal power, the sanctuary of the Orthodox Church, in the hands of the Bolsheviks became a symbol of the most flagrant violation of taste and style caused by the Russian revolution¹⁷⁶. Those who knew the capital in the days of its glory hardly recognize it now. In all areas of the city, and especially in the central shopping district, the walls of houses are dotted with holes from zero - evidence of the battles that were fought here. The wonderful Metropol Hotel was turned into a heap of ruins by artillery fire, and even the Kremlin suffered severely. Some of the gates were badly damaged.

Life is in full swing on the streets, but the impression is that they were sown exclusively by the proletariat. Well-dressed people are almost invisible - as if all representatives of the former ruling class and bourgeoisie have disappeared from the face of the earth at once. Perhaps this is partly due to the fact that most of them are trying to adapt outwardly to the current appearance of the streets, so as not to incite greed and unpredictable excesses on the part of the new ruling class. Orthodox priests, formerly

shii a significant part of the passers-by, also disappeared from sight. You can buy almost nothing in stores, except perhaps the dusty remnants of former luxury, and even then at unheard-of prices. The main leitmotif of the whole picture is the unwillingness to work and idleness¹⁷⁷. At this time, when the factories are not yet working, and the land is not yet being cultivated - at least it seemed to me during my journey - Russia seems to be heading towards an even more terrible catastrophe than that which the revolution has already caused.

The security situation is quite bad, but during the day you can freely walk everywhere without an escort. However, it is unreasonable to go out in the evening, and in the daytime, gun shots are heard every now and then, and some more or less serious events constantly occur.
collisions.

The former wealthy class fell into a state of deepest anxiety: one order from the government is enough to deprive them of all their property. Almost all palaces and large mansions are hung with ominous orders for requisition, according to which the owner, often in a matter of hours, is on the street. The desperation of the members of the old ruling class is boundless,

but they are unable to muster enough strength¹⁷⁸ to put an end to the organized plunder they are undergoing. The desire to introduce some kind of order extends down to the lower strata, and the feeling of their own impotence makes them hope that salvation will come from Germany. The same circles that used to slander us most loudly now see in us, if not angels, then at least a police force that can save them. Food prices have risen greatly, but since the pockets of the lower classes are stuffed with millions of rubles issued by Kerensky, only the former rich live in poverty. An eight-hour working day has been introduced everywhere, a minimum wage of 200 rubles per month has

been set for domestic workers, plus free food and

housing.

The power of the Bolsheviks in Moscow is ensured mainly by the Livonian battalions, as well as a large number of cars, requisitioned by the government, who are constantly circling the city and can, if necessary, deliver troops to where there is unrest.

It is impossible to predict where all this will lead. At the moment, one can only assume that the situation is largely
will change.

MIRBA X180 THE

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT THE STATE -- IN THE
MFA OF GERMANY Telegram No 1034 May 6,
1918, 21.30 Received: May 6, 22.30

The command of the Eastern Front sent to the Supreme the army high command the following telegram: "The command of the 8th army telegraphs:

Captain von Mylinsky from the Ministry of War, currently in Petrograd, instructed the courier who returned from Petrograd on May 1 (Lieutenant Brussatis) to convey the following to the Supreme High Command of the German Army:

"The government of the maximalists was to be overthrown by the minimalists at the instigation and with the financial support of the French, British and Americans. The appointed date of May 1 had to be postponed, since organizational matters were not completed. Chernov, General Schwartz, Krivoshein¹⁸¹ and Savinkov¹⁸² were to become dictators of the minimalist government, and also, presumably, Kerensky in Petrograd. After the victory of the counter-revolution, an army of 30-50 thousand people was to launch an offensive against the German troops in Finland or Estonia in order to alleviate the situation on the French front. The Maximalists received a warning from the monarchists about the impending counter-revolution, and "Soviet government has arrested Minimalist dictators. A certain French firm is exporting metal, raw rubber and tires from Petrograd in large quantities. The German delegates failed to take advantage of this opportunity, as they did not have the authority to buy. They received lucrative offers for big deals." Lieutenant B[russatis] was accompanied by a Russian officer Georgy, sent by Major

General Shulgin. George is at the disposal of the German government until May 8 and is ready to fulfill any instructions. BERKHEIM
FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE AT STATES IN THE GERMAN
FOREIGN
MINISTRY

Telegram No 1047 May 8, 1918, 12.00 Received: May 8, 13.40
General Ludendorff would be grateful
for information about

Count Mirbach's reports on the internal political situation in Russia. The general does not rule out the possibility of a government hostile to us coming to power and considers it useful to prepare for this possibility by helping circles acceptable to us to enter the government.

BERKHEIM

THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO THE
GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 78 May
10, 1918, 23.59

Received: May 11, 2.10 to the government, which they presented today and in which the Entente solemnly proposes even now to continue supplying Russia with weapons and raw materials for the fight against Germany and promises recognition of the Soviet government in the event of a general mobilization. Karakhan¹⁸³ and Radek did not tell me about this event, probably because the official wording was not to be discussed until the evening. The conduct of the affairs of the Entente was completely transferred from Vologda to Moscow and fell on the shoulders of local representatives, who receive instructions directly from their governments. More reasonable Bolshevik leaders are still trying to calm those who are worried about the advance in the south and the restoration of Ukraine. However, in view of the colossal difficulties of the Bolshevik government and its confusion due to the development of affairs in the south, all sorts of surprises are quite likely.

I have already heard post factum that tonight the Entente again urged Sverdlov¹⁸⁴ with important proposals to organize the delivery of food from Siberia and that the non-Bolshevik socialist parties that very evening, in accordance with the actions of the Entente, proposed to forget

ry and begin to cooperate with the Bolsheviks to save Russia. I'm working undercover to ensure both offers are rejected. MIRBAH

THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW -- IN THE
GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 96 May
13, 1918, 6:50 pm

Received: May 13, 9:00 pm

Continuation of telegram No. that our interests still require the continuation of the power of the Bolshevik government [one word deleted] efforts to denigrate or declarations

friendship on the part of other parties, in most cases only a desire to get rid of the Bolsheviks. If they do fall, then all their successors, with the help of the Entente, will seek to reunite with the lost territories, especially Ukraine, and to revise the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Any of our offensives can throw the Bolsheviks into the arms of the Entente, or, if they fall, bring the supporters of the Entente to power. In the event of a break in relations with us, which will be difficult to avoid under such circumstances, the leadership of Russian political and economic development will pass to the Entente. As far as we can judge from this, it is in our interests to supply the Bolsheviks with the necessary minimum of goods and keep them in power. Despite all their decrees, at the present time something can be achieved with the Bolsheviks, for they have suddenly become more accommodating in economic affairs, and one can at least prepare for further economic infiltration. MIRBACH MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE WATER May 13, 1918 Russia¹⁸⁵ The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs von Kühlmann said that the Entente had apparently recently promised something to the Bolsheviks if they resumed the war against

Germany. From a military point of view, he does not consider it serious.

In any case, the Bolsheviks are under serious threat from the left, that is, from a party that espouses even more radical views than the Bolsheviks, who seem to be gradually trying to deviate "to the right." Be that as it may, it is in our interest to announce once and for all that our operations in Russia

finished.

General Ludendorff replied that this was the case and that such an announcement had probably already been made.

At the General's request, Colonel von Winterfeldt stated that he had told Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs von den Bussche that the line of demarcation had been drawn and that the offensive had thus been completed. General

Ludendorff added that our troops were very often attacked by bands of Bolsheviks and other Russian groups and fighting broke out, even against our will. In

in any case, the Bolsheviks are completely different now, they have nothing in common with our original idea of them. Now they are actively engaged in the formation of the army and have already assembled several units. In domestic politics, their behavior has also changed a lot, as stated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW -- TO THE
GERMAN MFA Telegram No.

114 May 15, 1918 Sent: May 16, 13.45 Received:

May 16, 16.30 Today Chicherin¹⁸⁶ asked for a preliminary discussion on economic problems with Minister of Trade Bronsky¹⁸⁷. Vronsky developed an extensive program for the economic restoration of Russia, the main provisions of which are contained in a telegram openly transmitted at the request of Chicherin to Ioffe. Chicherin added that these proposals provide for a more or less

favorable settlement of political problems for Russia. The Russians ask that the negotiations of the commission in Moscow be expedited and suggest that it would be wiser to have a special commission dealing with legal matters and reparations, another with financial matters, and a third with trade, economic matters and concessions. Therefore, I recommend starting negotiations on this basis as soon as possible, without involving anyone who might be interested in restoring the previous economic conditions in Russia. MIRBAKH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO THE CHANCELER Communication No 61 May 16, 1918

Today I

had a

lengthy conversation with Lenin.

Lenin, in general, deeply

believes in his lucky star and constantly expresses

boundless optimism. However, he admits that while his system has stood and is holding on, the number of his opponents is growing and that the situation "requires more vigilance than a month ago." His belief is based mainly on the fact that only the ruling party has organized forces,

while all other parties converge only in their opposition to

the existing regime, but in everything else they diverge in all directions and behind them there is no such force as the Bolsheviks have¹⁸⁹. In

some respects, of course, this is true, but the tone in which Lenin speaks of the impotence of his enemies indicates that he did not less than somewhat underestimates them.

However, Lenin calmly admits that the composition of his opponents has changed: if before they were only representatives of the right parties, now he has opponents in his own camp, where something like a left wing has formed. The main argument of this internal opposition is that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which he is still ready to stubbornly defend, was a mistake. All large chunks of Russian territory are being occupied, peace with Finland and the Ukraine has not yet been ratified, famine has not only not been defeated, but, on the contrary, has increased. In short, the real world is still very, very far away.

Unfortunately, he is forced to admit that some events recently confirmed by the accusations of his opponents.

Therefore, he is trying in every possible way to expedite the clarification of affairs in the north and south¹⁹⁰, and especially makes efforts, with our cooperation and influence, to achieve peace agreements with Finland and Kiev¹⁹¹.

Lenin did not complain or scold, and did not hint that if the current state of affairs did not change, he might be forced to turn to other powers. However, he clearly tried to depict all the difficulties of his position as expressively as possible. AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO THE

GERMAN MFA Telegram No. 122 May 16,

1918 Sent: May 17, 22.30

Received: May 18, 1.25 According to a reliable source, the situation in Petrograd is again dangerous. The Entente is allegedly spending huge sums to bring the right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party to power and resume the war. The sailors on the ships "Respublika" and "Dawn of Russia" and on the cruiser "Oleg", which sailed to Ino, are said to have been bribed, and the Preobrazhensky Regiment was bribed in the same way. Warehouses] at the arms factories in Sestroretsk in the hands of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks cannot locate the center of this organization. It looks like movement! established contact with Dutov¹⁹³ and the Siberian movement. Here too

increased campaigning. I am trying to resist the efforts of the Entente and support the Bolsheviks. However, I would be grateful for instructions as to whether the situation justifies the use of large sums in our interests, if necessary, and what trend I should maintain if the Bolsheviks do not hold out. In the event of the fall of the Bolsheviks, the followers of (one word crossed out) of the Entente have the best prospects at the present moment.

MIRBA AX

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE

AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW Telegram No.

121 Berlin, May 18,

1918 To telegram No. 122 Please use large sums, as we are interested in the Bolsheviks' survival. The Rietzler funds are at your disposal. If you need more, please cable how much. Hence it is very difficult to say who should be supported in the event of the fall of the Bolsheviks. If there is really strong pressure, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries will fall together with the Bolsheviks. It seems to me that these are the only parties that base their positions on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Cadets as a party are against Germany, the monarchists will also be in favor of revising the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. It is not in our interests to support the monarchical idea that will reunite Russia. On the contrary, we must, as far as possible, prevent the consolidation of Russia, and for this purpose we must support the extreme left parties. KYLMANN STATE SECRETARY

OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW
Telegram

No. 246 Berlin, June 1, 1918 front. We

also learned from a reliable source that five transports with fully equipped Serbs were seen on the Vologda-Perm line. The government in Moscow should be made clear that we cannot sit back and watch

behind such actions of the Entente. If the Russian government is unable to prevent the movement of such transports, then we will be forced to look for more reliable guarantees against any support that the Entente sends to the Murmansk coast. As soon as we receive a response from the Supreme High Command of the Army to our proposal to send a German commissar to the Murmansk region, we will immediately inform Your Excellency, but I would ask you to immediately discuss these events with Chicherin in the form that you deem necessary, point out to him the

seriousness affairs and say that we cannot tolerate this situation. To top it off, according to other reports, a Czechoslovak corps is moving through Khabarovsk. We insist that he be prevented from going to Vladivostok, if there is such an intention. Report your steps by telegram. Kühlmann AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW-- IN THE GERMAN MFA

Telegram

No 233 June 3, 1918, 17.41 Received: June

4 3.20 In connection with strong competition from the

Entente, 3 million marks a month are needed. If it is necessary to change our political line, there may be a need for a larger

amount.

MIRBACH GERMAN MISSION ADVISER!

IN MOSCOW TO AMBASSADOR

BERGEN] AT THE
GERMAN

MFA June 4, 1918 Dear Herr

von Bergen! Over the past two weeks, the situation has deteriorated sharply. Famine is approaching us, they are trying to stifle it with terror. The Bolshevik fist smashes everyone in a row. People are being shot by the hundreds. All this in itself is not so bad, but now there can be no doubt that the material resources of the Bolsheviks are running out. Fuel supplies for cars are running out, and even the Latvian soldiers sitting in trucks can no longer be relied upon - not to mention the workers and peasants. The Bolsheviks are terribly nervous, probably sensing the approach of the end, and therefore the rats begin

to leave that aching ship in advance. No one can predict how they will meet their end, and their agony may last for several more weeks. Maybe they will try to flee to Nizhny or Yekaterinburg. Maybe they are going to drink their own blood in desperation, or maybe they will suggest that we leave in order to

break the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk - which they call "breathing space" - and thereby their compromise with typical imperialism, thus saving their own in their mortal moment. revolutionary consciousness. The actions of these people are absolutely unpredictable, especially in a state of despair. In addition, they again believed that the increasingly exposed "military dictatorship" in Germany was causing great resistance, especially as a result of further advance to the east, and that this should lead to revolution. This was recently written by Sokolnikov,¹⁹⁴ apparently based on Ioffe's reports.

At the moment, the terror seems to have given them some strength, but despite this, Karakhan shoved the original of the Brest Treaty into his desk. He is going to take it with him to America and sell it there, earning a lot of money on the signature of the emperor.

We must not, of course, listen to the cries of the bourgeoisie imploring us for help and the restoration of order, but we must nevertheless take into account one serious possibility—namely, the possibility of restoring bourgeois Russia with the help of the Entente. There are Czechoslovak troops here, the British and French are stationed in Arkhangelsk, there are officer associations and party organizations. The joy of liberation from the Bolshevik terror may help the country cope with some economic problems, and the opening of banks and the resumption of free trade can significantly improve things. If this happens, then the Ukraine with its Kyiv Cadets and Hetman Skoropadsky¹⁹⁵ will finally lift the Ukrainian veil and unite with Great Russia. We will find ourselves in an extremely difficult position - we will either have to resist a powerful movement with only a few divisions, or be forced to accept this movement. Concretely speaking, this means that we must stretch the thread to Orenburg and Siberia over the head of General Krasnov¹⁹⁶, keep the cavalry secretly ready, orienting it towards Moscow, prepare the future

a government with which we could enter into agreement, having investigated for this purpose as deeply as possible the ranks of the Cadets (in order, if necessary, also to compromise them, and finally to revise the clauses of the Brest Treaty directed against economic hegemony in Russia, namely, to reunite Ukraine with Russia and come up with something with Estonia and Latvia, which we could then sell back to Russia again. Helping the revival of Russia, which will again become imperialist, is not a pleasant prospect, but such a development of events may be inevitable, because, due to the complete instability of the Rada (as I and everyone else understands it), any thought of continued independence of the UK

the rain becomes fantastic, and the united Russian soul has, in spite of everything, a rare vitality. Ukraine will fall along with the Bolsheviks. The "fait accompli" of the dynasty in Kyiv may somewhat prolong the existence of this artificial state, but nothing more. With regard to my work here, the apparatus of our united rivals, who act in a variety of roles, is extremely powerful, and our devalued rubles are disappearing at an unprecedented rate. Please excuse me for this lyrical digression about the state of chaos, which, even from the

point of view here, is already completely

unbearable.

With best wishes, Yours and
others RITZLER PS

Today the situation seems to have improved somewhat. Terror, it is true, had its effect, violating the plans of the conspirators. True, the famine is becoming more and more threatening, and since the people believe that there are wheat fields in the south, we are blamed - and not without reason - for the lack of bread, kerosene and coal. However, we may still have 6-8 weeks to decide whether we can risk the state of chaos throwing the country into the arms of the Entente - and then all our economic interests will perish, or, for the sake of saving our natural resources, we will have to establish here a bourgeois regime with which we can reach an agreement. STATE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS --TO THE MINISTER OF FINANCE

Berlin, June 8, 1918

Dear Reder!

Enclosed with this note is a memorandum for your personal and strictly confidential information, from which you will learn everything about the state of affairs today. Upon receipt of your consent in principle, I will immediately send a formal request. In view of the great importance of the matter, I would be especially grateful to you for your prompt and positive answer.

Your Kühlmann

APPENDIX

Memorandum to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for discussion with

Count Raedern Berlin,

June 5, 1918 In connection with the recent efforts of the Entente in Russia to persuade the Soviets of Workers' Deputies to accept the demands of the Entente, which could lead to an orientation of Russia towards the Entente, Count Mirbach was forced to spend considerable sums to

prevent this decision. Until now, the Bolsheviks have successfully withstood the onslaught of the Entente, but any day can bring new surprises. The Social Revolutionaries have completely sold themselves to the Entente, which, with the help of the Czechoslovak battalions, is trying to undermine the power of the Bolsheviks. It seems that as of today, the Bolsheviks managed to repel the attacks of the Czechoslovak troops. However, internal political strife may flare up in the coming months. It may even lead to the fall of the Bolsheviks, especially considering that one or even two of their leaders have already reached a certain degree of despair about their own fate.

As long as the Bolshevik government remains in power, we will try by all possible means to keep the Bolsheviks from orienting in another direction, despite the serious trials and obstacles caused by our own demands (in connection with Estonia, Livonia, Transcaucasia and Crimea). It will take money, and probably a lot of money. On the other hand, since we are considering the possibility of overthrowing the Bolsheviks, we should not break off relations with other political parties. On the contrary, in the event of the fall of the Bolsheviks, we must ensure the safest possible transition for ourselves. This will also require money.

Count Mirbach said that from now on he would need 3 million marks a month for expenses related to this activity. However, in the event of a change in policy, twice the amount may be needed, if, of course, this is possible. The funds at

our disposal for spending in Russia have been exhausted.

Therefore, it is very important that the Minister of Finance give us new funds. In connection with the situation described above, this fund should amount to at least 40 million marks. TRAUTMAN197

GENERAL

QUARTERMESTER TO STATE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS General

Headquarters, June

9, 1918 With Your Excellency's permission, I will state my views on our military and political situation in the east. Due to lack of personnel, we had to further weaken our divisions. They are strong enough to carry out the tasks of the occupying order, but if the situation in the east worsens, they will not be able to cope with it. In any case, in connection with the vagueness of the policy of the weak Soviet government, we must look in the east for other allies. In the north we have Finland, which has strengthened its military power, thanks to our entry into the country, made with the approval of Your Excellency. We can hope that whatever happens here, we will have strong military support. Ukraine has not yet achieved success in creating its own army. Ukraine is also important for us in terms of raw material

supplies. From a military point of view, we have every right to use our troops here, it would be a mistake not to do so. In Georgia, as well as in Finland, we have the opportunity to strengthen our military forces, we must form a Georgian army. Therefore,

it is necessary to recognize the Georgian state and protect it. In this case, the ethical side of the matter should be taken into account: Georgia is a Christian state, and for a long time we supported its hopes. Recognition and protection from Germany at the same time will keep Georgia safe from the greedy Turks. Otherwise, we will never cope with the difficulties there. I ask you to check the credentials of M. Chkhenkeli198, while

you have it, and accept the policy I have proposed regarding Georgia, in order to be sure that Georgia, like Finland, will support our war efforts. The decision should not be delayed until the first reports from General Kress¹⁹⁹. If Georgia becomes our forward base, then we can hope that the Caucasian territory will gradually be pacified, and we will be able to export the raw materials we so badly need from there.

I would like to emphasize that Turkey should not be forgotten and that we should, to some extent, take into account its wishes. The railway from Batum through Tiflis to Dulfa is extremely important to them. Turkey should ensure the transport of troops along this line. We must not establish control over the Tiflis-Baku line. Here the Turks will be forced to yield to us. Baku should not be given to the Turks either. General Kress must first find out

thread the situation in the Armenian and Muslim parts of the Caucasus. We must be guided by the principle that Turkey should not interfere with the formation of the Georgian army and the supply of raw materials from the Caucasus. If the Turks occupy the Tiflis-Baku line and Baku itself, we will consider this as a hostile act, as an act of occupation, which can lead to the destruction of the local oil industry. From all this it follows that

in the east we can count on the military support of Finland and Georgia. But this is not enough. We should also get in touch with the Caucasian Cossacks who are trying to escape from the power of the Soviet government. A step in this direction could be the return to them of the weapons confiscated by us, provided that they are not directed against us.

I think that everything that our situation in the East requires has been done in the military sphere, but this is not so in the political sphere. I regard the dishonest efforts of the Soviet government with the greatest distrust. I have already mentioned this to Your Excellency several times. In the attached telegram, the position of this government looks extremely unattractive. I would also like to remind you about the problems of prisoners of war, about the support of the Soviet government for the Red Guard in Finland, about the preference given to the Entente on the Murmansk railway, about the courts in Novorossiysk ... Particularly alarming is the attitude

the Soviet government to the Czechoslovak, Serbian and Romanian troops, although Mr. Ioffe objects to this. Instead of disarming them as agreed, the Soviet government armed the Czechoslovak and other troops and allowed them to advance as before and even fight us in the Ukraine in order to get the Murmansk railway and get out of the Far East. From here, according to the Soviet government, they can be transferred to France and there they will fight against us. This seems to have been in keeping with the desires of the Entente to occupy Murmansk and the East Siberian road with these troops in order to take over Russia. Then the Soviet government made a 180-degree turn and suddenly announced that the Czechoslovak troops wanted disarmament. Thus, their lies came out. I will only note here that the pretensions of the Soviet government increased as soon as they

found out that we would not cross the demarcation line, although they always protested against our imaginary advance. The Soviet government, as far as anyone can see, has adopted the same position towards us as it did at the beginning of the negotiations in Brest. It delays in every possible way all important decisions for us and, as far as possible, acts against us. We have nothing to expect from this government, although it

and exists by our grace. For us, this is a constant danger, which will only be lessened if it unconditionally recognizes us as the supreme power and submits to us out of fear of Germany and out of fear for its own existence. Consequently, the strict and ruthless treatment of this government seems to me to be ostentatious.

In order to avoid unpleasant surprises in the east, we must see to it that our own demands, based on our position, are carried out promptly and unconditionally.

The Soviet government has not yet proved that it is capable of ruling on its own territory. Until now, it has only destroyed, but now, turning sharply to the right, it will begin to build. But they have no control apparatus. In any case, powerful currents are operating against the Soviet government, and we must bear this in mind.

Although we are currently in formal negotiations only with the Soviet government, we must at the same time maintain

relations with other movements in Russia, so as not to suddenly find yourself all alone. We cannot rely on the supporters of Kerensky, they are subordinate to the Entente. We must contact and influence the monarchist groups of the right wing so that the monarchist movement, as soon as it gains some influence, will be controlled by us. The Entente also understood the importance of this movement. According to a reliable source, the Entente had already pledged support to the monarchists through Minister Nulen at a meeting of conservative elements and proposed the introduction of a constitutional monarchy in the country. The offer was accepted politely, but

no answer yet.

In the field of economics, we must reach clear agreements with the Russian people, otherwise we will be in danger that the Soviet government will do everything possible to improve the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Economic agreements in the east will also remove the Entente's threats to boycott Germany, which will greatly strengthen our position in future peace negotiations and around the world. LUDENDORFF
GERMAN FINANCE MINISTER -- AT THE GERMAN MFA Berlin,

June 11, 1918

Dear Kuhlmann! In reply to your letter of June 8, in which you also sent me the memorandum attached to document

No. 2562, I inform you that I agree to support the application, submitted without giving any reasons, for 40 million marks, which will be transferred to you on needs discussed. REDERN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS June 25, 1918 Dear Mr. Chief! Today I would like to take advantage of

your offer

to write you private letters from time to time in order to summarize briefly some

considerations about

the situation here, which, perhaps,

it will be more convenient for you to find concentrated form in one letter, despite the fact that they have already met in separate messages.

After two months of careful observation, I can no longer make a favorable diagnosis of Bolshevism. We are undoubtedly standing at the bedside of a dangerously ill person, whose condition may sometimes improve, but who is doomed.

Not to mention the fact that Bolshevism is sure to soon fall victim to the process of internal decay that devours it, there are too many elements working against it, trying to hasten its end and install their own successors. (Of course, this is not so terrible from a military point of view, but politically and economically it cannot possibly be desirable).

If we accept it as a fact that Bolshevism has reached the end of its part, then I think we should try to ensure that the vacuum left by its disappearance is filled with a regime favorable to our plans and interests - this does not necessarily mean an immediate restoration of the monarchy. There are basic prerequisites for

this. They are to some extent in a latent state, but at any time they can be activate. We

have groups of interested parties of various shades at our disposal. First of all, the monarchists, in the narrower sense of the word, who probably deserve to be considered only as the only available solid support for any possible combination, but who should not be recommended. In general, they are too lazy and too much confused and are mainly interested in getting back their comfortable and secure existence with our help. The core of the people we need must be made up of moderate right wing, Octobrists and Cadets (here the farther to the left the better), especially since such a combination will provide us with a large percentage of influential figures in industry and banking who will serve our vital economic interests. This bloc, which is already quite strong, can be further strengthened if we manage to attract Siberians there - although this will be our most difficult

problem. Then we will have even broader prospects associated with the minerals of Siberia, and in this regard I will touch a little on the wide, almost unlimited development opportunities that lead us to the Far East.

In the event of a change in orientation, we will not even have to resort to force on a significant scale, and we will be able to maintain to some extent the appearance of good relations with the Bolsheviks until the last moment. As a pretext for a military offensive, we can at any moment take advantage of the mismanagement that prevails here, or set off for the damage that is constantly inflicted on our interests here. Any significant military offensive of ours - not even necessarily directed against both capitals - will automatically lead to the fall of the Bolsheviks, after which, just as automatically, the formation of governmental bodies, which we will keep ready and which will be entirely and completely with us in service.

emptiness immediately will fill new

Of course, we will have to pay something for this, if not immediately, then later. Those friends who may show up here with us will certainly have objections to the map of Russia drawn by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. They, perhaps, have already managed to separate spiritually from Poland, Lithuania and Courland, they can even come to terms with the rejection of Livonia. But the secession of Estonia will cause - because of Revel - great bitterness, and the permanent separation of Ukraine from Russia should be considered impossible, and this should be taken as a political axiom. For those Germans who have already invested something in Ukraine, it will be difficult to agree with the demand to return it to Russia; those who thought

secession of

Ukraine as a temporary military event, they will be able to get used to with the thought of a new turn of affairs.

Of course, I am well aware that only part of the picture is available to me. Decisions can only be made by those who see the whole picture and know all the various interrelationships and relationships. However, I have desired and found it necessary to describe the part for which I am responsible, and to describe it as I see and understand it. MIRBAKH Notes 1 In this section of the book by B. I. Nikolaevsky, we have given, in translation from English

and German, a

consolidated text of selected documents published in the collections Germany and the Revolution in Russia 1915 -- 1918. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign

ministry. Edited by Z. A. B. Zeman. London, Oxford University Press, 1958, *L'Allemagne et les problèmes de la paix pendant la première guerre mondiale. Documents extraits des archives de l'Office allemand des Affaires étrangères.* Pub. et ann. par A. Schrerer et J. Grunewald. Liv. I - III, Paris, 1962 - 1976, as well as previously unpublished archival materials obtained by B. I. Nikolaevsky himself. A significant part of the documents published by Zeman, Schrerer and Grunewald, primarily Zeman's documents, were translated into Russian and published by Russian émigré periodicals. In order to make the publication of documents on German interference in the affairs of the Russian revolution as complete as possible, in the interests of the reader, this section also includes those documents from the books of Zeman, Schrerer and Grunewald that are not formally part of the archive of B.I. Nikolaevsky - Note. Yu. F. 2 A. L. Gelfand (Parvus) (1869--1924). Russian-German Social Democrat. Since the 1890s member of the Social

Democratic Party of Germany. In '1897-1898 he was the editor of "Sächsischen Arbeiterzeitung". The ideologist of the first Russian revolution, the creator of the theory of permanent revolution, later taken up by Trotsky. After the defeat of the revolution, he emigrated. In Turkey, he became a successful businessman. During the First World War he lived in Germany, took a pro-German position. With the help of the German government, he made a fortune by supplying weapons to the German army. Advisor to the Kaiser government on questions of the Russian revolution. In 1915 he founded the socialist magazine "Die Glocke" ("The Bell"). In Denmark, he organized an institute for the study of the consequences of the World War, which became the largest spy center, in which many Russian revolutionaries were involved. At the same time, he used the money allocated by Germany for the institute to finance Russian revolutionaries. Claimed to lead the revolution of 1917, but was pushed aside by Lenin. He tried to come to Russia, because he did not trust Lenin's abilities, but he was not admitted. He went to Switzerland, where he died. --Note Yu. F.

On January 10, 1915, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied: "I ask you to receive Dr. Helfand in Berlin. Yagov." On the same day, the German Foreign Ministry sent telegrams to the German embassies in Vienna (No.

142), Constantinople (No. 66) and Bucharest (No. 37) demanding that Parvus' connection with Batsaris be kept secret.

4 Kurt Rietzler (Ryudorfer, 1882-1955) - German diplomat, philosopher and publicist. Since May 1913 - 'permanent assistant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In August 1914 he was appointed to the Kaiser's retinue at Headquarters. In January 1915 he was transferred to the Imperial Chancellery. In September 1917 he was appointed consul at the embassy in Stockholm at the head of the newly created Russian section. Recalled in April 1918 to Berlin, at the same time he went to work with Count Mirbach, ambassadors in Moscow. After the assassination of Mirbach in July, he acted. ambassador until being recalled to Berlin in August 1918. Author of a number of works on world politics. -- Approx. Yu. F.

5 Gottlieb von Jagow (1863--1935), German diplomat, states secretary of foreign affairs in 1912-1916. -- Approx. Yu. F.

6 V. I. Lenin (1870-1924). Leader of Bolshevism, the extremist wing of the Russian Social Democratic movement. Failed lawyer, weak economist, banal philosopher. A brilliant tactician of the party struggle, a brilliant organizer of the split. In April 1917, through the German government, he returned to Petrograd. In July, due to travel through Germany and revealed ties with the Germans, in particular, and because of the information that got into the press about the receipt of money by the Bolsheviks from the German government, he is accused by the Provisional Government of treason, hiding from arrest, practical participation in organizing a coup in Petrograd is not accepted. The impeccable authority of Lenin in the party is one of the legends of Soviet historiography that do not correspond to the truth. Lenin repeatedly came close to losing power over the party: in November 1917, when, against the will of the majority of the Central Committee, he insisted on the creation of a one-party government; in the spring of 1918, when he insisted on signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; in the last months before his death, when he was no longer physically able to fight against Stalin. -- Approx. Yu.

F. 7 At the request of the German Foreign Ministry, Gelifand (Parvus) was granted freedom of movement in Germany, limited for foreign nationals, and a passport was issued, which he could use in neutral countries. Formerly A. Zimmerman, Deputy State

Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, asked the Minister of Finance to provide two million marks to support Russian revolutionary propaganda. Already on March 11, they received a favorable answer. -- Approx. Yu. F. 8 The request was

granted on July 9, 1915. 9 Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau (1869-1928), count, German diplomat. In the diplomatic service since 1894. In 1897--1901 no. - Secretary of the German Embassy in St. Petersburg, then in Vienna. In 1901- -1909. - Counselor of the Mission in The Hague, then Counselor of the Embassy in Vienna. In 1909-1912. -- Consul General in Budapest, in 1912-1918. Ambassador to Copenhagen. From December 1918 to June 1919 - Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1922-- 1928 - the first ambassador of Germany in

the USSR. -- Approx. Yu. F. 10 From the time of Bismarck, the Imperial Chancellor was also the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany. He was assisted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and at first one, and during the First World War two Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. From December 1912 to November 1916 Jagow was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, until August 1917 - Zimmermann, until July 1918 - Kulman, until October 1918 - Ginze. Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs were from May 1911 to November 1916 - Zimmermann, then until October, 1918 - Shtumm, simultaneously from

October 1916 to December 1918 - Busche. Missions and consulates abroad were part of the German Foreign Office. By the beginning of the war in 1914, there were 44 missions under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 9 of them had the status of embassies. After the start of the war, the missions essentially became subordinate to the Supreme High Command and lost many of their peaceful functions. Foreign Ministry officials now often had military ranks and switched from diplomatic to military work and vice versa. Relatively unaffected by these changes, only the missions of a number of neutral

states The structure of the Foreign Ministry was changed only after the November Revolution of 1918, and in March 1920 the government of the Weimar Republic of the German Foreign Ministry was completely reorganized. -- Approx. Yu. F.

11 Helphand argued that the stability of the ruble in Russia and abroad could be shaken by certain measures taken by the German Ministry of Finance. See report No. 463, envoy in Copenhagen to the Chancellor, November 30, 1915. 12 Karl

Gelferich (1872-1924) -- statesman, diplomat, economist. His work on money is often referred to with the epithet "classic". Since 1906 - one of the directors of the Anatolian (Baghdad) railway. Since 1908 - Director of the German Bank. Since February 1915, one of the influential members of the government, first as Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance, then as Secretary of State for the Interior, and until November 1917 as Vice Chancellor. One of the leaders of Germany's financial policy in the First World War. In November 1917, after the formation of the government headed by Chancellor Hertling, he resigned, led the preparations for future peace negotiations. He was appointed as Mirbach's successor to the post of German ambassador to Russia, where he left Berlin on July 26. However, on August 6, he left Moscow and never returned to Russia. -- Approx. Yu. F. 13 A Zimmerman (1864--1940). Since 1906 -

Privy Councilor of the mission. In 1910 - Head of the Political Department. In 1911-1916. -Deputy Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry. From 1916 to August 1917 - State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Note. Yu. F.

14 A. E. Kesküla, Kesküla (pseudonym A. Stein. Born in 1882), Estonian businessman, agent of the German government. June 18, 1917. left Germany due to German annexation of Estonian territory. In 1940 still lived in Stockholm. -- Approx. Yu. F.

15 A. I. Tuchkov (1862-1936), leader of the Octobrists, deputy, and since 1910 chairman of the 3rd State Duma. In 1915--1917. -Chairman of the Central Military-Industrial Committee. Military and Naval Minister of the First Provisional Government (March - May 1917). He advocated the continuation of the war with Germany. After the October Revolution, he emigrated -Prim. Yu. F. 19 G. E. Lvov (1861--1925),

Prince Deputy of the 1st State Duma. Chairman of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union, one of the leaders of Zemgor. March to July 1917 - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government. After the Bolshevik coup, he emigrated. -- Approx. Yu. F.

17 A. F. Kerensky ((1881-1970), lawyer by profession, leader of the Trudovik faction in the 4th State Duma), Minister of War and Naval Affairs (May - September), Minister-Chairman (from July 8) and Supreme Commander-in-Chief (from August 30). therefore, the Bolsheviks were easily swept away. He fled from Zimny at the last minute, tried to regain power with the help of Krasnov. Failed and emigrated abroad. Openly accused the Bolsheviks of treason (alluding to cooperation with Germany). In the last period of emigration - professor Stanford University in California - Note by Yu. F.

18 VV Shulgin (1878-1976), Russian politician, publicist One of the leaders of the right wing of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th State Dumas Member of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. After the Bolshevik coup, he emigrated. He was used by the Soviet political police as a provocateur in the "Operation Trust", then again at the end of the Second World War, when he was arrested by Soviet punitive authorities, returned to the USSR, sentenced to imprisonment, but at the same time he called on compatriots abroad to return to their homeland. Until 195b he was serving a sentence in a concentration camp. In the 1960s, he was used as a provocateur for the third time, when, on behalf of the right

The government called on emigrants to abandon their anti-Soviet views. -Note Yu. F. 9

Apparently, we are talking about Baron Leopold von Hennen. -- Approx. YU. F.

20 A. N. Khvostov ((1872-1918), Minister of the Interior of Russia in 1915-1916. Representative of the right-wing faction in the 4th State Duma.

Disappointed by the Soviet government. -

Note. Yu. F. 21 Nikolai II, Romanov (1868-1918), the last Russian emperor (1894-1917) Executed by the decision of the Soviet government.- Note Yu.F.

22 The maid of honor of the Russian court, who caught the outbreak of war on her estate in Austria, Vasilchikova was connected not only with the Russians, but also with the Austrian court circles and was used by the Germans as an intermediary. In the course of 1915, she sent three letters to Nicholas II with the message that the German Kaiser was ready to conclude a separate peace with Russia. In December of the same year, Vasilchikova arrived in Russia and tried to get an audience with Nicholas. Nikolai apparently refused to accept her: Vasilchikova was expelled from St. Petersburg. -- Approx. Yu. F

23 Georgian separatist movement. 24

Baron Leopold von Hennen (b. 1876), Doctor of Law. Attached to the Austro-Hungarian military attache in (Bern. - Note. Yu F.

20 Ye Tsivin (Weiss), socialist-revolutionary. Until mid-September 1916 he worked for the Austro-Hungarians, then for the Germans. During the First World War he lived in Switzerland. At the Socialist-Revolutionary party court, held in 1916 in the presence of Natanson and some other Socialist-Revolutionary activists, he stated that Chernov knew about the origin of the money that Tsivin had and transferred to him (apparently not completely) for the needs of the party, and gave further explanations affected. On October 23, 1917, Romberg reported rumors circulating in Russian circles in Switzerland that Tsivin, who had returned to Russia, had been arrested by the Provisional Government on charges of treason. -Approx. Yu F. 26 VM Chernov

(1873-1952), one of the founders and leading theorists of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In the revolutionary movement since the late 1880s. Member of the

Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences. In 1917 - Minister of Agriculture in the Provisional Government. Chairman of the Constituent Assembly dispersed by the Bolsheviks. Since 1920 in exile. 'During the Second World War, a member of the resistance movement in France. - Approx. Yu.F. In

1914-1918. - internationalist. Participant of conferences in Zimmerwald and Kienthal. Ideologically, he was close to the Bolsheviks. One of the organizers of the split in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and

leader of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, formally formed after the October Revolution. Emigrated. -- Approx. Yu. F.

On August 28, on August 30, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs approved the request for the extradition of 25 thousand francs, but reserved the final decision on further ties with Zivin (telegram No. 599.). Until

January 1917, when he went to Norway through Germany, Zivin received money three more times, each time for 25 thousand francs. On 19 February he returned to Bern. His request for an additional 30,000 francs was denied on March 6 (telegram No. 271). On March 17, Zimmermann changed his mind and authorized the issuance of the money, promising three

further payments of 5,000 francs each. 29 Gisbert, Baron von de Romberg (1866-- 1939). In 1905-1910. was Consul General and Envoy in Sofia, in 1910-1912. -advisor-rapporteur of the German Foreign Ministry German envoy in Bern in 1912-1919. Since October 16, 1917 - Active Privy Councillor. -- Approx. Yu. F. 30

Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856--1921). From July 1909 to July 1917 German Chancellor. After his resignation, he retired from political activity. -- Approx. Yu. F. 31 Part of

the text is unreadable. The signature is illegible The same signature is under the documents dated December 12, 1916 (see below) -Note Yu. F. 32 Christiania,

Christiania - in 1624-1924. name Oslo, capital of Norway. -- Approx. Yu. F.

33 Hermann Greulich (1842-1925), one of the founders of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland, leader of its right wing, publicist. From 1869 to 1880, he edited the social democratic newspaper "Tagwacht" ("Sentry") in Zurich. In 1887-1925. -- Secretary of the Swiss Workers' Union Member of the board of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland. Since 1902 - Member of Parliament. During World War I, he opposed the Zimmerwald Left. -- Approx. Yu. F. 34 A. F. Trepov (1862-1928), in 1916

- Chairman of the Council of Ministers Sturmer's successor. After the October Revolution in exile. -- Prim Yu. F.

35 B. V. Stürmer (1848-1917), Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign and Internal Affairs of the Russian government in 1916. Replaced by A. F. Trepov - Note. Yu. F. F.

S. D. Sazonov (1860-1927), Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia in 1910-1916. In 1918-1919) member of the government of A. V. Kolchak and A. I. Denikin. Then in exile. -- Approx. Yu. F.

37 M. V. Rodzianko (1859-1924), one of the leaders of the Octobrists. -- Chairman of the 3rd and 4th State Dumas. In 1917 - Chairman of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. After the October Revolution - in exile. -- Approx. Yu. F. 38 PN Milyukov (1859-1943),

leader of the Cadets, Minister of the Provisional Government in March-May 1917 Emigrated to Paris, where he was the editor of Latest News. -- Approx. Yu. F.

39 A. V. Peshekhonov (1867-1933), Russian public figure, publicist In the early 1900s. close to the SRs. Since 1904 - a member of the editorial board of the cadet magazine "Russian wealth", one of the organizers and leaders of the People's Socialist Party. May-August 1917 - Minister of Food of the Provisional Government. After the October Revolution, he took anti-Soviet positions. In 1922, he was expelled from Soviet Russia. -- Approx. Yu. F. 40 V A. Myakotin (1867-1937), historian,

publicist, one of the leaders of the People's Socialist Party. Member of the editorial board of the cadet magazine "Russian wealth". Since 1922 in exile. -- Approx. Yu. F.

41 VG Korolenko (1853-1921), Russian writer and publicist. In 1879 he was arrested on suspicion of having connections with revolutionaries. In 1881-1884 he was in exile. Editor of the magazine "Russian wealth". --

Approx. Yu. F. 42 N. Sukhanov (Gimmer N. N., 1882, --1940), revolutionary, economist, publicist, historian. From 1903 - Socialist-Revolutionary, from 1917 - Menshevik. Member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of the First Convocation. Together with Yu. M. Steklov and N. D. Sokolov, he negotiated and concluded an agreement with the committee of the State Duma on the composition of the first bourgeois government of Russia. Until 1920, he joined Martov's Menshevik group. Author of the seven-volume history of the Russian revolution "Notes on the Revolution" (Izd. 3. I. Grzhebin, Berlin-Petersburg - Moscow, 1922-1923).

He tried to come to terms with Bolshevism and join the party. It was never accepted. Be

Communist Academy. In 1930 he was expelled from it, and in 1931. -- Exposed as an accused in the Menshevik trial and convicted as the leader of a non-existent underground Menshevik organization. In 1939 condemned again. Died in the camp. -- Approx. Yu. F.

43 K. A. Gvozdev (born in 1883), Menshevik. During the First World War, he stood on patriotic positions Chairman of the working group of the Central Military-Industrial Committee. After the February Revolution, a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet, Deputy Minister, and then Minister of Labor in the Provisional! government. -- Approx. Yu.

F. 44 Manuscript of the telegram. Part of the text is illegible -- Note Yu F. 45

Dr. Carl von Schubert (b. 1882), Counselor of the Mission from January 27, 1917 From July 9, 1915 to August 31, 1918, he worked at the mission in Bern

-- Note. Yu. F. 46 According to German sources, Kolyshko was Baron Witte's personal secretary for 15 years. In June 1915 he arrived in Stockholm and was

introduced to the German ambassador. Kolyshko expressed his readiness to conduct pro-German peace propaganda in Russia in the Russkoye Slovo newspaper. Brockdorff-Rantzau, who was then in Copenhagen, recommended that Kolyshko and his plans be treated with caution. In July 1916 Kolyshko

reappeared in Stockholm, this time accompanied by Prince Bebutov. Foreign Ministry agent Bokelman negotiated with them. During these negotiations, it became clear that both Russians considered it highly desirable to create a publishing house that would become the center of pro-German propaganda. According to Warburg, a member of the family of Hamburg bankers, this project was not only desirable, but also profitable. The industrialist Hugo Stinnes was also interested in negotiations between the Russians and Bockelmann, but he was hostile to the whole matter, especially at the initial stage. Stinnes wanted to play a leading role, but Lucius, the German ambassador in Stockholm, felt that Bockelmann, who had connections with major Russian figures, was a better negotiating figure than Stinnes' agents in Stockholm, Trenck and Ferman.

On August 12, 1916, Stinnes and Bockelmann finally came to a compromise. Stinnes agreed to lend Bokelman 2 million rubles. to finance a publishing house in Russia. Two days later, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Jagow and Stinnes signed an agreement in Berlin, according to which the Foreign Ministry had the right to control the event in the sense that it affected relations between Germany and Russia. It seems that part of the money intended for conducting pro-German propaganda in Russia ended up through Kolyshko in Maxim Gorky's newspaper Novaya Zhizn. In one of his reports to Stinnes, Ferman

(Wrote - "New Life" began to appear only now (May 1917) and therefore it seems justified to assume that our friend is connected with this. He is probably inciting Gorky to work along purely social democratic lines in order to keep Luch

in reserve for himself ". Before his arrest by the Provisional Government in the summer of 1917, Kolyshko once again came to Stockholm and met Erzberger there. See also the appendix to Erzberger's document of March 31, 1917.

47 M. Erzberger (1875--1921), prominent German social democrat, agent of the German government. In October - November 1918 - a member of the government. On behalf of Germany, he signed the Compiègne truce of 1918. In 1919-1920 he was Minister of Finance. Killed by terrorists of the Consul organization. --

Approx. Yu. F. 48 News of the Russian revolution arrived in Western countries v lateness caused by difficulties in transmitting information.

49 Zimmermann replied on March 17, 1917 at 11:45 pm: "Erzberger has left. The Kolyshko case will be handled from

Stockholm." 50 Erif von Skavenius (1877--(1940) - at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. -

Note. J. F. 51 In the margin, Wilhelm II wrote: "But he should have gone there a few weeks ago! And he would have been there long ago! All this is the result of slowness in decisions, to which all Holsteiners along the Glusburgish line are subject!

52 A member of the Swedish government, a representative of one of the richest families in Sweden, which controlled banks and insurance companies, associated with the largest concerns in Western Europe. - - Approx. Yu. F.

53 Russian Ambassador to Sweden. --

Approx. Yu. F. 54 Wilhelm Janson (1877-1923), a Swede by nationality, a member of the German socialist movement. During the war - a member of the

General Commission of Trade Unions of Berlin. In 1905-1919. together with P Umbreyt he was the editor of the "Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands" ("Correspondent sheet of the General Commission of German Trade Unions"). From the end of 1919 - attache for social issues at the Swedish mission in Berlin. He stood on the point of view that the victory of Germany in the First World War would be in the interests of

the working class. 55 Baron Helmut Lucius von Stedten (1869-1934) - German envoy in Stockholm since March 1915. The first information about the preparations for the February coup also came from Lucius. On February 23, he reported from Stockholm: "I heard from an important figure in the Entente, who has just arrived here from Petrograd, that a major internal political change is being prepared there. Events of tremendous importance are expected this month" - Note. Yu. F.

56 NS Chkheidze (1864-1926), one of the leaders of the Menshevik Party, deputy of the 3rd and 4th State Dumas from the Tiflis province. In the 4th Duma - the head of the Social Democratic faction. After the February Revolution, he was chairman of the Petrosoviet. After the Bolshevik coup and the proclamation of independent Georgia - Chairman of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, a member of the Georgian government, a member of the Transcaucasian Seim. In 1921, after the occupation of Georgia by the Soviet army, he emigrated to Paris - Prim Yu. F.

57 Marginal note: "Since we are accused of such intentions, in order to quarrel us with the socialists, we must support the socialists (Kerensky and others) against the Entente and Milyukov and get into contact with them as soon as possible Wilhelm"

58 Marginal note in the handwriting of Wilhelm II: "This has already been ordered, since the field marshal (as well as myself) is of the same opinion."

59 A marginal note in the handwriting of Wilhelm II: "It would be possible to organize the transmission of a message from front to front (pilots with newspapers, Jews) that we are in no way going to interfere in events or somehow interfere with them."

60 V. Radoslavov (1854-1929), Prime Minister of Bulgaria in 1886-1887 and in 1913-1918. One of the founders and leaders (1807) of the liberal party (the so-called Radoslavists), which existed until 1920. He pursued a pro-German policy. In 1918 he emigrated to Germany. -- Approx. Yu F.

61 George William Buchanan (1854-1924) - English diplomat. In 1910-1918. -- Ambassador to Russia, in 1919-1921. - Ambassador to Italy. In 1921 he retired. -- Approx. Yu. F. 62

Napoleon I Bonaparte (1769 - 1821 |) - French emperor in 1804 - 1814 and March - June 1815 - Note. Yu. F. 63

Carl Hjalmar Branting (1860-1925) - Swedish socialist and statesman, leader of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden, one of the organizers of the Second International. In 1887- -1917. (intermittently) editor-in-chief of "SocialDemokraten" ("Social Democrat"). In 1887-1925. - Member of the Riksdag He took a pro-Entente position, being, apparently, an agent of the Entente, Chairman of the Stockholm Conference of the II International (April-July 1917). In 1917 he entered the coalition liberal socialist government of Eden. In 1920, 1921-1923 and 1924-1925. led the social democratic government of Sweden. - - Approx. Yu. F. 64 Hugo Stinnes (1870-1924), a major German industrialist

Since 1920 - a member of the Reichstag, one of the leaders of the "German People's Party" - Note. Yu. F.

65 On April 1, 1917, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a request to the Ministry of Finance for an additional five million marks for political purposes in Russia. This request was granted on 3 April. Taking into account the size of this sum, Count Rodern, the new Minister of Finance, asked the Foreign Office what this money was spent on. And again, for reasons of secrecy, the matter was settled verbally. 66 The following entry is in the margin of the document: "Orally used in

a conversation with Messrs. Scheidemann and Ebert, who are leaving for Copenhagen tomorrow to negotiate with Herr Stauning. alleged annexations I especially emphasized that we are interested in Courland and Lithuania

They promised not to bind themselves in any way on this score. In general, I reminded Scheidemann of his own words, spoken by him in the Reichstag "Naive is he who thinks that this war can be ended without moving the frontier pillars" Zimmermann, April 4 '67

Answer: Telegram No. 260, Berlin, 10. 4 "Russian emigrants from Switzerland will arrive in Sassnitz on Wednesday afternoon. Zimmerman"

68 Dr. Adolf Müller (1865--1943|), physician. Member of the SPD, deputy of Munich from the Social Democrats. In 1915 - an employee of Parvus at the founding of "Die Glocke". 1858-1933), Prussian envoy in Munich Since October 18, 1910 - Actual Privy Councilor. Until July 6, 1916 - Representative

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - Note Yu.F.

70 Philipp Scheidemann (1865-1939), leader of the majority of the German Social Democrats, during the war - chairman of the Social Democratic faction in the Reichstag. In February - June 1919 he headed the coalition government of the Weimar Republic. After 1921, he retired from active political activity. -- Approx. Yu. F.

71 Friedrich Ebert (1871-1925), board member of the German Social Democratic Party from 1905. Since 1913 - one of its chairmen. On November 9, 1918, he succeeded Prince Max of Baden as Chancellor of the Reich. On November 10, he entered the Council of People's Deputies, concluded an agreement with the General Staff on the deployment of troops to Berlin to suppress the revolution. Since 1919 - President of Germany. --

Approx. Yu. F. 72 Wilhelm von Stumm (1869--1935), in 1911-1916 - Head of the Political Department, from November 22, 1916 to August 1917 - Deputy Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. -- Approx. Yu. F.

73 Ottokar Czernin (1872--1932), Count, Minister of Foreign Affairs Austria-Hungary from December 1916 to April 1918 - Note. Yu. F.

74 Not published. The telegram warned Vienna of the intention of the German government to propose to King Ferdinand of Bulgaria a joint declaration of the Central Powers, where, in response to

the declaration of the Russian Provisional Government would proclaim readiness to conclude an honorable peace with Russia.

75 Boris III (1894-1943), crown prince, and in 1918-1943. - King of Bulgaria. -- Approx. Yu. F.

76 Ferdinand I of Coburg (1861-1948), from 1887 - prince, and in 1908-1908. - King of Bulgaria. The founder of the Coburg dynasty, from a German princely family. He led a pro-German policy. He abdicated the throne because of the revolution that began in the country. -- Approx. Yu. F.

77 Werner Baron von Grünau (1874--1957) - active adviser to the mission from September 1916 until the end of the First World War, representative of the Foreign Ministry under the Kaiser. -- Approx. Yu. F.

78 This is telegram No. 403 to Baron von Romberg from Zimmermann.
79 Robert

Grimm (1881-1958), one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland. In 1909-1918. - her secretary. V. 1909--1918 and 1928--1932 --Chief editor of the newspaper "Berner Tagwacht" ("Bern watch"), the organ of the Swiss Social Democrats. Since 1911, he was a member of the Swiss parliament. In September 1914, he facilitated Lenin's entry into Switzerland. Member of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences. Chairman of the International Socialist Commission. Agent of the German government. In April 1917, he made attempts to facilitate the conclusion of the Russian-German

separate peace As an agent of the German government expelled from Russia by the Provisional Government One of the organizers of the so-called "two-half" International. In 1945-1946 - Chairman of the National Council of Switzerland - Prim Yu F

80 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the envoy in Copenhagen, telegram No 250, Berlin, April 6, 1917 "Thank you for the letter Unfortunately, Gelfand left before I could see him Zimmermann" 81 Marginal note: "Dr. Gelfand

received a letter of invitation" 82 Ernst Langvert von Simmern (1865--1942),

Baron, Doctor of Laws, Acting Privy Councilor of the mission Political adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1910-1918, from November 1916

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head of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -- Prim Yu F 83

Warsaw industrialist, in whose apartment Ko-lyshko lived in Stockholm The document contains only the initials of the participants in the conversation, but it is obvious that "I K\u0003e this is Joseph

Kolyshko," B "- Bebutov "G - the owner of the apartment Gurevich When translating the document from German, for the convenience of the reader, all the initials

were deciphered and given in full by us - Note Yu F 84 Albert Thomas (1878--1932), French politician, socialist mason In 1915--1917 - - Minister of Armaments of France After the February Revolution, he came to Russia and, along the Masonic line, tried to influence the Provisional Government, insisting on the continuation of the war. In 1919, he was one of the organizers of the Berne International. - Prim Yu F

85 D O Bebutov (1859-1917) Prince One of the founders of Freemason lodges in Russia, a friend of M M Kovalevsky Sympathized with social democracy, collected documents related to the revolutionary movement and bequeathed his archive to the RSDLP The Provisional Government arrested him on suspicion of illegal contacts with representatives Germany and high treason - Note

Yu F 86 GV Plekhanov (1856--1918) One of the leaders of "Land and Freedom" "Black Redistribution" Organizer of the Marxist group "Emancipation of Labor" One of the founders of the RSDLP and the newspaper "Iskra" In exile from 1880 After the Second Congress of the RSDLP - one of the leaders of Menshevism In the First World War - a defencist, head of the Menshevik group "Unity" In 1917 he returned to Russia, supported the February Revolution He reacted negatively to the Bolshevik coup, as such, but did not oppose the Bolsheviks hypnotized by the fear of a possible counter-revolution Remained on social-democratic positions Shortly before his death, he emigrated again to Finland, where he died in a sanatorium from tuberculosis on May 30. On Lenin's instructions, he was buried in Petrograd - Note Yu F 87 Hugo Stinnes 88 Not

identified

89 Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937), Prussian general, during the First World War - assistant to General Hindenburg From August 1914 - Chief of Staff of the Eastern Front Actually led the military operations of the Eastern Front in 1914-1916 From August 29, 1916 to October 26, 1918 - the first quartermaster teneer at the Supreme High Command, that is, the actual commander of all the armed forces of Germany Participant in the Kapp putsch in 1920, accomplice of the fascist putsch of 1923 in Munich - Prim Yu F

90 International Conference of Socialists, at the request of the Dutch members of the Executive Committee of the International, who met in The Hague on April 15, 1917, was to be held on August 15, 1917 Holweg" 92

On the draft telegram, the note "Delayed after the report of Grünau on April 36" Below is the text of the telegram "Field Marshal von Hindenburg today presented me with Erzberger's report with the

conditions of the Russians, which he did not endorse. These conditions contradict my opinions already expressed earlier and

are impossible and outrageous as with from a military point of view, and from a political point of view, I have the right to rely on the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carefully checks its agents sent by them for children, from the point of view of their reliability and then provides them with instructions approved by me and absolutely binding on them. that if the Russians agreed to his proposal, I would be forced to disavow them and incur charges of treason. His act harms our propaganda in the trenches, representing the complete opposite of the recommended guidelines there. No proposals other than those made at the last meeting with my participation, should not be I must be constantly informed about the people who are sent and about their tasks, just as the army informs me daily about propaganda in the trenches , quite unsatisfactory, however

will give rise to questions and doubts, as well as to fruitless discussions that should have been avoided. It turns out that I was quite right in proposing to make a statement to the press that at the negotiations held in Kreutznach, under the chairmanship of His Majesty, the negotiations between the Supreme High full agreement was reached in peace, and thereby give the people the clarity they want and need to have. It could be said that, for reasons of military order, it is not yet possible to give details of these negotiations. Erzberger's conditions should be declared as soon as possible through appropriate means. Such self-will of an intermediary is unacceptable and should not be repeated again Wilhelm"

Wilhelm II Hohenzollern (1859-1941), German emperor and Prussian king in 1888-1918. After the November 1918 revolution in Germany, he emigrated to Holland. -- Note Yu. F 93 Georg

Ledebur (1850--1947), German Social Democrat, who voted in 1914. in the Reichstag against the allocation of military loans to the German government. Member of the Reichstag from 1900 to 1918 Member of the Zimmerwald Conference. In (1916-1917 - joined the "independent" social democrats - Note Yu. F. 94 Some places in the document could not be deciphered 95 Eduard David

(1863-1930), economist, one of the leaders of the right wing of the German Social Democracy, advocated a revision of Marxism in the agrarian question One of the founders of the journal "Socialistische Monatshefte" ("Socialist Monthly") In 1903 he published the book "Socialism and Agriculture", which Lenin called "the main work of revisionism in the agrarian question" From 1903 -- Deputy of the Reichstag In 1919, he joined the first coalition government of the German Republic B (1919-1920 - Minister of the Interior, in 1922-1927 - government representative in Hesse - Note Yu F. 96 Some places it was not possible to decipher the document 97 8th Army - Prim Yu F 98 Yu. M

Steklov (Nakhamkis, 1873-1941), in the social democratic movement since 1893. In 1917 - member of the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet, since 1917 g - editor of Izvestia and a number of other publications Member of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Rep

99 M. V. Alekseev (1857-1918), Russian infantry general (1914). 11 World War I chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, commander of the Northwestern Front, since 1915 - chief of staff of the Stavka In March - May 1917 - Supreme Commander of the Russian Army First Commander of the Volunteer Army - Prim Yu F 100 Zimmermann's handwritten note: "One member of the Socialist Party and one

member of some other." 101 Dr. Kurt von Lersner (1883-1954), baron, in 1917 secretary of the mission, from 11 April

1918 councilor of the mission. Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Headquarters in 1916-1918. -- Approx. Yu. F.

102 Dr. Diego von Bergen (1872-1943), from -12 April 1915 active mission adviser and adviser to the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

-Approx. Yu. F. 103 Bergen's reply: Telegram No. 569; Berlin, 125. "In response to Schubert's private letter: I have no connection with them. Bergen. Busche".

104 Undercover alias of Karl Moor (1853-1932), Swiss Social Democrat, German by nationality; one of the leading secret agents of the German government. In 1917 Moor was the liaison between the German government and the Russian revolutionaries. As part of the general German policy aimed at organizing a revolution in Russia and thus withdrawing it from the war, he organized the relocation of Lenin and other defeatists to Russia. Through cooperation with the German government, he compromised himself in the eyes of many Social Democrats in Western Europe and, after the end of the First World War, was forced to emigrate to Russia, where he died in a sanatorium for old Bolsheviks. -- Approx. Yu. F. 105 G. L. Shklovsky (1875--1937), a chemist by profession. In the party since 1898. Since 1908 - in exile in Switzerland. In 1912

- 'Bolshevik delegate to the Basel International Socialist Congress. One of the organizers of the Berne Conference of Bolshevik Party Leaders. He returned to Russia for the October coup. In 1918 he again arrived in Switzerland, now as part of the Soviet diplomatic mission. He was in diplomatic work until 1925. Shot - Approx. Yu. F.

196 P. B. Axelrod (1850-1928) - populist, then a member of the RSDLP. During World War I, he was a member of the Menshevik Organizing Committee. Member of the Zimmerwald (September 5-8, 1915) and Kienthal

(April 24-30, 1916) conferences. After October
coup from the ___ one

leaders of the Mensheviks Died in exile. -- Approx. Yu. F. 107 The German military
attaché in Bern, Walter Nasse. -- Approx. Yu. F.

108 The request was granted (telegram No. 299 from the Secretary of State to
The Hague on May 25, 1917): "In response to report A2026. You can give Mr. Futran
3,000 guilders. Zimmermann."

109 Marginal note in Zimmermann's handwriting: "Agreed." On June 2, Dietrich
Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to the Foreign Ministry: "Counselor Hoffman will convey
to Councilor Grimm the points of our peace program in the most general terms, as a
general impression of the conversations, so that it does not seem as if he is giving
Grimm a task." Dietrich von Bethmann-Hollweg

(1877-1933), cousin of the Reich Chancellor, mission adviser. Since December
24, 1916 - the first secretary of the embassy in Bern. -- Approx. Yu. F. 110 Telegram No.
967 of June 1, 1917 Italian agent in

Berne asked if the Entente's hopes for Russia were justified.

111 Charles I (1887-1922), Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary (under the
name of Charles IV) in 1916-1918, from the Habsburg dynasty. After the defeat of the
Central Powers in the First World War, on November 11, 1918, he abdicated in Austria,
and on November 13 - in Hungary. -- Approx. Yu. F. 112 Paul von Hindenburg
(1847--1934),

from November 27, 1914 - Field Marshal. On August 29, 1916, he was appointed
chief of the general staff of the German active army of the Supreme High Command. --
Approx. Yu. F. 113 Solomon Arvid Akhates Lindman (1862-1936), in 1905 - Minister of
the Navy of Sweden. In 1906-1911 and

1928-1930. -Prime Minister of Sweden. Since 1917 - in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In 1912-1936. leader of the Swedish Conservative Party. -- Approx. Yu. F.

114 K. Kautsky (1854-1919), leading theoretician of the Second International. In 1917 he joined the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany. -- Approx. Yu. F. 115 G. D. Weiberg (1891-1946). in the party since 1906. In

1917 - secretary of the board of the union of metalworkers, member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. Since 1929 - Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Since 1925 - a member of the Central Control Commission, in 1930 - a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Since

1937 - in the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Food Industry. Repressed. -- Approx. JF 116 Lloyd George D. (1863-1945), Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1916-1922, one of the

leaders of the Liberal Party. -Approx. Yu. F. 117 Abridged. --

Approx. Yu. F. 118 Headquarters, June 17. The Supreme High Command reports: "Brussels informs that the transport of Russian socialists will arrive in Sassnitz at noon on June 7. The

commissioner for transport, Lieutenant Rosbakh. Lersner" .. 119 I.R. In 1905 - Member of

the Petersburg Council. In 1907, he was a deputy of the 2nd State Duma from the workers' curia. After the dissolution of the Duma, he emigrated. In June 1917 he returned to Russia. In October 1917 - Chairman of the Nizhny Novgorod Military Revolutionary Committee. From November 1917 - Chairman of the Nizhny Novgorod Provincial Executive Committee. -- Approx. Yu. F. 120 "Pravda" was published by Ganetsky in Stockholm in German

language.

121 Ya. S. Ganetsky (Fursteiberg, '1679--1937), Russian-Polish revolutionary. In the party since 1896. In 1907 he was elected to the Central Committee. During the First World War, one of the closest collaborators of Parvus (Gelfand). After October 1917, he was a member of the board of the People's Commissariat of Finance, commissar and manager of the people's bank; in 1920-1921, Mr.. -

Member of the Board of the People's Commissariat of Trade, plenipotentiary and trade representative << Latvia. In 1921-1923. - Member of the Board of the NKID. After the death of Lenin, who patronized Ganetsky, he was demoted. In 1936 he was appointed to the "humiliating" position of director of the Museum of the Revolution. He was shot two years later. -- Approx. Yu. F.

122 V. V. Borovsky (1871-1923), in the party since 1894. From November 1917 - Soviet plenipotentiary in Scandinavia, from 192, 1 - in Italy. Killed in Lausanne (Switzerland).

123 K. B. Radek (Sobelson, 1885--1939), nicknames "Kradek", "Parabellum", . Polish-German-Russian revolutionary Before the revolution, he was suspected of fraud (appropriation of public money) and provocateurism (cooperation with the German and Austro-Hungarian governments). Expelled first from the Polish, and then from the German Social Democratic Party. Taken under the protection of Lenin. During the First World War, he collaborated with Parvus and Georg Klarz, and through them with the German government. Apparently, he was involved in organizing the assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in January 1919. In 1919-1924. - Member of the Central Committee, member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Since March 1920, Secretary of the Comintern, responsible for subversive activities, primarily in Germany and China. In 1923, he took the path of the opposition, in particular on the question of the German revolution, which, as the opposition believed, Stalin "failed." Around this time, Radek began to lose power, he was removed from all posts, and in December 1927 by the decision of the Fifteenth Congress of the party, they are expelled from the CPSU (b) among the other 75 oppositionists and sent to Ishim. In the summer of 1929, in a letter addressed to the Central Committee, Radek repents of his opposition activities. After the "capitulation" Radek was reinstated in the party and sent to work for Izvestia. In 1935, Radek was a member of the constitutional commission of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. In 1936, he was arrested and put on trial in 1937 (together with Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov and others). Sentenced to ten years. Killed in custody. - - Approx. Yu. F. 124 Hugo Haase (1863-1919), lawyer, long-term chairman of the SPD. On April 8, 1914, he voted in the Reichstag against granting military loans to the government. One of the founders of

the Social Democratic Workers' Commonwealth and the Independent Social

Democratic Party of Germany

From November 9 to December 29, 1918, member of the Council of People's authorized. -- Approx. Yu. F.

125 A. A. Brusilov (1853-1926), during the First World War - cavalry general (1912), commander of the 8th Army in the Battle of Galicia. Since 1916 - Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front. In May - July 1917 - Supreme Commander. Since 1920 - in the Red Army. -Approx. YF 126 Zimmerman's marginal note: "He told me the same thing." 127 August Mackensen (1849-1945),

German General Field Marshal (1915). During World War I, he was a corps

commander in East Prussia. Army commander in the Gorlitsky breakthrough. Since 1910 - commander of the army group during the defeat of Serbia and Romania. -- Approx. Yu. F. 128 D, S. Ermolenko (born in 1874), ensign, prisoner of war, who crossed the front line on April 28, 1917 and reported compromising information on Lenin and other Bolsheviks

about espionage of the latter in favor of Germany. Perhaps he was an employee of the Russian counterintelligence. -Approx. Yu.F. 129 A.F. Kerensky writes in his memoirs that their existence "was confirmed (Kerensky A.F. Russia at a historical turn: Memoirs. Republic Publishing. M., 1993. P. 20). - Note On August 15, Vorverts published an article about the Stockholm Conference, which

stated that the conference was doomed to failure in advance, since the British, French, Italian and American governments refused to issue passports to their citizens participating in the conference, and the Russian government disavowed the whole event. The newspaper stated that all the efforts of the German Social-Democrats were in vain. "What's left to do?" it said there. "We are ready for an agreement - they repulse us. a boxer's fist ready to crush us. In these circumstances, we have only one option left: to protect our lives."

131 Dietrich von Huelsen (1878-1940), from July 1916 Nadelny's successor as head of the Political Section of the General Staff. -Approx. Yu. F. 132 There are two answers to this telegram.

The first telegram No. 1455 of October 1 from Grünau concerns the question of the Åland Islands.

and communicates Ludendorff's opinion that their occupation is absolutely out of the question for the moment. In the second telegram No. 1493 of October 6, Ludendorff writes about the subversive activities in Russia on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Political Department of the General Staff, thanks for the generous funds allocated for it and emphasizes the importance of such work, especially in Finland.

133 Richard von Kühlmann (1873-1948), German diplomat. In 1900, he began his diplomatic career as an attaché at the German embassy in St. Petersburg. In '1904--1909. -- chargé d'affaires in Tangier, in 1909-1914. --. embassy counselor in London. At the beginning of the First World War - in Constantinople. In 1915 he was appointed envoy to The Hague, in 1916 - ambassador to Constantinople. From August 1917 to July 1918 - Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs. -- Approx. Yu.

F. 134 The consent of the Minister of Finance for the amount of 15 million marks was received

on November 10, 1917. 135 Hans von Seeckt (1866-1936), German military leader, colonel general. During the First World War - Chief of Staff of the Army. In 1920-1926. - Head of the Land Forces Reichswehr. In 1934-1935. military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

139 See telegram to Rietzler of November 8, 1917.

137 Handwritten note in the left margin: "Berlin, November 11, 1917. Mission to Copenhagen. To telegram No. 1329. Authorization to issue. 20,000 marks for Blau." Blau is Levenshtein's

pseudonym. 138 D. Levenshtein, a liaison between the Germans and Tsivin after Tsivin's return to Russia (for more details, see Stefan Possoni's letter to R A. Abramovich dated May 24, 1958, in the Archives of the Hoover Institute, B. I. Nikolaevskii's collection,

box 614 , folder 7), 139 G. E. Zinoviev (Radomyslsky, (1883-1936), in the period 1905-1917 - Lenin's right hand, Bolshevik, in 1917. The Provisional Government was accused of spying for Germany. After the October coup - in high government positions. Since 1919 - the first head of the Communist International. Since 1923 - in a bloc with Stalin and Kamenev against Trotsky in order to prevent the latter from seizing power. Later - in a bloc with Kamenev and Trotsky against Stalin Accused of opposition activity, expelled from the party in 1927. In 1928,

repented and was reinstated. In 1935 he was arrested in connection with the murder of Kirov and sentenced to imprisonment. In 1936, he was put forward as one of the main defendants in the first Moscow trial. For cooperation with the investigation, he was promised life. But Stalin did not keep his word. Zinoviev was shot. -- Approx. Yu. F. 140 L. D. Trotsky (Bronstein, 1879-1940). The most prominent Russian and international

revolutionary, one of the ideologists of the first Russian revolution, in

1905--1907 - Chairman of the Petersburg Council. After the defeat of the revolution - in exile. After returning to Russia in 1917, he was the actual organizer of the October Revolution in Petrograd, a supporter and theorist of the world revolution, one of the most radical elements in the Soviet government: an opponent of the creation of a multi-party socialist government from the Popular Socialists to the Bolsheviks, a supporter of terror against non-proletarian sections of the population, especially the peasantry. With the death of Lenin, he is gradually pushed aside from power by Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin. In 1926, he forms the so-called left opposition, but loses the fight and is pushed back by the right (Stalin and Bukharin). In January 1928 he was exiled to Alma-Ata, a year later he was expelled from the USSR to Turkey. 3 emigration continues to engage in political activities, publishes the journal Opposition Bulletin, forms the so-called Fourth International, sharply opposes Stalin, at the same time defending the Soviet system as such. In August 1940, he was killed by the NKVD agent R. Mercader, a Mexican communist who received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the murder. -- Approx. Yu. F.

141 A.P. Izvolsky (1856-1919), in 1906-1910) was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. From 1910 to 1917 - Russian ambassador in Paris. In May he retired and remained in exile in Paris until his death. -- Approx. Yu. F. 142 Jean Jaurès (1859-1914), leader of the French socialists,

founder of the newspaper "Humanite". -- Approx. Yu. F.

143 Jean Paul Marat (1743--93), during the French Revolution one of the leaders of the Jacobins. Killed by Charlotte de Corday. -- Approx. Yu. F.

144 M. I. Tereshchenko (1866-1956), Russian capitalist, sugar factory. In 1917 - Minister of Finance, then Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government. After the Bolshevik coup, he emigrated. -Approx. Yu. F.

145 L. G. Kornilov (1870-1918), General of Infantry (1917), in July - August 1917 - Supreme Commander. One of the organizers of the Dob-Yuvolcheskaya army (November - December 1917). Killed in battle. -Prim Yu. F. 146 A.

M. Kaledin (1861--1918), cavalry general (1916). Since 1917 - chieftain of the Don Cossack army. Shot himself. -- Approx. Yu. F

147 Naose was in Berlin at the time. -- Prim Yu. F.

148 X Rakovsky (1873-1941), one of the leaders of the Balkan revolutionaries before and during the First World War. During the war, he collaborated

with the Germans, get money from them for defeatist propaganda. In

—
1918 he was a diplomatic representative of the RSFSR in Ukraine (together with Manuilyzhim). Later (1919-1923) - the head of the second Soviet government in Ukraine. In subsequent years, in diplomatic work: from 1923 to 1925 - half-representative in England, in 1925-1927. - Soviet Ambassador to France. Initially, one of the leaders of the left opposition. As an opposition member expelled from the party in December 1927 by the resolution of the Fifteenth Congress, exiled Repented of

1934, was returned from exile, received a position in the People's Commissariat of Health of the RSFSR. At the beginning of 1936 he was the third deputy chairman of the Academic Medical Council of the RSFSR. After the formation on July 20, 1936. People's Commissariat of Health of the USSR became the head of this institution. At the Moscow (Bukharin) trial of 1938. exposed as an accused, sentenced to twenty years. Died

in custody. -- Note Yu. F 149 In 1915 Bussche was the German ambassador in Bucharest. Rakovsky spent most of his time in the same city, leading the Romanian Socialist Party and publishing its daily newspaper. On January 13, 1915, Bussche telegraphed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The Romanian socialists, whose leader Rakovsky is closely connected with the Italian socialists, want to renew in the press and on

public meetings vigorous agitation against the entry of Romania into the war on the side of the Entente. I am able to supply them with money in such a way that it does not arouse suspicion, which Südekum failed to do. I consider this matter important and ask for your permission to spend 10,000 lei on it. I need an answer by Friday morning. Busche." The next day, the Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs telegraphed his consent to Bucharest

Helphand was at that time there on the road from Constantinople to Vienna. It is very likely that he was an intermediary between Bussche and Rakovsky. On January 14, Bussche wrote to Zimmermann, including a number of reports, among them one from Gelfand, who wrote: "In addition to Batsaris, I spoke with Hristo Rakovsky, whose strong position in favor of peace is known. He also considers it possible for Romania to enter the war on the side of

the Entente" Later, In the same year, Bussche reported from Bucharest that on July 4 a demonstration of socialists in favor of peace took place with Rakovsky as the main speaker. In his report, Bussche made it clear that "the demonstration was subsidized by me and the Austro-Hungarian embassy." At the end of 1916, after Romania entered the war on the side of the Allies, Rakovsky was arrested by the Romanian authorities for anti-war propaganda.

150 Rudolf Nadolny (1873-1953), head of the Political Section of the General Staff, created in September 1914 under the representation of the General Staff in Berlin. Later, an envoy. -- Approx. Yu. F. 151 One of Erzberger's

agents in Scandinavia. 152 L. Martov (Yu. O.

Zederbaum, 1873-1923), in 1895 a member of the St. Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Since 1890 - Member of the editorial board of Iskra. Since 1, 903 - the leader of the Mensheviks, since 1917 - the leader of the left wing of Menshevism. In 1918 - a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In 1920 he emigrated: he was one of the leaders of the "two-half" international. -- Approx

153 S. Yu. Bagotsky (1879-1953), doctor by profession, active participant; revolutionary movement. Member of the SDKPiL since 1910. After the October Revolution, one of the organizers of the Soviet health care system. In 1918-1937, he was a representative of the Soviet Red Cross at the International Committee of the Red Cross in

Geneva. Since 1937, he was a consultant in the executive committee of the Red Cross in (Moscow. In 1950-1951, he was a senior researcher in the medical department

of the TSB. - Note Yu. F. 154 "Central Committee for the return of residents to their homeland Russian political emigrants in Switzerland". Chairman S. Yu Semkovsky, secretary S. Yu. Bagotsky. - Note Yu. F. 155

O. V. Blum (Oscar, N. Rakhmetov, born in 1886) , Social Democrat, Menshevik. Engaged in literary activities, wrote on philosophical topics. He was a member of the editorial commission of the Social Democracy of the Latvian Territory, collaborated in the newspaper Golos Truda. Since July 1909, a secret agent of the Riga security department. It is difficult to call him a friend of Lenin : According to one account, Lenin personally kicked Blum off the train when he intended to join the first batch of revolutionaries returning to Russia. On his return to Russia in 1917, Blum was

exposed as a provocateur, sentenced to prison and sent abroad.- Note. Yu. F. 156 Lersner's answer: "The Headquarters has no objections to the passage of

emigrants if they receive Swedish visas. The political department in Berlin will be informed. Lersner" 157 See previous document 158 In the margin, Kühlmann's handwriting reads:

"This must end." 169 In the

margin, Kühlmann's note: "To Bergen. Please draft an answer that does not obligate us to anything." 160 Telegram No. 1943 161 Reply from the Deputy Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs: Berlin, & December 1917.

Telegram No. 1416. "Reply to Telegram No. 1919. Desired trip to Bergen . Bussche." 162 Goldberg's interview with Hindenburg and Ludendorff, published in the Sunday

issue of Freie Presse, December 1, 1917. Ludendorff told Goldberg: if we are sure that it will be respected ... If someone would tell me that the Russian

revolution for us is an accidental success, I would object: the revolution in Russia is not an accident, but a natural and inevitable result of our waging a war ... This is the fruit of our victory. .), Russian diplomat.

In 1914-1916 - Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the eve of the February Revolution - Envoy Extraordinary to Norway. In 1919 - Envoy of the Kolchak government in Sweden. - Note Yu.F.

164 In the margin is Kühlmann's remark: "Serious consideration should be given to sending a copy to His Majesty without naming the source." A copy of Zise's report was in Grünau's mana. See also telegram No. 1674

165 The telegram was sent to Stockholm on December 10, 1917 under No. 1684. 166

Telegram No. 1674. 167

That is, the agreement between the army and the Foreign Ministry on preliminary conditions for peace negotiations between Germany and Russia.

168 On the same day, Bussche sent a telegram (No 1736) to the envoy in Stockholm asking him to ask Helphand to go to Copenhagen and then to Bergen. Rosenberg was in

Brest-Litovsk at that time.

170 The same text was sent to Rosenberg in Brest-Litovsk in telegram No. 18. 171 Reply

of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: "Agreed. Kulman." (Teleframe No. 74 of January 10, 1918). 172 The German

economic and naval missions, headed by Mirmach and Vice-Admiral Keyserling, arrived in Petrograd on December 29, 1917. They were to discuss and settle the issue of civilian internees, the exchange of crippled prisoners of war, and other similar issues. Mirbach reported on the chaos in the Russian capital and predicted the imminent fall of the Bolshevik government. The missions left Petrograd on 18 February, and on 23 February Mirbach and Keyserling reported to the Kaiser at Headquarters. Mirbach returned to Russia as German ambassador at the end of April. On April 26, he presented his credentials to Sverdlov.

173 Kaiser's marginal remark: "We ought to do the same the same with our tabloid press".

174 A. I. Shingarev (1869-1918), zemstvo figure, doctor, publicist, one of the leaders of the Cadets. Deputy of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th State Dumas. In 1917, Minister in the Provisional Government. Soon after the Bolshevik coup, he was brutally murdered by sailors.

-- Approx. Yu. F. 175 F. F. Kokoshkin (1871-1918), Russian lawyer, publicist, leader of the Cadets party. Member of the 1st State Duma. In 1917, he was State Comptroller of the Provisional Government. Killed by sailors along with Shingarev. -- Approx. Yu. F. 176 The Kaiser's remark in the margins: "This does not concern us; in

the world war, too, there is not enough style." 177 Kaiser's marginal note: "Symbol of the 'socialist

state of the future". 178 Kaiser's marginal remark: "It must come from outside." 179 Kaiser's

marginal remark: "Either from England and America, or from us (indirectly, through Russian generals)." 180 Wilhelm Mirbach (1871-1918), count, German diplomat. From April 1918

- German Ambassador to Soviet Russia. Killed by members of the Cheka Blumkin and Andreev on July 6. -- Approx. Yu. F. 181 A. V. Krivoshey (1857-1921), Russian statesman. In 1908-1915. - Minister of Agriculture, manager of the Noble and Peasant banks. He led the implementation of the Stolypin land reform. In 1920 - the head of the government of the South of Russia. Then in exile. -- Approx. Yu. F.

182 B. V. Savinkov (1879-1925), in 1903 - September, 1917 - Social Revolutionary, one of the leaders of the "Combat Organization", a terrorist. After the Bolshevik coup, he emigrated, setting himself the goal of overthrowing the Soviet regime. In 1924 he was lured to Soviet Russia by provocateurs from the GPU and arrested. According to the official version, he committed suicide. However, the circumstances of his death in a Soviet prison should be considered unclear. -- Prim Yu. F.

183 L. M. Karakhan (1889-1937), in the party since 1917, member of the BPK. Secretary of the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on the Brest peace. In 1918-1920 and 1927-1934 - Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In 1921 - plenipotentiary in Poland in 1923-1926. -- in China, p. 1933 - in Turkey. Shot. -- Approx. Yu. F.

184 Ya. M. Sverdlov (1885--1919), in the party since 1901. In 1912 he was co-opted to the Central Committee of the RSDLP, a member of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. After the Seventh (April 1917) party conference - secretary of the Central Committee. Head of the Orgburo for convening the Sixth Congress of the RSDLP, an active participant in the preparation and conduct of the October coup in Petrograd, a member of the party center for leading an armed uprising, a member of the All-Russian Revolutionary Committee, Chairman of the Bolshevik faction of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets and, after the removal of Kamenev, Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. He was chairman of the commission for the development of the first Soviet constitution. From the spring of 1918, he actually directed all party work, pushing Lenin aside. He organized the convening of the Seventh Party Congress, spoke there with the Central Committee's report. One of the initiators of the decision to kill the royal family in July 1918. At the beginning of 1919, pushed aside by Lenin, who had recovered from his wound, he began to lose power. During the work of the congress sent

to the province and on the way back, according to the official historiography, he "fell ill", and soon died. It is possible that the circumstances of Sverdlov's death are completely different and that Sverdlov was killed - Note. Yu. F. 185 Only the last part of

the protocol is published here. The discussion began with the question of Ukraine, then the Caucasus, the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the Flemish movement and the Crimea were discussed.

186 G. V. Chicherin (1872-1936), in the Social Democratic Party since 1905. Menshevik. Since 1918 - a Bolshevik. In 1918-1930. - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs - Approx. Yu. F.

187 M. G. Vronsky (1882-1941), member of the SDKPiL since 1902, Bolshevik. Member of the Zimmerwald Conference, member of the Zimmerwald Left. Representative of the Polish Social Democracy at a conference in Kientala. After the October Revolution - Deputy People's Commissar of Trade and Industry, In 1928 - Member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Finance, then professor of political economy and member of the Communist Academy. Repressed. -- Approx. Yu. F.

188 A. A. Ioffe (1883-1927), in the revolutionary movement from the end of the 19th century. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917 and was a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee in Petrograd. Chairman, then a member of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk. Left communist, opponent of the Brest peace.

The first Soviet plenipotentiary in Germany (since April 1918). In 1922-1924. -- plenipotentiary in China From 1924--1926 - plenipotentiary in Austria. Since 1925 - an oppositionist. Committed suicide. -- Approx. Yu. F.

188 The remark of the Kaiser in the margins: "And the Japanese, the Chinese, the British?! The entire Cossack army will be

against her!" 190 The Kaiser's remark in the margins: "This will soon settle the Cossack

army!" 191 Kaiser's marginal remark: "He will not be able to enforce this, just like the terms of the Brest peace. He has neither a government nor an executive apparatus."

192 Kaiser's marginal remark: "It's all over with him." 193 A. I.

Dutov (1879-1921), from September 1917 - Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks, in 1918-1920. commanded the Orenburg army. Lieutenant General (1919). He retreated to China, where he was killed, - Approx. Yu.F. In 1918-1920. --on military-political work

in the Red Army, member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 2nd and 9th Army, commander of the 8th Army of the Southern Front. From 1920 - Commander of the Turkestan Front, Chairman of the Turkestan All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, was a member of the first Turkburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. During the period of the trade union discussion, a supporter of Bukharin. Since 1921 - Member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Finance, Deputy. finance commissar. In 1922-1926. - People's Commissar for Finance of the RSFSR (USSR). In 1925 he joined the "new opposition". In 1926 he was expelled from the party. Repented, was restored. Since 1929 - Ambassador to England, since 1934 - Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In 1935-1936. - First Deputy People's Commissar of the forest industry of the USSR. Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, then the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Arrested in 1936, put up as a defendant at the trial of the "anti-Soviet Trotskyist center (parallel)". Died in custody. -- Approx. Yu.

195 P. P. Skoropadsky (1873-1945), lieutenant general (1916), hetman of the Ukrainian state (1918). In the same year he emigrated to Germany. Arrested by SMERSH at the end of

the Second World War, taken to Soviet Union and shot. -- Approx. Yu. F.

196 P. N. Krasnov (1869-1947), lieutenant general (1917), In 1918-1919 - chieftain of the Don Army and commander of the White Cossack army,

1919 emigrated to Germany. At the end of World War II, he was arrested by SMERSH, taken to the Soviet Union and executed. --

Approx. Yu. F. 197 Advisor to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. 198 Al Chkhenkeli (1874-1959), in the party since 1898. Member of the 4th State Duma. In 1917 - representative of the Provisional

Government in the Transcaucasus. One of the leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks. Since 1918 - Chairman of the Provisional Transcaucasian Government, Minister in the government of Grusha After the occupation of

Georgia by Soviet Russia - in exile. -- Approx. Yu F. 199 General Kress at that moment led a military expedition to the Caucasus

200 It is doubtful that this money reached Moscow at all, in any case, by the time of Mirbach's assassination on July 6, it had not yet arrived. On

June 29, Bussche telegraphed to Moscow to find out how to deliver the money. The first reply came from Rietzler on 10 July; he requested that the July portion of 3 million marks be transferred to the account of the central commission of the Deutsche Bank. The second reply was sent by Helferich on 30 July. He requests that the equivalent amount in rubles be placed at his disposal by the consuls general in Petrograd and Moscow. Gelferich, Mirbach's successor, had very little time to use this money. He stayed in Moscow for only 10 days.

II

Politburo

Decisions

and Other Secret

Documents of 1934

From the Compiling Editor

In January 1960, Milton Lowenthal, one of the American Sovietologists, drew

the attention of B. I. Nikolaevsky to the materials of 1934 and 1935, stored in the library of the Hoover Institution, California. The documents discussed below have been kept in the library for several years now. However, it was assumed that they

are fake, and their texts were not introduced into scientific circulation. It was about the resolutions of the Politburo of 1934 and 1935, in excess of 300 typewritten sheets of small text, in German. Lowenthal himself concluded that the documents were not forgeries. And he turned to Nikolaevsky as an expert, sending him photocopies of part of the materials for viewing.

Lowenthal's message about the existence of such documents was news to Nikolaevsky. But after reading them, he came to the conclusion that the documents were fabricated. Here is what Nikolayevsky Lo Venthal wrote in a letter dated February 3, 1960: "It seems to me that I still do not have

all the necessary data to finally resolve the issue. Nevertheless, I am inclined to conclude that the document is a fake. Of course, a fake, perfect very knowledgeable persons and very skillfully restrained in a certain sense - but a fake.[...] First of all, the Politburo met regularly once a week, on a certain day, which was then precisely fixed (I think on Thursdays). True, there was a commission

Politburo for foreign policy, but general issues were considered by the Politburo.

Among the decisions there are not some questions that, as exactly known to have been considered by the Politburo. For example, a question about run by the Communist Party of France in February 1934, when, by order The Politburo of this Communist Party has drastically changed its tactics.

It can be stated with complete categoricalness that the Politburo never made a decision to eliminate collectivization: it generally lay outside the plane of possible decisions. I did not quite understand where the "copies" were

filmed: if in Vienna, then this is the most convincing evidence of a forgery. Copies of Politburo decisions in 1934 were not sent abroad. They sent only extracts from the decisions to those embassies to which they were directly related. [...] I don't want to say this in the affirmative right now, but I get the impression that we are talking about a double game of

Soviet (Stalinist) agents who, with the knowledge of their superiors, sent the Germans the information that seemed useful to them, misinforming in the corresponding spirit of the Germans. From this angle, the papers are of some interest: what kind of representation

Stalin wanted to educate the Germans about his policy. But, of course, from this angle, the documents are subject to additional verification.

For Lowenthal, Nikolaevsky's answer was apparently not a surprise. Here is what he replied in a letter written by him in Russian on February 11: "I was

deeply interested in your remark that we are talking about a double game of Soviet (Stalinist) agents. In 1934, Adolf Ert, head of the Anti-Comintern, also believed that the documents represent an attempt by Soviet agents to misinform the Germans[...] When I began to study the documents, I carefully looked through them precisely from this point of view, but I could not find data for such a conclusion. set out almost in full in these documents. In general, they harm the position of the Soviet Union both in international and in internal affairs [...].

Speaking of a sharp turn in the tactics of the Communist Party of France in 1934, I [...] found that the French Communist Party came to an unexpected decision to radically change the line of the party not in February, but on May 30, 1934 (See, for example, the speech of Renaud Jean, a French Communist, delivered at the Ivres Conference CP of France on June 24, 1934, in which he complained that the United Front was to be held in the first week of February 1934, but the Politburo of the Communist Party of France did not do so until a letter about Thälmann (published on May 31, 1934) appeared. No conference took place with the rest of the party about this change. [...] see also the article by A. Vassart in the French edition of the Communist KPF

about the United Front were made

Socialist Party of France on May 30, 1934 and finally accepted by the socialists on July 15, 1934 [...] In Pravda on May 23, 1934, an attack on Doriot for his policy of the United Front appears on the second page [...] So, we can conclude that somewhere between May 23 and May 30 - most likely closer to May 23 - a decision was made in Moscow to change the party line towards the United Front [...] And the resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of May 24, 1934 (according to Stalin's report) contains this decision. [...]

By the way, I completely agree with you that some questions that the Politburo should, in all likelihood, should have discussed are missing. I have never claimed that these documents are a complete account of the activities of the Politburo during this period. [...].

It is assumed that the documents were transcribed in pencil at the Soviet embassy in Vienna, apparently by the employee who was in charge of deciphering. He handed them over to Nazi agents, who, quite possibly, hired a Russian to copy them in clear handwriting. The Nazis made translations from these Russian copies [...] The American army [in 1945] found both Russian texts and German translations. [...] I have always

considered documents to be excerpts -- so this should not contradict your notes. I look at these documents as [at] condensed reports that were sent to important Soviet agents around the world in order to inform them of the everyday politics of the Soviet Union.

"However, Nikolaevsky could not be persuaded. In a

letter to Lo Venthal, written on February 25, he concluded the following: "I am inclined to think about the disinformation work of Soviet agents - this version seems to me more plausible, but the possibility of gross fakes cannot be completely discarded. "Nikolaevsky did not even consider the possibility that the documents are genuine. Nevertheless, during the trip in Washington in June 1960, he met with his old acquaintance, Richard Vraga, who worked in the Polish intelligence service in 1934-1935. containing, among other things, materials relating to Poland, primarily the "fourth section" of this country planned by the Soviet Union and Germany. The enemy then familiarized himself with the documents and came to the conclusion that this was a fake. Thus ended the correspondence between Milton Lowenthal and Boris Nikolaevsky. Each of them remained unconvinced. Today, when the archives are open to domestic

historians, it is easy to verify whether the secret documents published below, proposed in 1935, are genuine or fabricated.

to Polish intelligence officer R. Vraga In the days of Nikolaevsky, however, access to these archives was closed. And we decided not to deprive the reader of the excitement of the unknown, leaving the search for a formal answer to the question asked by the next generation of historians. If the documents are authentic, how did they end up abroad, who exactly handed them over? If they are false, who fabricated them and for what purpose?

The publication uses materials stored in the archives of the Hoover Institution, the collection of B. I. Nikolaevsky, box 778, folders 11 and 12; box 775, folder 4. Documents are published in translation from

German language.

Yu. Felshtinsky Decree

of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of May 24, 1934

(according to the report of Stalin) The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of Comrade. Stalin I. V. 1 "On the revision of the basic premises of the general line of the CPSU (b)", comes to the unanimous conclusion that the international political and economic situation forces the party leadership to make a fundamental decision, which, for all its exceptional importance, must remain absolutely secret for all comrades, with the exception of senior officials of the central party bodies. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary that all measures be taken to prevent this resolution from being made public, even in the form of silent rumors and "confidential conversations." The Politburo of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks cannot but express its admiration for the straightforwardness of Comrade. Stalin, who has the courage to draw political and tactical conclusions that, at first superficial glance, may seem like an open betrayal of the principles and ideas of communism. Not considering it possible, for tactical reasons, to make these conclusions widely publicized, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks cannot but recognize them as absolutely correct, representing, under the conditions of the present situation, the only way out of the situation that has arisen for the Party and the Soviet Union.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully subscribes to the first thesis of Stalin's reports that the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks must temporarily abandon its very ideological essence in order to preserve and strengthen its political power over the country. Soviet

the government must for the time being cease to be communist in its actions and measures, setting itself the only goal of being a firm and strong power based on

broad masses of the people in the event of a threat from outside

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully subscribes to the second thesis of the report of comrade. Stalin that in the conditions of being surrounded by capitalist states armed to the teeth, which, moreover, have a tendency to go through a long stage of fascist political and social pseudo-revolutions (slowing down, in any case, the historical process, the completion of which will be the world communist revolution). The All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government must reckon with the forced necessity of "postponing" the world triumph of communism and timely carry out a difficult maneuver of retreat within the country in order to strengthen their resistance to a probable external onslaught. The Politburo of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully approves the third thesis of Comrade Stalin's reports that the world communist movement must remain ideologically and tactically-organizationally intact, becoming a powerful weapon in the hands of Soviet foreign policy and remaining a huge reservoir of communist cadres for a future decisive offensive against world capital. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully share the point of view of Comrade. Stalin that the rank and file fighters for the communist revolution should in no way be aware of the tactical retreat of the CPSU (b), the leadership of which is obliged to take care in a timely manner of the corresponding ideologically clear formulation of the new general line of the party. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union

*

Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 10, 1934 The

Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard at a meeting on June 10, 1934, a telegraph report from Comrade Litvinov² dated June 9, p. and the corresponding explanations of Comrade Krestinsky³, considers it necessary once again to draw the attention of the NKID to some aspects of the so-called "normalization" of relations between the Soviet Union and the states of the Little Entente⁴ The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully agrees with Comrade Litvinov and Comrade Krestinsky that the act of recognizing the Soviet government by the Little Entente should be considered. the success, above

However, he cannot but attach significant importance to the position taken by Yugoslavia on this question, and does not at all share Comrade Litvinov's opinion that the recognition of the Soviet Union by Yugoslavia is "a trifling matter." The Politburo of the CPSU(b) does not exaggerate the significance of the fact that Germany tried to flirt with the states of the Little Entente in order to weaken their ties with France, and it is well aware that the only result of these - in general, futile - attempts; was the conclusion of the German

Yugoslav Economic Cog

or, rather, a series of agreements, the final meaning of which, however, remains not entirely clear. The Politburo of the CPSU (b) agrees with comrade. Litvinov and the fact that the forthcoming visit of the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevtich to Paris is partly connected with the question of establishing normal relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, but by no means shares the exceptionally small interest that Soviet diplomacy takes in the said visit. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks had every reason to believe that the recognition of the Soviet government by the Little Entente was a foregone conclusion a year ago after the signing in London of a pact on the definition of the attacking side⁶. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks also knew that, nevertheless, the very act of recognition was delayed due to the existence of contentious issues between the USSR and the Little Entente - or, more precisely, between the USSR and Romania in connection with the question of Bessarabia. Meanwhile, the Romanian government recognized the Soviet Union simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, while this act was not followed by Yugoslavia⁷. The Politburo of the CPSU (b) cannot at all approve of the fact that Comrade. Litvinov considered it possible to be satisfied with the statement that Yugoslavia would carry out the decision taken by the council of the Little Entente "at the moment when it considers it expedient"⁸. If the assumption is correct that Evtich postponed this act until his trip to Paris, then, in the opinion of the Politburo of the CPSU (b), it would be much more compatible with the dignity of the USSR to postpone until this moment the act of recognition by Romania and Czechoslovakia. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks attaches great importance to Comrade Krestinsky's suggestion that "the Belgrade government apparently has some serious doubts that should be resolved during the negotiations of the Yugoslav Minister

foreign affairs with his French colleague" and that "these doubts concern, probably, not only the very fact of recognition of the USSR, but also the proposed new pact, as well as the general plan for diplomatic cooperation with the Soviet Union, which joined the camp of states guarding order, established by peace treaties in Europe". The Politburo of the CPSU (b) sees in the fact of Yugoslavia's refusal to recognize the Soviet Union a fact of extremely symptomatic significance, clearly showing that the Belgrade government, firmly loyal to its allied

obligations towards France, not only does not share the Franco-Czech policy of international cooperation with the USSR, but also has concrete proposals on its part that eliminate the need for such cooperation.

undoubted trends in European foreign policy combinations that run counter to the interests and goals of the USSR. The

Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly suggests Comrade. Litvinov should not take a simplistic view of the Yugoslav factor in international politics, especially in the presence of Britain's new activity in the Balkans, and take all steps immediately to "normalize" Yugoslav-Soviet relations as soon as

possible. Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks of June 10, 1934 (according to the report of Voroshilov) of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of Comrade. Voroshilov⁹ on the mobilization of grain. stocks for the needs of the Red Army, states that the figure of 1.3 billion poods of grain stocks prepared in 1933, accepted by the military command, as sufficient to cover the needs of the army, the urban population, as well as workers and employees with their families, does not correspond to reality. The gross collection figures are clearly exaggerated not only in official reports, but also in secret reports received by the Politburo of the CPSU(b). This applies in particular to the harvest of but due to late crops, their

1933, which, however, turned out to be favorable in terms of climatic conditions, poor

harvesting), etc., turned into an average harvest, and in some areas it was definitely bad. The

Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks states that there are actually no grain reserves in the country, with the exception of the party's emergency reserve, which, in the event of an armed conflict in the Far East, is absolutely insufficient even for shock regions. A temporary

attempt, by raising the price of bread, to put pressure on the consumer and thereby reduce demand, naturally cannot produce any lasting favorable results. Bread becomes the center of all the concerns of the population, and Soviet citizens mobilize all monetary and property reserves to buy it up. The Soviet increase in the price of bread inevitably creates an increase in prices on the free and underground market, and the authorities - especially in the presence of a constant military threat from outside - do not have real opportunities to combat price increases in private sales and to suppress speculation. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is forced to admit that all proposals in this direction by Comrade Voroshilov are not feasible, since the danger of war does not allow the full application of the practice of social construction.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is forced to agree with the second proposal of comrade. Voroshilov and recognize, unfortunately, indisputable, that the main task of this moment is to calm the country, for

which a complete turn away from collectivization is absolutely necessary. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, however, does not consider it possible to make an immediate final decision, clearly realizing that a turn in agriculture will inevitably cause a turn in all other areas of the economy and will inevitably turn into a turn.

political significance.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides: to convene for the 20th p. m. meeting of senior officials of the CPSU (b) at the choice of comrade. Stalin to discuss the possibility and methods of eliminating collectivization and establishing new principles of economic policy, caused by the needs of the country's defense.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
of June 21, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having read at the meeting on June 21, 1934, the information material available to the Special

Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs regarding the meeting between Mussolini¹⁰ and Hitler¹¹ in Stra¹², expresses his complete dissatisfaction

with the work of the information apparatus. There is not the slightest doubt that the question of relations with the USSR played an extremely serious role in the conversations of the two fascist dictators. Meanwhile, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks learns only from French sources that Hitler made an attempt to persuade Mussolini to recognize the benefits of the prospect of a war against the Soviet Union both in Asia and in Europe: in the opinion of the German Chancellor, such a war would inevitably lead to the fall of Soviet power and the final defeat of world communism, unless other powers would prefer to take the side of the USSR. Only from the conversation comrade. Litvinov with the French ambassador, the Soviet government learned that Hitler did not insist on active and direct assistance to the German plan from Italy, but mainly put forward the thesis that Italy should stop supplying military supplies to the "enemy of European civilization." According to information, again from French sources, Hitler insisted on a radical change in the Italian trade policy towards the Soviet Union, which greatly hindered the implementation of the goals of German policy in Eastern Europe. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, noting all these extremely important information for the USSR, states that the Special Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was not even able to give any reasonable and definite conclusion about the accuracy of the indicated data and regarding their correspondence to the actual content of the negotiations between Hitler and Mussolini. Meanwhile, it is precisely the combination of the prospect of "destroying Bolshevism" through a war with the Soviet Union and a rather strange at first glance transition from these grandiose plans to a secondary one.

The issue of Italian-Soviet trade indicates, in the opinion of the Politburo of the CPSU (b), the correctness of the French information. It is impossible not to recognize the natural desire of Germany, under the guise of phrases about the "enemy of civilization", the united fascist front, etc., to achieve a possible reduction in Soviet orders in other states in order to again, as in the good old days, get for

Germany the opportunity to dictate to the Soviet Union its terms of trade relations. Nevertheless, the

Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is firmly convinced that the named immediate task did not prevent Hitler from seriously talking with Mussolini about the prospect of fighting Bolshevism in Europe and Asia. In this regard, the opinion of Otto Strasser¹³ that Germany, due to her internal situation, will in the very near future be faced with the need to make a choice between "socialist revolution" and "fascist war" is extremely indicative. The second way out, that is, war, corresponding to the desires of the reactionary-capitalist Thyssen¹⁴-Goering¹⁵ group, seems more likely to the Politburo of the CPSU(b). The new aggravation of the situation in the Soviet East and the extreme possibility of Japanese war naturally provide rich food for adventurist plans in Germany. According to the French government, allegedly confirmed by serious Italian sources, Mussolini showed no inclination to support Hitler's plans for the USSR and, on the contrary, influenced Hitler in the spirit of

German-Soviet reconciliation. Reports from the Roman embassy vaguely indicate that "to some extent, the Fuhrer managed to win over the Duce to his side." As for the Special Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, it generally preferred to bypass the whole topic of Italian-German-Soviet relations in connection with the meeting in Stra with absolute silence, despite the fact that it is precisely on this point that Soviet foreign policy needs completely accurate and exhaustive data.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks categorically proposes to the Special Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to establish with exhaustive accuracy the further political line of Italy towards the USSR, as well as the content of the German-Italian agreement on this issue, as soon

as possible. Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 25, 1934 The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of Comrade Litvinova M. M. on the

international situation, comes to the unanimous conclusion, a) that the French diplomacy c Soviet foreign policy plan to create a system, regio

national pacts of security and mutual assistance are considered not only by Germany, but also by Italy as a direct threat to the formation of a Franco-Soviet bloc directed against them; that this plan not only does not meet with the support of England, but also causes extraordinary behind-the-scenes activity of British policy, aimed at, if not disruption, then at least "neutralization" of the project; b) that the disintegration of Europe into two opposing camps of states

can be considered an already accomplished fact, a circumstance that does not present any serious danger to the Soviet Union, since it will be possible to implement the idea of "Eastern Locarno", i.e., practically force Poland to refuse direct or indirect participation in any combinations regarding Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine; c) that Japanese-Soviet relations have entered a new stage in connection with the resolute rejection by the US government of all more

or less tempting offers by Japan regarding the division of spheres of influence, the signing of a pact on mutual non-aggression, on economic cooperation in East Asia, etc. Politburo of the CPSU (b) having carefully discussed all the possibilities arising from the aforementioned provisions, decides: 1) to propose to the People's

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to unswervingly pursue the current line of Soviet foreign policy, avoiding, in particular,

unnecessary complications with Germany and, which is extremely important, with Poland;

2) to draw special attention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the desirability, without direct dependence on the success of French policy, to improve the relations of the USSR with Great Britain and Italy to the maximum, highlighting mainly the newly growing economic contradictions between these countries and Japan;

3) stop the Soviet-Manchurian negotiations on the sale of the CER¹⁷, again putting forward the contractual rights of the USSR, violated by Manchukuo and Japan.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to pay special attention to Comrades. leaders of Soviet foreign policy on the dangers arising from:

1) from the steady desire of Italy to restore the latent in pact of the four powers¹⁸ the idea of the latter's hegemony over Europe,

II) from the desire of influential conservative circles in Great Britain to restore the Franco-British alliance, provided that France abandons the "Soviet orientation",

III) from the persistent desire of the Polish and Yugoslav diplomacy to achieve direct Franco-German cooperation.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks urges the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to avoid any, even the slightest deviation from the main foreign policy line, which, in general, has been successfully pursued by it so far. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

considers the inevitability of an armed conflict with Japan, but considers it absolutely possible to create conditions under which the Soviet western border will be guaranteed from attack from outside, and any conflict on the Far Eastern border will lead to the action of China and thereby America against Japan. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 30, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard at a meeting on July 30, 1934, a memorandum from Comrade Krestinsky dated the 28th p. m. on the situation in Europe, states that the European political situation requires extraordinary attention from Soviet diplomacy, close observation of the most insignificant events at first glance and especially careful assimilation of the slightest fluctuations in the international atmosphere. Approving basically the theses of the report of comrade. Krestinsky, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks notes with satisfaction the fact of the extreme aggravation of German-Italian relations as a result of the failed Nazi attempt to seize Austria¹⁹, considers, however, it is necessary to warn the leadership of the foreign policy of the USSR against the danger of exaggerating the nature and extent of the discord between Rome and Berlin, since it is caused by "random" episode. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks firmly adheres to its former view of the essence of German-Italian relations, which ultimately forces both fascisms to seek support in each other, especially as long as the dominant position in Europe of French militarism and, to a certain extent, French finance capital is threatened a new increase in the influence of

France on European destinies. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is inclined to assume that, unexpectedly for the Nazis, the heavy def

which did not lead to a new armed clash of the European powers, will obviously have as its consequence a more or less complete capitulation of Berlin to Rome, which feels behind it the support of Paris and the passive sympathy of London. The latter circumstance is fraught with the danger of one way or another returning to the premises of the four-power pact, especially if the Franco-British military agreement (in particular, the so-called "air Locarno") is really concluded, and Germany will have nothing else to do but, relying on conditional support of London and Rome in the issue of "equality", join the Western European system of powers or return to the broken trough of Rapallo²⁰. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers, in view of all the foregoing, that it is necessary to pay special attention to the

NKID on the possible threat of a new exclusion of the Soviet Union from participating in solving European problems, a trend especially supported by London, adopted recently by Rome and, undoubtedly, meeting with full sympathy Berlin, not to mention Warsaw. Proceeding from this, the Politburo of the

CPSU(b) urges Comrades. leaders of Soviet foreign policy, the foreign policy line of France and the Little Entente in order to achieve at least the speedy implementation of the plan for the Eastern European security and mutual assistance pact, that is, from the use the current point of view of Soviet interests, guarantees of the inviolability of the western borders of the USSR. Considering this task as the main one, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks recommends [two words lost] 1) to use to the full extent the strengthening in Germany [two words lost] in order to prevent the danger of creating a united front [two words lost] of the great powers;

2) to use fluctuations in Polish foreign policy [two words lost] (the nature and limits of the latter must be established by [two words lost] the consent of the Warsaw government to "Eastern Locarno", although [two words lost] is significantly different from the current draft East European Pact;

3) establish full contact with Lithuania and bring the Baltic countries into the sphere of economic and - joint with the Soviet -

the political influence of France;

4) to achieve closer foreign policy contact with Italy, relying on the Benes²¹-Barthou²² plan to harmonize the interests of Italy, France and the Little Entente.

Undoubtedly, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is clearly aware that the indicated tasks, or rather, the guiding lines, may seem mutually exclusive at first glance, but nevertheless, it strongly suggests that they be taken with due seriousness. and not disregard a single opportunity that would help consolidate the foreign policy positions of the USSR, adhering to the tactics of skillful maneuvering between the conflicting interests of European states. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

emphasizes that the threat of an armed clash with Japan, once again assuming extremely tangible forms, compels the Soviet Union to sincerely and in every possible way contribute to the pacification of Europe, while at the same time preventing the creation of a united front of the European great powers, which may ultimately turn out to be directed against the USSR.

Realizing the extraordinary difficulty of the task facing the NKID, the Politburo of the CPSU(b) believes that, with a certain favorable turn of things, this task could be significantly facilitated if London could be persuaded to one form or another of the Franco-British-Soviet cooperation, at least - at worst - in the form of the simultaneous existence of the Franco-Soviet and Anglo-French guarantee pacts. Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks of August 7, 1934 The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed the current international situation at a meeting on August 7, 1934, considers it necessary to state that the main task of Soviet foreign policy is to ensure the security of the western border of the Soviet Union - should be considered as yet unfulfilled, despite the undoubted partial successes of Soviet diplomacy. This conclusion is primarily due to the fact that the Politburo of the CPSU (b) cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that

1) the British policy of conditional support for the French security thesis is directed mainly against Franco-Soviet military and foreign policy cooperation;

2) the Polish policy of creating a new anti-Soviet front of powers with the indispensable inclusion of Germany in it and the resulting opposition to "Eastern Locarno" (according to the real results achieved so far - successful) is fraught with the danger of a gradual "platonization" of the East European pact and the latter approaching the type of academic treaties like the Kellogg Pact²⁵-Briand²⁴; 3) the leaders of French foreign policy tend to use the

Soviet Union exclusively as a "trump card" in the West European game, keeping open for France the possibility of a radical change in orientation towards approaching the Polish-German "Eastern plan"²⁵.

Considering all of the above, the Politburo of the CPSU(b) considers it expedient for its part to use Germany's foreign policy isolation to put decisive pressure on France by threatening to return Soviet policy to the path of Rapallo. Considering this tactical move inevitable, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks simultaneously recommends Comrades. leaders of foreign policy of the Soviet Union to pay special attention to the possibilities arising from Poland's tendency to join the Italo-Austro-Hungarian bloc, especially since the contradictions between Hungary and the Little Entente seem insurmountable²⁶. For, in the opinion of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the tactical maneuver of Soviet diplomacy in the direction of implementing the combination of the USSR-Germany-France-Little Entente, having no great chances for implementation, can play a decisive role in replacing the pact of four with an expanded one, in the sense of the guarantee thesis security, a pact of five powers (France, England, Italy, Germany and the USSR) or, at least, to undermine the plan of German-Polish expansion to the east at the expense of the USSR, which has not yet been finally archived.

In conclusion, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks urges the NKID to achieve in the very near

future, in one form or another, and a combination of the actual security of the western borders of the USSR, taking into account that the conflict with Japan that threatens the Soviet Union in the Far East has again entered an extremely acute phase.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 9, 1934 (Vilna

issue) of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed the memorandum of comrade. Krestinsky from the 8th p. m., considers it expedient to authorize comrade. Litvinov to declare to the Kovno government at a convenient opportunity that the USSR considers the Vilna question²⁷ to be resolved in the form of a direct agreement between both interested parties. Irrespective of this point of view, the Soviet government, in the event that the Vilna problem is raised on an international scale, will defend the justice of the Lithuanian claims to Vilna.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 15, 1934 (regarding the decision of the Presidium of the ECCI of August 12, 1934)

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed at a meeting on August 15, 1934, the decision of the Presidium of the ECCI of the 12th p. m. and an explanatory note to him comrade. Manuilsky²⁸, comes to the conclusion that the sharp criticism of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the activities of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs by the responsible leadership of the Comintern is a vivid example of the inability of the comrades from the ECCI to rise above the level of an ordinary political instructor in a backwoods²⁹.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers, first of all, its duty to condemn in the strongest possible way the criminal frivolity of the Presidium of the ECCI, expressed in the inexcusable fact of the dissemination of its decree of the 12th p. m. between rank and file members of the party before the specified resolution, containing irresponsible attacks against the party leadership and the Soviet government, was considered and properly evaluated by the Politburo of the CPSU (b). The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks most resolutely makes it clear

to the Presidium of the ECCI that the general direction of Soviet foreign policy and all responsible speeches and actions of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs or individual representatives of the diplomacy of the USSR are the exact fulfillment of the directives of the party leadership and the implementation of the plans of the leader of the world proletariat comrade. Stalin.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks most resolutely condemns the behavior of the Presidium of the ECCI, rejects with deep indignation

malicious attacks by comrades who are considered genuine communist Bolsheviks, against comrades who are no less genuine communist Bolsheviks, who carry on their shoulders the thankless task of defending the vital interests of the Soviet state in the field of international politics.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks reminds the Presidium of the ECCI and, in particular, Comrade. Manuilsky that in the current political and economic world situation, the main task is to preserve the proletarian communist state, which is threatened by an armed conflict with the militarily strongest imperialist-capitalist powers, Japan. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks reminds the Presidium of the ECCI and, in particular, Comrade. Manuilsky that German-Polish fascism-nationalism is only waiting for an opportunity to attack the country of the Soviets and tear away from it the most fertile and rich in natural gifts areas. The Politburo of the CPSU(b) reminds the Presidium of the ECCI and comrade. Manuilsky that British imperialism had not abandoned its hopes of organizing a powerful new front of powers capable of crushing or absorbing the Soviet communist state.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks categorically declares that the ultimate goal of the Party and the Soviet Union led by it is invariably the world communist revolution, the triumph of communism throughout the world. But the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks declares no less categorically that in the conditions of the present stage of development this goal can be achieved only if there is a powerful communist state, a citadel of Bolshevism and an inexhaustible reservoir of communist enthusiasm and revolution cadres.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly suggests that the Presidium of the ECCI continue in its work to strictly and unquestioningly carry out the directives of the party leadership and not allow any unauthorized speeches, especially if these latter are in obvious contradiction with responsible tasks, in unusually difficult conditions carried out by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs . The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks makes it clear to the Presidium of the

ECCI that its intrigues against the responsible leadership of the Soviet foreign

policies, if repeated, will lead to the immediate and energetic intervention of the Politburo of the AUCP(b) and to the immediate replacement of incapable and irresponsible comrades by people of discipline and work.

Decree of the Politburo

of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of

August 17, 1934 The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed the international situation and the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy at a meeting on August 17, 1934, considers it necessary to invite the NKID to concentrate all its attention on the earliest possible implementation of the Eastern Locarno plan . The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comes to the unanimous conclusion that - after the readiness of the Baltic states with certain reservations to join the East European Security and Mutual Assistance Pact - for the Soviet Union the task of ensuring the inviolability of the western border of the USSR is practically solved by the readiness of Poland to take part in the conclusion of the eastern pact, if such readiness could be achieved. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it expedient to recommend to the French government to make every effort, not stopping even at significant financial sacrifices, to attract Poland to participate in Eastern Locarno, especially since, if this task is successfully resolved by French diplomacy, Germany will actually have no other way out, how to follow the example of Poland. The

Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes that the Soviet government is deprived of the opportunity to pursue any sort of firm political line in the Far East as long as the security of the western borders of the Soviet Union remains unsecured. Because of this, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) offers comrade. Litvinov to achieve a joint discussion of the East European pact with the foreign ministers of France and Poland, making every effort to adapt the text of the treaty to the wishes of the Warsaw government, since these amendments and reservations will not negate the main purpose of the pact. The Politburo of the CPSU (b) draws

the attention of Comrade. Litvinov to the fact that the entry of the Soviet Union into the membership of the League of Nations³⁰ is by no means a task of Soviet foreign policy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes, on the contrary, that if the goal of ensuring

the inviolability of Soviet territory from the west can be carried out without the USSR joining the League of Nations, then such a solution to the problem seems ideal. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it especially desirable that, in the event of the inevitable entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations, all steps should be taken by Soviet diplomacy to induce the United States of America to reconsider its position with regard to Geneva.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 18, 1934 The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed at an emergency meeting on August 18, 1934, the latest reports received by the NKID from the embassy missions in Tokyo, Washington, London, Paris, Berlin and Warsaw, and having equally read with the latest data on the situation in Mongolia, Manchuria, and China proper, comes to the unanimous conclusion that the now aggravated danger of an armed clash between the Soviet Union and Japan poses unusually difficult obstacles for Soviet diplomacy on the way to creating international political conditions that can provide the USSR with a real support from outside in the event of war in the Far East, or at least guarantee the inviolability of the Soviet borders in the west. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks states that 1) Poland and Germany are evading in every possible way from making a final decision on the issue of Eastern Locarno, clearly basing their calculations on the fact that the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict will break out before the conclusion of the East European security and mutual assistance pact, and, moreover, before the conclusion of a defensive alliance between France and the USSR;

2) France, interested primarily in the military support of England in the event of an attack from Germany, in its rapprochement with the Soviet Union is afraid to go further than it would be desirable for British policy, and with extraordinary perseverance seeks to limit the limits of its possible obligations in relation to the USSR only concrete cases of open attack on the Soviet Union by the named states, Germany and Poland; the French government clearly prefers an Eastern European guarantee pact to a bilateral Franco-Soviet defense treaty;

3) Britain is pursuing a very clearly expressed policy of rapprochement with Japan, especially on all points of divergence between the latter and the Soviet Union; England's direct or, at best for the USSR, indirect support of Japan against the Soviet Union is now an indisputable fact; the constant tendency of British policy - overt or covert struggle against the communist country of the Soviets - acquires in the conditions of the present moment the character of a secret Japanese-British agreement regarding East and Central Asia; this last circumstance, naturally, strengthens the hopes and, as it were, justifies the calculations of Berlin and Warsaw; 4) The United States of America, which is a natural ally of the USSR against Japan, avoids taking on formal obligations in the event of a Japanese-Soviet armed conflict; 5) Japan, perfectly aware of the tenseness and confusion of the European situation, and at the same time firmly convinced that the Soviet Union fears war and avoids it by all means, Japan invariably proceeds from the last mentioned

assumptions and expects to seize - as a result of the failure of the Soviet-Manchurian negotiations on the sale of the CER - the indicated road, does not take into account the possibility of active resistance of the USSR to this act of naked violence. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it expedient to draw special attention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the urgent need for the speedy implementation of the plan for the Eastern European Security and Mutual Assistance Pact in order to tie the hands of Germany and Poland in relation to the alleged exclusion of a number of regions from the USSR by both of these powers in the event of a Soviet-Japanese war.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposes that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs discuss in a spirit of complete sincerity and frankness with the French government the situation that has arisen for the USSR and urgently ask the French government to accept a formal guarantee of the Soviet western border; The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to ask for the mediation of French diplomacy in the matter of rapprochement between the USSR and Britain.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks urges the NKID to take urgent diplomatic steps in Washington to induce the US government to conclude a formal defensive alliance between the US and the USSR. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks draws special attention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the restoration, as far as possible, of former ties with the German Reichswehr, proceeding from the assumption that the fantastic plans of Rosenberg⁵² do not meet with the sympathy of the German military circles.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, considering it necessary to avoid an armed conflict in the Far East, does not, however, consider it possible to give in to violence further. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, however, considers it absolutely necessary to delay as far as possible the beginning of direct hostilities, keeping a close eye on the slightest signs of the creation of this or that anti-Soviet front of the powers. Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 19, 1934 The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed the general international situation at an emergency meeting on August 19, 1934 and assessing the current situation in the Far East, comes to the unanimous conclusion that the Soviet government must immediately respond to the Japanese-Manchurian provocations. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks authorizes the NKID to take all the necessary diplomatic steps in this direction, while at the same time attending to the French government taking the initiative to prepare a collective action by the great powers to prevent an armed conflict between the Soviet Union and Japan. The Politburo of the CPSU(b) recommends

The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs shall immediately submit to the Washington government the documentary material available in the Special Department and the Intelligence Agency, illustrating further plans for Japanese expansion in East Asia. * The

Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes that the avoidance of an armed clash with Japan continues to be one of the main tasks of Soviet diplomacy, since this goal can be achieved without a complete and obvious surrender of the Soviet Union to Japan. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposes at the same time to all the appropriate responsible organs of the Party and government

to act, starting today, in strict accordance with the secret directives at their disposal, given "in the event of an immediate threat of war in the Far East."

The Politburo of the CPSU (b) authorizes comrade. Voroshilov to make, starting today, independent decisions regarding the military defense of the Soviet Union, within the powers given to him by the Politburo of the CPSU (b), "in the event of an immediate threat of war in the Far East."

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposes to the Presidium of the ECCI that, starting today, the energetic implementation of the program of communist activity in China, Korea and Japan, worked out "in the event of an immediate threat of war in the Far East." The Politburo of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides; starting from August 20, 1934, to transfer the industry, economy and transport of the Soviet Union to a hidden martial law.

Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks of August 23, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed the international situation at a meeting on August 23, 1934 and familiarized itself with the views of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs regarding the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, considers it unlikely that this time it will be possible to avert the danger open armed conflict in the Far East. In the firm conviction of the Politburo of the CPSU(b), the Tokyo government, which is entirely in the hands of the Japanese military, considers this moment the most suitable for the implementation of the next stage of its expansion plan, relying, on the one hand, on the obvious support of British imperialism, on the other, on the undoubted presence of a secret Polish-German agreement on the division of "spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe, up to and including the seizure of vast territories of the USSR. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, fully aware of the extreme acuteness of the threat of war with Japan that has come close to the Soviet Union, comes to the unanimous conclusion that the Soviet government

there is no other way out than to act with all determination to defend the rights and interests of the USSR in Manchuria and Mongolia. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, considering it tactically expedient to confine itself to the limit of the last possible acts

diplomatic protests and the mobilization of world public opinion against Japan, completing at the same time, as soon as possible, the preparation and implementation of the measures envisaged in the event of an armed conflict, strongly recommends that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs concentrate all its efforts on the possible hasty implementation of the following tasks:

1) the intervention of the great powers in the Soviet-Japanese conflict as mediators or in the form of an arbitration court (for the Soviet government, any irreproachable form of such intervention is acceptable from the international legal point of view); The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposes that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs make full use of France's readiness to support the Soviet Union in this regard;

2) speeding up the solution of the issue of the Eastern European security pact and mutual support, seeking at least the conclusion of the Baltic pact, guaranteed by France and the Soviet Union; 3) prompting the US government to take the initiative in

the very near future to propose a pact of security and mutual support between the Pacific powers, with the indispensable participation of China and the USSR in it. The Politburo of the CPSU(b) recommends vols. leaders of Soviet foreign policy should pay due attention to

the following tactical combinations, which conceal undoubted opportunities for successful maneuvering by Soviet diplomacy: conflict; b) to the simultaneous aggravation of relations between Poland and

Czechoslovakia and between Romania and Hungary;

c) active assistance to the Polish-French break and the mediation of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Franco-German conspiracy at the expense of Poland. The Politburo of

the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes that these tactical combinations are by no means ends in themselves. The main goal of Soviet foreign policy remains an international guarantee

western border - the USSR and the creation of the widest possible front of powers against Japan. The inclusion of the Soviet Union in the European Concert of Powers and the associated entry of the USSR into the membership of the League of Nations should, first of all, prevent

to implement plans for the creation of an anti-Soviet front of states, as Germany has been striving for until very recently. Decree of the Politburo of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 31, 1934.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having read the report of Com. Stomonyakov³³ and the report of comrade.

Maisky,³⁴ is forced to state that the international situation continues to be extremely tense and, in particular, the main task of Soviet foreign policy - to protect the USSR from the threat of being drawn into an armed conflict - cannot be considered even partially fulfilled. In particular, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks notes as an alarming symptom Japan's "peaceful" assurances, which correspond to the usual tactics of Japanese diplomacy, used by Tokyo invariably before the start of "decisive actions." In addition, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers the second extremely alarming symptom to be the skillful spreading by British diplomacy of a complex network of intrigues, systematically destroying - unfortunately, not without success - not only the entire combination of Soviet-American cooperation in the Far East, but also the entire system of European pacts of security and mutual assistance, especially important for the USSR in this formidable

moment.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers the assumption of comrade. Maisky that British imperialism, which is experiencing an acute crisis, sees no other way out of the impasse and to restore its world position, lost in recent decades, how to provoke a war of "annihilation" between France and Germany in Europe and between the USSR and Japan in the Far East. Based on the data of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Politburo of the AUCP(b) believes that especially the involvement of the Soviet Union in an armed conflict is the immediate goal of British policy, which quite correctly takes into account that the development of events and time work for communism, which again represents

immediate and real threat to the British Empire. A sharp aggravation of social conflicts in America, where revolutionary events of enormous proportions are brewing; the extraordinary growth of the communist movement in Central Europe, especially in Germany and Austria, as a result of the bloody days of June 30³⁵ and July 25³⁶; revolutionizing colonial and semi-colonial countries; the extraordinary strengthening of communist influence in Japan and China; a new wave of communist sentiment and revolutionary tendencies throughout the world - all this prompts British imperialism to seek an alliance with imperialism

Japanese, fully aware of the dangers arising from this for Great Britain itself. If an armed

conflict between France and Germany is included in the calculations of British policy, then it is generally immaterial to her whether this clash takes place now or in a distant time, with or without the participation of England herself. On the contrary, a war between Japan and the Soviet Union is the immediate task of British policy and, from its point of view, should simultaneously bleed communism in the USSR and Japanese imperialism, and kill two birds with one stone. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes that today the Soviet government must achieve, in spite of everything, such a position for itself in the circle of European powers, so that the western border of the Soviet Union will really be protected from foreign invasion. Using

the desire of French diplomacy to draw the Soviet Union into participation in the League of Nations, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs must take all measures to turn the Geneva talking shop into a weapon against Japan or lead to the destruction of the League of Nations as an absolutely unnecessary and even harmful institution. Regardless of this or that outcome of the "excursion" comrade. Litvinov to Geneva, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks invites the NKID to continue with the same energy its efforts towards the implementation of plans that bring closer the creation of guaranteed security and mutual assistance.

pacts

Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September 6, 1934 Krestinsky on the international situation and

immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, comes to the unanimous conclusion that the original plan for the creation of a system of guarantee pacts of security and mutual assistance, ensuring the actual inviolability of the borders of the Soviet Union, obviously cannot be implemented. The draft of the Pacific Pact, the most important for the USSR, although not completely discarded, did not meet with that share of sympathy on the part of the interested powers, which would make it possible to conclude it not only in the main version, but also in a modified and weakened form. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks got the definite impression that only Nanjing³⁷ would be ready in principle to take part in such a conversation. Tokyo categorically refuses to join it, while London, Paris and Washington are showing such obvious hesitations, however, due to various motives, that it is absolutely impossible to count on the implementation of the above plan. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks unanimously decides to propose that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs again concentrate its efforts on shifting the center of gravity of the issue to the

area of Sino-American relations, seeking first of all the conclusion of a number of political and economic agreements between Washington and Nanjing, which, by their very content, create the necessary prerequisites for aggravating US-Japanese rivalry in the Far East. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adheres to the point of view that Soviet diplomacy in relation to the United States should adhere primarily to the tactics of waiting and giving the initiative to Washington, especially since the main danger for the USSR lies in the work of British diplomacy, skillfully trying to convince the government and leading political and United States public circles that the Soviet-Japanese conflict is in the interests of both Anglo-Saxon powers, since they will be able to evade direct intervention in this conflict. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly recommends vols. leaders of Soviet foreign policy, in indispensable close cooperation with the relevant sections of the Comintern, to focus their main attention on creating conditions that cannot but give rise to an open clash between American and Japanese

interests. At the same time, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks draws special attention of the NKID to the extremely important circumstance that, judging by the report of Comrade. Yurenev³⁸, in Japan itself, part of the leading military - mainly naval - circles is on the point of view of tactical expediency for Japan to initially "deal with" the United States and only then deal with Soviet Russia. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it useful to instruct the relevant bodies, as well as individual responsible comrades, to direct their efforts towards creating conditions that confirm the point of view of the said Japanese group. It is quite obvious that the slightest attempt on the part of Tokyo to reach a peaceful agreement with the USSR on terms that are at least acceptable to the latter must meet with immediate sympathy and full readiness for negotiations on the part of Soviet foreign policy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks states that the "Eastern Lo Carno" plan is unlikely to be implemented due to the positions taken by Germany and Poland³⁹.

According to the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the conclusion of the Eastern Pact without Poland's participation in it would actually be tantamount to the termination of the Franco-Polish alliance and the final replacement of Poland in French foreign policy by the Soviet

Union. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comes to the conclusion that such a development of events is currently in the interests of the USSR and proposes that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs consistently follow the line of complete coordination of the foreign European policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of France, leaving dip

to find the legal form in which the named cooperation could be fixed.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks comes to the conclusion that the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations must be carried out at all costs during the September session, even if in a form that does not fully correspond to the wishes and international prestige of the USSR⁴⁰. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks has no illusions that the League of Nations in the event of a Soviet-Japanese armed conflict will be able to exert a greater influence on the course of events than in its time in the Sino-Japanese conflict. But the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is confident that, having added to the bilateral obligations of non-aggression pacts, a new instrument in the form of multilateral

for each power from the fact of being in the League of Nations, the Soviet government will still provide its rear to some extent. Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September 14, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the reports of vols. Krestinsky and Stomonyakov about the international situation and a telegraphic report from Comrade. Litvinov from the 13th p. m., decides: I.

Authorize comrade. Litvinov give the consent of the government of the USSR to any form of admission of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations, naturally making every effort to ensure that this form does not cause irreparable damage to the international position of the USSR.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to recommend Comrade. In negotiations with the powers, Litvinov should be given as many vague and non-binding assurances as possible regarding the forthcoming easing of the regime.

P. Offer Comrade. Litvinov to pay special attention to the urgent need to achieve certain results in Geneva in the direction of applying international sanctions against the attacker. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks also

considers it extremely desirable to involve the Soviet Union in direct participation in the implementation of the "Air Locarno" plan put forward by Britain.

III. Strongly recommend Comrade Litvinov to seek a new rapprochement between the USSR and Poland. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it highly desirable to achieve the mediation of the Warsaw government in the direction of establishing friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Germany,

European pact, seeking to establish any possibility of a Soviet-Polish-German agreement in this paragraph.

IV. Suggest tov. Litvinov to make full use of the current relations between the Soviet Union and France to induce the latter to assume a role! mediator in the Soviet-Japanese conflict. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the moment has

every reason to believe that, in connection with the change in the international political situation, the Japanese government is showing a certain, albeit in

in an extremely weak form, a tendency to resolve some of the main disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels⁴¹. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks considers it expedient to urge Comrade. Litvinov to resume unofficial attempts to reach an agreement between the USSR and Great Britain on the most important international issues as soon as possible.

politics and economics.

Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September 19, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of Comrades. Krestinsky and Stomonyakov about the international situation and having read the telegraph reports of comrade. Litvinov dated September 17 and 18 p. considers it necessary to establish the inviolability for the Soviet government and for the CPSU(b) of the position that the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, caused by tactical considerations, by no means even represents a temporary surrender of communism of its ideological positions. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to especially emphasize this circumstance in view of Comrade. Litvinov's inclination to regard the tactical maneuver of Soviet foreign policy - for the way to Geneva for the USSR is nothing more than a maneuver - as a kind of "shift" or "turn" in the political attitude of the Soviet Union in general. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it its direct duty to make it clear to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that the temporary subordination of the goals of the Comintern to the goals and objectives of the foreign policy of the Soviet state does not in any way mean even a partial "liquidation" of communism, as the new "friends of the USSR" dream of in their short-sightedness ". Returning to the immediate topics of the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the

reports of comrade. Litvinov, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to give up any hope for the participation of France and its allies in the system of military-defensive agreements with the Soviet Union, which go beyond the framework of narrow European relations. The rapprochement between the USSR and France ensures - and then only to a certain extent - the security of the western borders of the Soviet Union, but only indirectly strengthens the position of the latter in the Far East

in the face of the Japanese threat. Politburo of the CPSU (b),

paying tribute to the results achieved by Soviet diplomacy in the direction of disrupting the Polish-German plan for a "crusade against Bolshevism", considers it appropriate to strongly recommend Comrades. leaders of Soviet foreign policy to pay special attention to the possibility of an eventual Franco-German conspiracy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it highly desirable to support such a course of events, "since Poland, rather than the Soviet Union, may turn out to be a compensatory object. and Rome are inevitably doomed to futility, since the prerequisite for all of them is the exclusion of Germany from all the main combinations. The Politburo of the AUCP(b) considers it useful to recommend that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs draw the attention of French diplomacy to the possibilities arising from a joint agreement between France and the Soviet Union with Germany, taking into account especially complete foreign policy isolation that Germany experienced in the very recent past, mainly in European politics. Deeming it unnecessary to hasten with the practical implementation of the plan outlined above, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks recommends that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs its strengthening.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it first of all necessary to use "friendship" with France in order to immediately involve her in the role of mediator in relation to Great Britain and especially Japan. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks urges the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to find, as soon as possible, ways to artificially direct Japanese political and, even more so, economic expansion in side, inevitably causing such a sensitive violation of British and American interests that the focus of the Far East conflict was moved far from the borders of the Soviet Union. With regard to Europe, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it most correct from a tactical point of view to concentrate all efforts on turning Austria into an apple of discord between neighboring

states. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks further considers it necessary to give German expansion a direction to the south and south-east, while at the same time using all the available personnel of the secret police to help, by hook or by crook, to escalate the Yugoslav-Italian conflict and, thereby, divert the interest of all the great powers in side of the Balkans.

Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks of September 28, 1934 Krestinsky about the international situation and a telegraphic report from Comrade. Litvinov dated September 27, p. d., comes to the unanimous conclusion that the regrouping of forces in Europe, caused primarily by the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations and the rapprochement between the USSR and France, is beginning to take more or less definite forms. The Declaration of the Three Great Powers on Austrian Independence,⁴² which is in essence only a repetition of the Anglo-French-Italian declaration of February 17 of this year. ⁴³, served as the touchstone on which it was found with undeniable distinctness that

1) the Franco-Italian contradictions are much deeper and more difficult to eliminate than Barthes imagined; 2) the contradictions between Italy and the Little Entente, especially relations between Rome and Belgrade, can hardly be settled without Italy abandoning hidden plans for the Danube basin,

3) England is by no means inclined to get involved in a Central European strife and definitely refused a real guarantee of Austrian independence, 4) the Polish-

Hungarian rapprochement went along a line that directly contradicted the goals of French policy, but also did not fully correspond to the direction of Italian policy, 5) the "encirclement" of Germany ,

which constitutes the central link in Barthou's political combinations, turned out to be essentially broken through precisely at the Austrian point, which turned out to be already completely fixed,

6) Italian foreign policy has rediscovered moments forcing to suspect the duplicity and double-dealing of Rome.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comes to the conclusion that Poland's refusal to participate in the guarantees of the Lithuanian, Czechoslovak and, indirectly, Austrian borders is an irrefutable confirmation of the existence of the German-Polish treaty, which provides precisely for the "correction" of the latter. The Polish and German diplomatic initiative in Hungary and Rumania thus constitutes only a part of the larger Polish-German plan to "redive" Europe.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to draw special attention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the fact that the danger for the Soviet Union to find itself in the very center of new international conflicts seems far from being eliminated. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, for its part, is beginning to incline more and more to the opinion that it is in the interests of the Soviet Union to provoke an inevitable European

conflict, if possible, before the spring of 1935 and in the western or central, and not eastern, part of Europe. Since, at this moment, relations between the USA and Japan have reached the maximum maximum tension, it is necessary for the USSR to put out of action its possible opponents Germany and Poland as soon as possible, which could be carried out in the most advantageous form for the Soviet Union in the event of a German-Italian conflict due to behind the Austrian and Polish-Czechoslovak clashes. Realizing that both of these conflicts, by their very nature, cannot be localized, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that despite this, the line of development of European clashes will move away from the Soviet Union. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly recommends that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs concentrate its efforts precisely in this direction. Resolution of the

Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September 30, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard in an emergency meeting on September 30, 1934, a telegraph report from Comrade. Yurenev from the 29th p. m. and having read the conclusion of the Eastern Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on the issue, he sees the undoubted possibility of a radical change in Japan's policy towards the USSR, but considers it necessary to exercise extreme caution in assessing such. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is forced, first of all, to reckon with the obvious fact that the C

Regardless of the form of such an agreement, not only does it not tend to stop its activities, but it is gradually being filled with more and more concrete content. On the other hand, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it unwise to leave unused the opportunities that arise for Soviet foreign policy both from the existence of serious disagreements between the Rosenberg clique and the German General Staff regarding the USSR, and from the undoubted presence of a trend among the Japanese military that insists on collusion with the Soviet Union. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, without making a final decision at this meeting,

decides:

1) recommend the NKID and, in particular, comrade. Yurenev to show maximum interest and readiness for an exchange of views in relation to the Japanese diplomatic initiative, while striving at the same time to attract France to active cooperation with the Soviet Union in matters of Far Eastern policy; 2) to propose to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to pay special attention to the possibility of using to the utmost the tendencies of the German military to a new revision of the "Russian question";

3) to propose to the Special Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to establish, finally, with complete certainty, the nature, form and actual limits of the German-Polish-Japanese agreement.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, again without making a final decision on the issue, considers it necessary to carefully study the problem of ensuring the security of the western border of the Soviet Union on the basis of a complete rupture between France and Poland. The Politburo of the CPSU(b) recommends vols. leaders of Soviet foreign policy to start immediately sounding the ground in the direction of a Franco-German-Soviet collusion at the expense of Poland, bearing in mind that German claims to the Memel region⁴⁴ could be satisfied subject to adequate compensation from Lithuania⁴⁵. The return of the Silesian regions to Germany and the provision of guaranteed markets for German industry in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, the destruction of the Danzig Corridor⁴⁶ - all this would certainly satisfy the national

aspirations of Germany than the possible benefits in the event of the dubious success of the Polish-German plan.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly recommends that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs start researching the soil in the direction

indicated above in Berlin, Paris and Kovno as soon as possible. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 1, 1934 Krestinsky about the international situation and having read the telegraph report of comrade. Litvinov dated September 30, p. expresses its full approval of the diplomatic steps taken by the NKID towards an agreement with Poland and Germany regarding an Eastern European security and mutual assistance pact. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that the tactics pursued by Soviet diplomacy to support the desire of French foreign policy to re-establish genuine allied relations with Poland and thereby improve Franco-German relations, apparently, will lead to the desired result in terms of further strengthening Soviet-French cooperation. At the same time, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks notes with satisfaction that the main idea of the Soviet plan to pacify Eastern and Central Europe at the expense of Poland, put forward in a roundabout way from the circles of the French General Staff, is already being taken into account by very influential factors in French foreign policy as one of the possible solutions. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly suggests vols. the leaders of the foreign policy of the USSR, and in particular the leadership of the Special Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, to take all measures to ensure that this idea finds new and rather politically influential supporters in the near future. At the same time, the Politburo of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to concentrate the main efforts of Soviet diplomacy on preventing Barthou's tendency to skillfully evade establishing closer cooperation between France and the Soviet Union until the final clarification of Polish-French relations and on skillfully inflaming the Franco- Polish controversy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that in the latter case, relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia can, under any favorable conditions,

really become a stumbling block for all attempts to restore the Franco-Polish alliance.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks of October 2, 1934. Having heard the report of the Presidium of the ECCI on the situation in Spain and on the possibilities of active revolutionary action by the Spanish comrades, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comes to the conclusion that under the conditions of the present moment there is no reason to count on a real and any lengthy triumph of communist Spain. The process of revolutionization of the Spanish popular cannot be recognized as completed in an objective assessment of the situation, which is why we have to admit that the calculation of the creation of Soviet Spain can in no way be justified. Since, however, in itself a premature explosion of the revolutionary moods of the broad masses of the Spanish working population seems inevitable, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) unanimously speaks out in favor of the active participation of the Comintern and, first of all, the Spanish Communists in revolutionary uprisings and mass actions. The Politburo of the CPSU(b), however, believes that the forthcoming revolutionary attempt, doomed to failure, must appear in the eyes of the world proletariat as

an attempt predominantly socialist-minimalist and anarcho-syndicalist. The failure of the uprising and the inevitability of a temporary "triumph" of the bloody fascist reaction, just as happened with Germany and Austria, will inevitably lead to the unification of truly revolutionary elements around the banner and ideas of communism. The Spanish comrades must now show their courage and self-sacrifice to the worker, peasant and soldier, so that later they will have a real opportunity to stand at the head of the revolutionary movement. Therefore, the Politburo of the AUCP(b) does not consider it expedient to refuse the Presidium of the ECCI to approve its proposals. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 6, 1934 Litvinov on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, unanimously expresses his full approval of the political line and tactics of Comrade People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The Politburo of the CPSU(b) does not consider

however, it is possible to hide some anxiety in connection with the revealed delay in the formalization of the Franco-Soviet alliance, especially since the question of a direct agreement between Paris and Berlin becomes again relevant. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks strongly suggests vols. leaders of Soviet foreign policy, as well as personally comrade. Litvinov, to pay special attention to the need to timely eliminate the danger that the Soviet Union will be excluded from direct participation in the settlement of disputes between the great European powers. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes once again the undoubted fact that neither the Franco-German, nor the Franco-Italian, nor, all the more so, the German-Italian rapprochement should take place before the task of consolidating the positions of the Soviet Union in the concert of European powers will be finally

completed.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) therefore makes Comrades. leaders of Soviet foreign policy to steadily pursue a political line that would allow the USSR, relying on close cooperation with France, to seek rapprochement with Britain and Italy and, along the way, eliminate contradictions with Germany. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sees in Mussolini's plan to preserve the European balance in the form of a kind of directory of the five great powers an undoubted opportunity for the USSR to firmly join this combination. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks recommends Comrade Litvinov to concentrate his efforts on supporting which assumes the active and equal participation of the Soviet Union in it, and considers it necessary to influence French diplomacy in the same direction.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sees in the correct use of the international political initiative of Italy a real means for destroying the Polish-German combination of the Germany-Poland-Hungary-Yugoslavia (+ Bulgaria)-Italy bloc, which aims to drive a wedge between France and the USSR and to turn Czechoslovakia - and perhaps Austria as well - into an object of appropriate territorial compensation. The Politburo of the AUCP(b) emphasizes that it is in the

ultimately inevitable for "appeasement", the redistribution of Europe, in which Poland would be the subject of the division. Putting in

In the form of a strictly secret directive, the real task of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) believes that the necessary prerequisites for its implementation are the aggravation of Franco-Polish relations and bringing the Franco-Polish alliance to a complete rupture, as well as the impossibility of a bilateral Franco-Italian collusion. Decree of the Politburo of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 7, 1934

Stomonyakova on the situation in the Far East and on the immediate tasks of the East Asian policy of the Soviet Union, comes to the conclusion that Japanese imperialism bases all its calculations on the assumption that the USSR cannot conduct any serious foreign war without risking the overthrow of Soviet power by the armed population. For the Japanese government, the question of an attack on the Soviet Union, therefore, does not pose any problem: the implementation of the plans of the Japanese General Staff in relation to the Far Eastern regions of the Soviet Union is hindered only by the position of the United States, the absence of a formal Anglo-Japanese alliance, as well as the situation in China and Manchuria, where the Japanese still failed to secure their positions to the extent that they could play for sure.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, joining the assessment of the international situation made by Comrade. Stomonyakov, considers it most likely that Japan will not go for any further aggravation of the Manchurian-Soviet conflict until the problem of naval armaments is finally clarified from the point of view of the ratio of the naval armed forces of England, the USA and Japan. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes at the same time that the internal situation of the Soviet Union and the present mood of the Red Army make it really impossible for the Soviet government to take the risk of general mobilization and war. The Politburo of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly recommends Comrade. Stomonyakov, in his forthcoming conversation with the Japanese ambassador, to make it sufficiently clear to the latter that the government of the Soviet Union sincerely

is ready to discuss with the Japanese government all possibilities for radically eliminating the causes that cause the constant clash of interests between the two powers. The Government of the USSR is sincerely prepared to subject the question of coordinating the Far East policy of both states to a thorough joint discussion with the Japanese Government. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

emphasizes that its present decision must in no way weaken the efforts of the Comintern to win over the Chinese, and especially the Manchurian, revolutionary movement of the masses. The struggle between

the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang⁴⁷ for control of the insurrectionary movement in Manchuria must continue unabated.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
(on events in

Spain) of October 8, 1934 The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed the situation in Spain at a meeting on October 8, 1934, considers it necessary to remind the Presidium of the ECCI that the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) again turned out to be right in his assessment of the general political and social situation of the young Spanish republic. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks states that throughout the last days, troops have not taken part anywhere in all of Spain in revolutionary uprisings and uprisings. The Spanish army, from general to soldier, is fulfilling its "duty", and it is only to this circumstance that the fact that the present Spanish government, a plaything in the hands of industrial and agrarian magnates, which came to power by the grace of clerics, has been able to strangle with torrents of blood should be attributed outbreak

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it beyond doubt that the Spanish bourgeois republic is now going through the most severe crisis that could ever fall to its lot, and that the very existence of the republican system is in danger. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it very likely that the position and tactics of the "socialists" will ultimately lead Spain to the regime of a fascist dictatorship, as happened in Germany and Italy. Leaving aside for the time being the question of the possibilities in the future for the Spanish Communist Party to create a mass revolutionary movement and seize power as a result of an organized uprising, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) considers it necessary to consider the events in

Spain from the point of view of the tasks of the entire Soviet foreign policy. Considering it more or less established that the monarchist restoration in Spain will mean a significant weakening of the position of France, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) nevertheless sees in it a lesser danger than the establishment of a fascist dictatorship regime, the result of which will be the strengthening of the fascist bloc and the undoubted "activation" of the latter. . The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly recommends that the Presidium of the ECCI carefully examine the question of whether it is not expedient under the circumstances to concentrate all efforts on preserving the democratic parliamentary system in Spain to avert the otherwise inevitable threat of fascist dictatorship. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks urgently invites the Presidium of the ECCI to present its fundamental considerations and specific proposals on this issue as soon as possible. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 8, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, after discussing the report of Com. Litvinov on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and having familiarized himself with the assessment of the international

situation given by Comrade. Stalin, establishes the following immediate tasks of the Soviet

diplomacy:

I. Support for Mussolini's plan for a five-power pact, subject to the possibility of turning it into a security pact and mutual assistance;

II. The destruction of the German-Polish plan of joining the Roman bloc 48 and separating Yugoslavia and Romania from Czechoslovakia; III. The destruction of the Italian plan to involve France in a combination of the Roman bloc, Bulgaria and Greece and the subsequent agreement with Germany on the basis of granting the latter a formal right to armaments equality;

IV. Exacerbation of Polish-French disagreements and the creation of a conflict between Lithuania on the one hand, Germany and Poland on the other; V. Rapprochement with the

Scandinavian countries; VI Consistent implementation of the plan for the division of Poland in the event of the complete impracticability of East Locarno;

VII. Support for a plan for a security and mutual assistance pact between the USSR, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan; VIII

Support for the Nine-Power Pacific Conference Plan and the Plan for Concluding Security Treaties between the latter and mutual assistance;

IX. Escalation of the conflict between Australia and Japan. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 16, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the reports of vols. Krestinsky and Stomonyakov on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, decides:

I. Taking into account the current external and internal political situation in Germany, to authorize comrade. Surits⁴⁹ to make independent decisions without a preliminary request from the NKID, within the following specific issues: a) ways to involve Germany in the adoption of the plan for the Eastern European Security and Mutual

Assistance Pact, based on the presence of serious, recently aggravated disagreements between the departments of Neurath⁵⁰ and Rosenberg; the fundamental readiness of the government of the Soviet Union to mediate between France and Germany on the basis of recognizing Germany's equal rights in the field of armaments; restoration of the main

the premises of the Rapallo Treaty and arising from the last business cooperation between the USSR and Germany in the form that took place before 1933⁵¹; b) harmonization

of the economic interests of Germany and the Soviet Union; the conclusion of a new trade agreement based on the principle of planned contingent exchange of goods; c) the activities of the organs of the Comintern

and the KKE, proceeding from the assumption that already in the spring of 1935 a situation favorable for a broad revolutionary offensive along the entire front would be created in Germany.

II. Taking into account the desire of Japan to achieve the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Great Britain and the United States of America and the simultaneous conclusion of a tripartite agreement between these powers on the division of spheres of influence in the Pacific Ocean, to authorize comrade. Troyanovsky⁵² for presentation to the Washington

government, relying on the latter's formal assurance to the government of the USSR regarding the involvement of the Soviet Union in direct participation in solving the Pacific problem and upholding by the United States of the plan for a nine-power conference, to authorize comrade. Troyanovsky to the Washington government's proposal to take the lead in the draft Pacific Security and Mutual Assistance Pact.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 19, 1934 The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed the international political situation at a meeting on October 19, 1934, sees a serious danger to the foreign policy positions recently captured by Soviet diplomacy in the fact that the French government is hesitating about formal conclusion of the Franco-Soviet alliance.

Continuing to stand on the point of view that it is in the interests of the USSR to preserve maximum freedom of maneuver for Soviet diplomacy, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is by no means a supporter of the final inclusion of the Soviet Union in the French grouping of powers, since the main aspiration of France remains such a solution to the problem of Franco-Soviet relations. The presence of French hesitations, however, is quite clear proof that French foreign policy has lately taken into account the possibilities that lie outside Soviet-French military cooperation. There is no doubt that the French General Staff is still of the opinion that the strategic position of Poland in

relation to Germany is more advantageous than the position of the USSR, and that due to this circumstance Poland should be the basis of the entire French policy of Eastern alliances. At the same time, the capital

French political circles fear both the consolidation of the Soviet regime and the need, in the event of a formal "alliance", to provide the Soviet Union with substantial financial support. The influence of London in the direction of weakening the ties between France and the USSR has likewise been increasing in recent times.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it expedient to direct all the efforts of Soviet diplomacy

a) closer rapprochement with Czechoslovakia and Romania and

b) to provide France with new evidence of the existence of a secret Polish-German treaty directed against Lithuania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia and providing for German expansion in the southeast direction.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks further considers it useful to give France the impression that there are secret negotiations between the USSR and German military circles regarding the conclusion of a Soviet-German military alliance. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly recommends that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs really continue such negotiations, given the simple circumstance that the conclusion of a Soviet-German alliance under these conditions places the key to the fate of Europe

in general in the hands of Moscow and Berlin. In conclusion, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it useful to remind the Presidium of the ECCI that for the USSR all treaties with the capitalist powers are only a means to an end goal. Violation of these agreements at the right time seems more than likely

to the Politburo of the CPSU(b). Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 21, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard in a meeting on October 21, 1934, comrade. Stalin on the international situation, unanimously speaks out for the firm and unswerving implementation of the foreign policy line drawn by the leader of the world proletariat. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully and unanimously subscribes to the point of view of comrade. Stalin regarding the tasks immediately facing the foreign policy of the Soviet Union at the moment, and comes to the conclusion that it is within the capabilities of Soviet diplomacy to achieve in the near future the set comrade. Stalin's goals

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully subscribes to the main thesis of Comrade. speaker that the immediate danger for the USSR of a war on two fronts can be considered eliminated. Thanks to the skillful maneuvering of Soviet diplomacy, Japan is currently deprived of the opportunity to start an armed conflict with the Soviet Union and is forced to concentrate all its attention on the problem of an agreement with the USA and Great Britain on the question of naval armaments.

Germany, unexpectedly for itself, in the face of the threat of an open conflict with Italy and forced to reckon with an even more formidable danger for her

of the Franco-Italian alliance, is experiencing an acute crisis in its foreign policy and is showing a clear tendency to replace the Rosenberg plan for eastern expansion with a project of IB expansion carefully developed by the specialists of the General Staff in the southern and southeastern directions, both in Trieste and Fiume, and in Constantinople

The Politburo of the CPSU (b) fully subscribes to the point of view of comrade. Stalin regarding the need to once again raise on an international scale the issue of concluding a system of security and mutual assistance pacts, with the aim of ensuring, first of all, the inviolability of the Far Eastern and Western borders of the Soviet Union. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks provides vols. leaders of Soviet foreign policy full freedom of initiative, insofar as the implementation of the main task indicated above can be facilitated. The Politburo of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks recommends that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, firmly adhering to the policy of rapprochement and cooperation with the United States in the Far East and striving to establish foreign policy contact with Great Britain, avoid excessive and exclusive dependence of the USSR on one group of powers or another in

the field of European policy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it especially desirable that the USSR should act as an intermediary between France and Germany, as well as between Germany and the Little Entente. In the event of a clear turn in German foreign policy towards rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks urges the NKID not to abandon the German card in its diplomatic game, especially since the presence of such a card should inevitably force France and the Little Entente to conclude a defensive alliance with the USSR.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes that it fully shares the views of comrade. Stalin that the five-power pact would be the most acceptable solution for the USSR to the problem of the security of its western borders, since this pact would acquire the character of a guarantee. Considering, however, the possibility of further aggravation of contradictions between individual European groupings of powers, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) considers it the direct and main duty of all bodies of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs

to ensure that the aggravation of contradictions takes place along the line of the southeastern and southern centers of disagreement, and not in the East of Europe. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated October 24, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having read the report of Comrade V.V. Krestinsky on the situation in Eastern and Central Europe, comes to the unanimous conclusion that it is necessary to pay special attention of the NKID to the desirability of concentrating the efforts of Soviet diplomacy in the direction of destroying or at least weakening Polish-German cooperation in the field of foreign policy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proceeds from the assumption that the Berlin government is gradually beginning to guess how much the game of Poland was in relation to it, which ultimately achieved such a settlement of Polish-German relations, in which all the benefits turned out to be on its side. Poland secured for itself not only unhindered possession of the Danzig Corridor for ten years, but also received every opportunity to firmly establish itself in Poznan and in Pomerania, not to mention the actual right to exert maximum pressure on the German national minority.

As for Germany, in the end she has only the dubious satisfaction of knowing that she has succeeded in breaking through the iron ring closed around her by French diplomacy, while at the same time witnessing the unchanging strength of the Franco-Polish alliance. One of the undoubted goals of the German-Polish rapprochement on the part of Berlin - to achieve by this means the elimination of the most acute differences with France and, at best, to reach a complete agreement with the latter - turned out to be not only unattainable, but also led the IB in the end to a completely undesirable effect for Germany, namely, to close foreign policy cooperation between France and the Soviet Union. At the same time, Berlin's firm calculation of a Soviet-Japanese

armed conflict did not justify itself and, according to all information, will not justify itself in any immediate future. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, taking into account these circumstances and taking into account the obvious desire of the German imperial government to re-engage in the concert of the European powers and come to an agreement, first of all, with

England and France, sees one of the essential tasks of Soviet foreign policy in deepening the Franco-Polish differences, in parallel driving a wedge between Berlin and Warsaw. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks pays special attention to Comrades. leaders of Soviet foreign policy on the fact that the German imperial government

1) avoids in every possible way any complications with England, 2) absolutely does not want an armed clash with France, especially as an attacking side, 3) gradually becomes convinced

of the doubtfulness of the successful implementation of the Rosenberg East European plan (which, apparently, itself is now inclined towards a radical revision of the sequence of stages of German expansion), 4) comes to the conclusion that the southern and southeastern

direction is, under the given conditions, the line of least resistance, 5) would, in essence, be ready to change the Polish orientation of its foreign policy to

participation in some more realistic combination, as such would give Germany immediate and tangible benefits. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sees no reason for the Soviet Union to fear a joint Polish-German attack on the territory

of the USSR in the near future, but considers it expedient to take timely measures to finally eliminate such a possibility. Without prejudging the further development of Soviet-German and Soviet-Polish relations, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks limits the task of Soviet foreign policy for the near future to the radical destruction of the close contact now established between Berlin and Warsaw in the field of foreign policy.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 25, 1934 The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having read the report of the Eastern Department of the NKID on the situation in the Far East and the latest reports of vols. Yurenev, Troyanovsky and Maisky, at a meeting on October 25, 1934, subjected the whole range of issues raised by the said report and reports to a thorough discussion and came to the unanimous conclusion that the immedia

armed conflict between the USSR and Japan can be considered eliminated.

Despite this conclusion, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) considers it necessary not only to maintain in force all the measures taken for the defense of the Soviet Far East, but also to continue unswervingly carrying out the measures planned at the time to create an obvious military superiority of the Soviet Union in the event of new complications in East Asia or the Pacific

ocean.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks makes it an indispensable duty for all responsible party and Soviet bodies to concentrate all efforts on creating conditions that will ensure the Red Army's ability to successfully defend the Soviet borders from any attempt by one or another imperialist power or group of

zhav. The Politburo of the CPSU (b) fully subscribes to the point of view of comrade. Voroshilov regarding the need for further vigorous intensification of combat training not only of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, but also of the rear. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is unanimously in favor of a radical revision of the entire policy and tactics of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from the point of view of increasing the country's defense capability and instructs Comrade. Voroshilov to submit in the most hasty manner to the Politburo of the CPSU (b) his and his employees proposals of a general and private order on the issue. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it

absolutely necessary to abandon, if necessary, the implementation of the general line of the Party in the future, both in the internal political and economic fields, and henceforth be guided solely by considerations of tactical expediency, setting itself the main task of strengthening the combat might of the Soviet Union. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it a particularly urgent need to request in confidence all responsible comrades regarding practical proposals in the field of the new agricultural policy of the Party, outlined by Comrade. Stalin.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks attaches exceptional importance to the preliminary negotiations between Japan, Great Britain and the United States on the question of the correlation of their naval armaments. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that Soviet diplomacy has every reason

count on a new aggravation of Japanese-American contradictions, which must inevitably lead either to the formation of an Anglo-American front against Japan, or to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Considering the first possibility more likely, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks urges the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to pay special attention to the further strengthening of ties between the USSR and the USA. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that in this way the Soviet government will succeed in the end in achieving rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, i.e., in creating favorable conditions for the implementation of the Pacific Conference plan, as a result of which either the ground is created for the Pacific Guarantee Pact of Security and Mutual Assistance, or the complete isolation of Japan and thus a situation conducive to the return to the Soviet Union of the political and economic positions it had lost in the Far East.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 26, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of comrade. Krestinsky on Soviet-German relations, notes with satisfaction the readiness of the Berlin government to move closer to the Soviet Union. Politburo of the CPSU(b) is perfectly aware that the indicated aspiration of German diplomacy is dictated primarily by tactical considerations and by no means represents a fundamental change in the basic meaning and content of Berlin's East European policy, but at the same time the Politburo of the CPSU (b) cannot but come to the conclusion that that the diametrically opposed tactical motives of Soviet and German foreign policy will practically lead to a situation that makes it at least expedient for both governments to demonstrate the possibility and likelihood of positive cooperation between them, if not even a return to the basic premises of Rapallo and Berlin

agreement⁵³.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comes to the firm conclusion that the economy ultimately determines the current, as yet faintly outlined, turn in political relations between Germany and the USSR. The actual collapse of the "grand plan" of Rosenberg-Hugenberg⁵⁴ puts forward for Berlin a

practice, the project of the German General Staff regarding the joint and coordinated work of the military industry (in the broadest sense) of both countries. The problem of industrial construction in the USSR again coincides with the problem of industrial raw materials for Germany, which creates truly real prerequisites for revising the political side of Soviet-German relations.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comes to the conclusion that Hitler's foreign policy is finally ready to take the path of tactical retreat, with the task of liberating Germany from the simultaneous threat from the West and East in order to obtain more or less certain freedom of action in the southern and southeast directions. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks repeats that such a turn in German foreign policy, if it actually occurs, even if only for tactical reasons, cannot fail to meet with quite definite support from Soviet diplomacy. If it. If the leaders of the foreign policy of the USSR succeed in achieving a cooling between Berlin and Tokyo, then one of the main tasks of Soviet diplomacy will be fulfilled. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks places great hopes in this direction on the abilities of Comrade. Surits, emphasizing for his part the need to shift the center of gravity to the economic side of Soviet-German relations. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes that the

Eastern European and Pacific pacts of security and mutual assistance remain specific tasks of Soviet foreign policy, that at the same time the emergence of armed conflicts in Europe and the Far East, since the USSR will not be involved in them, lies no less in the interests of the Soviet Union. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October

30, 1934 The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having considered the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on the international situation at a meeting on October 30, 1934, considers it necessary to draw the attention of Comrades. leaders of the foreign policy of the USSR to the fact that the military measures taken by France on the Saar border⁵⁵ are fraught with the danger of serious complications, if not armed conflict. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, although it doubts the possibility for Germany to take the risk of a military clash with

believes, however, that such a new aggravation of Franco-German relations is very likely that all European powers, without exception, will be forced to make a final choice between supporting one side or another. Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, remaining unfailingly faithful to the guiding principle of sowing

maximum discord V camp capitalist

imperialist powers, makes it an unconditional duty both to the corresponding Soviet and party bodies, and to individual responsible officials directly or indirectly connected with the Saarland, to contribute in every way to the emergence and, to the extent possible, to deepen and aggravate the conflict that is brewing between France and Germany. This directive, proceeding primarily along the line of the Comintern, by no means

eliminates for the NKID the task assigned to it by the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and reduced to the settlement of Soviet-German relations in the direction of restoring the basic principles of the Rapallo and Berlin agreements, compatible with the policy of rapprochement with France, likewise to the revitalization of the basic premises of Mussolini's four-power pact and its transformation into a pact of five, meaning the involvement of the Soviet Union in the system outlined by Italian diplomacy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comes to the unanimous conclusion that the aggravation of the Saar problem is disrupting, at least for the

time being, the tactical maneuver of German diplomacy along the line of direct collusion between Berlin and Paris. The extreme unreliability of Italy's support and the obvious duplicity of Polish foreign policy makes German diplomacy pay serious attention to the possible tactical advantages of Berlin's return to the "Russian orientation". The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it politically and tactically expedient to make full use of the turning point that has occurred in German foreign policy, which could result not only in a change in Berlin's position on the issue of "Eastern Locarno", but also in Germany's readiness for a radical revision of its foreign policy in general.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks pays special attention to the NKID on the opportunities opening up before Soviet diplomacy as

in the direction of disrupting more or less close international political cooperation between Germany and Japan, and in the sense of radically destroying all plans for creating a united front of fascist states in Europe, with the aim of forming a wedge between France and the USSR. Decree of the Politburo of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 31, 1934.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of comrade. Stalin on the tactics of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in relation to the present external and internal situation of the Soviet Union, states his complete unanimity regarding the main theses of the report. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully subscribes to the statement of comrade. Stalin, that the communist system in the USSR, based on the dictatorship of the party and the proletariat class, is at the moment threatened, and that the primary tactical task of the CPSU(b) is to preserve and strengthen the political positions of the latter, that is, elementarily speaking, to keep

The firmness of Soviet power and the invincibility of the political positions of the communist dictatorship in the USSR were not subject to the slightest doubt until the moment when the acute tension in the world situation and a series of grave defeats of the international proletariat, led by social democracy, in the struggle against fascism and capitalist reaction put the Soviet attacks on it by the imperialist powers armed to the teeth - with the aim of a new redistribution of the political map of Europe and Asia at the expense of the Soviet Union in the first place.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully shares the statement of comrade. Stalin, that if Soviet diplomacy use succeeded through skillful Franco-German Japanese-American contradictions to eliminate the immediate danger of a repetition - this time already on a larger scale than in 1918-19. scale - imperialist intervention against the USSR, then the creation in the end of a single capitalist-imperialist front against the Soviet Union is still within the limits of the possible and represents a real, although not an immediate threat to communism in general. The Politburo of the CPSU (b) fully subscribes to the point of view of comrade.

Stalin that

1) the guiding line of Soviet foreign policy, aimed at obtaining real international guarantees of the territorial inviolability of the USSR, has been taken and carried out correctly; 2) strengthening the political positions of Soviet power within

for the country, the essential defense capability of the USSR, requires the expansion of the social basis of the communist dictatorship, if only through decisive concessions in the field of economic policy and by strengthening the "ruling stratum" with new elements; 3) the gradual weakening of

political pressure within the USSR and the simultaneous mobilization of the forces of the Comintern to deliver a decisive blow to international fascism and reaction must go in parallel, obeying the same basic principle of strengthening the foreign and domestic political positions of the CPSU

(b). Resolution of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 2, 1934. The Politburo of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard at the meeting (November 2, 1934) the report of the NKID on the international situation, notes with satisfaction that the tactical moves and efforts of Soviet diplomacy did not prove fruitless and that the planned regrouping of international forces will proceed, according to all information, along lines that correspond to the plans and interests of the foreign policy of the USSR.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks attaches exceptional importance to the fact that, as a result of the aggravation of Japanese-American contradictions, the British dominions forced the London government to essentially abandon the policy of British-Japanese cooperation in the Far East and that certain real prerequisites for a real rapprochement were created by the efforts of French and American diplomacy. between the Soviet Union and Great Britain both in the field of international politics and in the sphere of economic relations between the two countries.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly recommends vols. the leaders of Soviet foreign policy to direct all their efforts towards creating the prerequisites for at least bringing closer the implementation of the plan for the formation of a more or less broad and powerful front of powers against Japan, ready to pursue a policy of actively counteracting the expansionist attempts of Tokyo. Politburo

The CPSU(b) nevertheless considers it expedient to meet, to a certain extent, the emerging, albeit in an extremely indefinite form, tendencies within the Japanese military clique towards the creation of a Japan-USSR-Germany bloc instead of the hitherto dominant idea of a Japanese-German front. against the Soviet Union. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Committee of the Bolsheviks) believes, however, that it is necessary to follow the path indicated above only to the extent that could lead to

to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact and

Eastern European Security and Mutual Assistance Guarantee Pact with the participation of Germany. ultimate challenge advice

What remains of foreign policy is the involvement of Japan in an international conflict in which the USSR could remain strictly neutral, just as in Europe a similar result is desirable for the USSR in relation to Germany.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly recommends that the NKID pay special attention to facilitating such a development of events that would lead to an open clash between Germany and Italy, which would further lead to the destruction or at least a decisive weakening of both the Italian and German forms of fascism . The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully subscribes in this paragraph to the thesis of comrade. Manuilsky regarding the need to first destroy the possibilities of the fascist path of development in the democratic countries of Europe experiencing an acute social crisis, which is feasible only after the delivery of a mortal blow to National Socialism and fascism. Leaving in force the methods of work of the Comintern within Germany and Italy, the Politburo of the CPSU(b) considers it expedient to direct the efforts of Soviet foreign policy along the line of creating a situation leading to mutual annihilation of the German and Italian reactions in the form of an open military clash between them.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 3, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of comrade. Voroshilov on the state of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and on the mood in the Red Army, comes to the unanimous conclusion that it is necessary to take the most urgent measures to completely eliminate the phenomena that threaten the country's defense in the event of a serious armed conflict. Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

joins the point of view of Comrade. Voroshilov regarding the inadmissibility of the current interruptions in the work of the military industry and railway transport, since such interruptions make it impossible for the command of the Red Army to unconditionally rely on the correct functioning of defense equipment in general.

The Politburo of the CPSU (b) decides to propose Comrade. Voroshilov, in the most hasty manner, to present his views on the transfer of the most important industries and railway lines of particular strategic importance under the direct control of the relevant bodies of the military department. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, however, considers it expedient to carry out this event in the form of secondment of special commissioners from the command of individual military districts to the appropriate institutions of industry and transport, endowing them with emergency powers, but not yet resorting to the formal subordination of these institutions to the military department.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks further considers it expedient to convene a special meeting on defense on November 10, 1934, with the participation of representatives of all the people's commissariats of the USSR to consider specific proposals by comrade. Voroshilov regarding the increase in the program of military construction and supply. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is in principle in favor of accepting the proposals of comrade. Voroshilov and limits the task of the above-mentioned meeting on defense to the exclusive development of practical measures for the implementation of the program. For its part, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) offers comrade. Voroshilov to submit by November 10, 1934, a plan developed in general terms for increasing the air and naval forces of the USSR in accordance with the newly emerging requirements for the defense of the country.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks urges the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to establish, by November 10, 1934, with the utmost accuracy, the probable possibilities for obtaining overt and covert loans in France and the USA in the field of supplying by these countries the number of aircraft and submarines required by the USSR. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks attaches particular importance to finding ways as soon as possible to strengthen the military power of the Soviet Union without increasing the cost estimates for defense needs in the budget of the current financial year.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks notes with particular concern part of the report of comrade. Voroshilov concerning the mood in the Red Army. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides to dedicate its meeting on November 5 this year. d. consideration and resolution of the complex problem of eliminating the dangerous symptoms of instability and disintegration in the Red Army.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 5, 1934 (according to

the report of the NKID) The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on the international situation at a meeting on November 5, 1934, attaches particular importance to the aggravation of the internal political crisis in France, which erupted just at a time when the whole of Europe is going through an acutely disturbing period. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks notes, on the one hand, the open gloating of Germany, which is already moving its troops to the borders of the Saar region, on the other hand, the beginning of the concentration of all the efforts of Polish diplomacy to achieve a Franco-German agreement on the basis of France's rejection of the policy of further rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Union and granting Poland and Germany freedom of action in Eastern Europe. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sees in

Warsaw's latest diplomatic steps not only in Paris, but also in Berlin, the hidden calculation of the Polish government to establish a regime in France that resolutely fights against the communist-socialist front in the country and is no longer inclined to cooperate.

honor with the USSR in the field of foreign policy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks attaches exceptional importance to the decision of the Polish Council of Ministers of November 2 this year. which sees in the French events "an increase in the chances for close cooperation between France, Poland and Germany against the USSR" and expresses a certain hope that "Polish diplomats will be able to keep Germany from premature actions hostile to France, to destroy the emerging rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow and put forward in the first place the plan of a broad anti-communist state front, with the inclusion of England and Japan.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly recommends that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs take timely and decisive steps to destroy the above-mentioned plans of Polish diplomacy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it expedient to recommend

the leaders of Soviet foreign policy to establish the closest possible contact with Czechoslovak diplomacy on this point. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers, however, that the establishment of such contact does not at all prevent the continuation of the tactical line taken by Soviet foreign policy towards Berlin. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 5, 1934 (according to the report of Voroshilov)

of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having discussed at a meeting on November 5, 1934, part of the report of comrade. Voroshilov from the 3rd p. m., concerning the mood in the Red Army, considers it necessary to take decisive measures as soon as possible to prevent the danger of serious political unrest within the Red Army, which is completely unacceptable under the current domestic and foreign political situation of the Soviet Union.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, while fully approving the propaganda and punitive measures taken by the military command and military-political bodies of the party, cannot but join the statement of comrade. Voroshilov, that without a radical elimination of the objective causes that create an impassable abyss between the Soviet government and the multimillion mass of the peasantry, it is impossible to rely not only on the Red Army, which is mobilized in the event of war, but even on its main personnel core.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks notes with particular concern the fact that the strongest fermentation is observed among the Red Army soldiers and command personnel, whose labor origin and often long and productive party work are beyond any doubt. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it extremely significant that discontent and In the ranks of the Red Army, it feeds not on counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet tendencies, but on the

conviction that the "bureaucratic Soviet and party apparatus" is the main obstacle to socialist construction and, in particular, to strengthening and increasing the combat power of the USSR.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks thus comes to the conclusion that the calming of the peasant elements of the Red Army and the radical eradication of bureaucracy that has really grown to unprecedented proportions in the Soviet and party apparatus of the USSR is becoming a rea

moment for the proletarian dictatorship of the Soviet Union a matter of life and death. The

Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks unanimously decides: 1) to mobilize not only all the forces of the party, but also all the living forces of the country for a merciless struggle against bureaucratic methods in all branches of party, administrative most cruel activity; set a series of abuses, radical stupidity and bungling to be the central task of the party; proclaim and unswervingly pursue the slogan of the struggle for quality in all areas of the party, cultural, administrative and economic life of the country; conscientiousness, personal moral qualities and knowledge to put above party careerism and stupid administrative zeal, having carried out a corresponding purge this time from top to bottom; 2) gradually pursue a policy of reconciliation with the peasantry, relying on the peasant business owner both in relation to collective farmers and in relation to individual farmers.

The Politburo of the CPSU (b) authorizes comrade. Voroshilov to put into practice his proposal that the command staff of the Red Army assume the role of a relaying authority for forwarding the complaints and wishes of the Red Army masses to the Politburo of the CPSU (b). The Politburo of the CPSU (b) offers comrade. Voroshilov to form, at his choice, a special commission under the Politburo of the CPSU (b), which will be given the full right to make decisions on specific issues relating to the Red Army, on behalf of the Politburo of the CPSU (b), within the framework of the main directives of the CPSU (b).

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks of November 6, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of Com. Krestinsky about the European political situation and the reports of comrade. Surits dated 2 and 4 November. G., fully subscribes to the thesis of comrade. Stalin that the appeasement of Europe is impossible without a preliminary resolution of the German problem: it is necessary that the European powers either come to a complete agreement with Germany, or, without wasting time, uproot the German threat to peace.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) recognizes the statement of comrade. Suritsy, which is the central point of the Berlin

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At the moment, the Saar question is at the forefront, in particular, the plebiscite of January 13, 1935. Concentrating all its attention on the Saar, Berlin considers it expedient to give up a lot in order to free itself, just in case, its hands in relation to France: flirting with Italy through Hungary; a broad diplomatic offensive against England; "disinterest" in Austria; change in policy towards the USSR; flirting with Romania and Yugoslavia and an unusual moderation of tone towards Czechoslovakia; at the same time, an emphasized readiness to come to an agreement with France - all this aims to bring discord into the already rather discordant concert of the European powers in one way or another, but to achieve its immediate goal, i.e., the occupation of the Saar and the simultaneous cancellation of the points of the Treaty of Versailles, limiting German armaments. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it beyond doubt that the German government is ready to return to Geneva,⁵⁶ is ready to give up for the time being many of the claims officially put forward by the National Socialist

politicians, is ready to "come to terms" with everyone, but this time will not give up one iota of its demands for the return of the Saarland and the annulment of the armaments part of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Politburo of the CPSU (b) fully subscribes to the point of view of comrade. Stalin, repeated essentially Comrade. Krestinsky and comrade. Suri-tsem, that England would not under any circumstances apply sanctions against Germany, even in the event of the unilateral annulment of the latter of the Treaty of Versailles, and that Italy would unconditionally follow British policy. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comes to the unanimous conclusion that even in the event that Germany frankly implements its military-diplomatic plan indicated above, France cannot count on a Franco-Italian-British alliance, because the Roman government openly supports German claims in the field of armaments, and British diplomacy is firmly convinced of the possibility of reaching a compromise between Paris and Berlin. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that it is not in the interests of the Soviet Union to support the trend of French policy, to create

France, the USSR and the Little Entente are the core of the anti-German bloc, since the latter can be given not so much a defensive as an "aggressive-punitive" character. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) is becoming even stronger in its point of view that at the moment the most advantageous solution for the Soviet Union would be to return to the basic idea of a four-power pact, provided that it is turned into a pact of five with the participation of the USSR. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks cancels all its previous directives that deviate from this thesis, and invites the People's Commissariat of Foreign

Affairs to concentrate their efforts in the named direction.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 7, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of Com. Stomonyakov on the international situation and having read the latest reports of vols. Yurenev, Troyanovsky and Maisky, considers it necessary to strongly recommend that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concentrate all the efforts of Soviet diplomacy on the consistent and systematic implementation of the policy of rapprochement with Great Britain, both in the field of foreign

trade and, in particular, in the sense of coordinating the interests of both powers in the Middle Asia and the Far East. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks notes with particular satisfaction that the possibility of an Anglo-American-Japanese agreement on the issue of naval armaments seems less and less probable every day, and that the Washington government, in this regard, is definitely leaning towards the idea of concluding a formal military defensive alliance with the USSR. At the same time, the change in the mood of British public opinion, which makes it possible for the Laborites to come to power, fundamentally destroys the plan of the conservative imperialist British circles to restore the Japanese-British alliance and forces the MacDonald cabinet⁵⁷, despite the insistence of a part of the conservatives, to gradually embark on the path of cooperation with the United States. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sees in this process of development of British foreign and domestic policy the presence of so many exceptionally favorable chances for Soviet diplomacy that it would

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks strongly suggests that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs immediately begin diplomatic preparations for the creation of a united front of the powers against Japan, relying primarily on the energetic support of the already emerging corresponding trends on the part of American and Italian diplomacy.

The Politburo strongly recommends further vols. the leaders of the foreign policy of the USSR to pay exclusive attention to the Far Eastern question in determining the future relations of the Soviet Union with France and Germany. In particular, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers that an indispensable condition for a real rapprochement with Germany, even if only in the economic and commercial field, is not only the completely unambiguous rejection of Rosenberg's East European plans by the Berlin government, but also the termination of Japanese-German cooperation in the Far East, since such cooperation is aimed directly against the vital interests of the Soviet Union.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it expedient in conclusion direct the energetic efforts of Soviet foreign policy to the lips of new diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Netherlands. According to the firm conviction of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the named task can be successfully completed under the condition of a Soviet-British rapprochement, or at least gentlemanly agreements.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to invite the Eastern Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to present their views on desirable adjustments in the activities of the

Comintern in Asia. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks of November 8, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of Com. Krestinsky on the foreign policy prerequisites for the emerging trade agreements with Britain, the USA and Germany, and having familiarized himself with the proposals of vols. Frumkin⁵⁸ and Troyanov decides:

1) to drag out, if possible, negotiations with England until the moment when the failure of the London negotiations between Great Britain, the USA and Japan on naval armaments is finally determined and the exact line of rupture between the named

powers; continue at the same time the policy of rapprochement with England in the direction of coordinating Soviet and British interests in Central Asia and the Far East; to establish closer contact with the leaders of the Labor Party (Great Britain), making the further tactics of the Soviet government in the question of trade relations between the USSR and Britain dependent on the respective results of this step;

2) offer com. Troyanovsky, upon his return to Washington, to immediately resume negotiations with the United States on the issue of debts, seeking a compromise agreement; in the case of the stubbornness of the Washington government, authorize comrade. Troyanovsky to accept American terms to enable the import-export bank to lend extensively to deals with the Soviet Union; to authorize Vneshtorg to distribute orders for aircraft, engines and automobiles, in accordance with the requirements of the military department, among the aircraft and automobile industries of the United States; offer tov. Voroshilov to submit to the 12th p. m. your considerations regarding the partial organization by the corresponding American firms of their production on the territory of the Soviet Union;

3) taking advantage of the readiness of the German government to restore economic and trade ties with the USSR, to provide comrade. Frumkin full freedom of initiative and action in the matter of concluding loan agreements. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it most desirable for the Soviet Union to receive loans from Germany in the amount of up to 400 million marks for a period of 10 years so that no more than half of these loans are provided

in the form of stamps.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes that in all three of the above points the question of trade relations must be inextricably linked with the establishment of political relations in the spirit of maximum foreign policy cooperation between the USSR and the

aforementioned powers. Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 10, 1934. After hearing the report of Com. Stalin on the world situation and on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, comes to the unanimous conclusion that international capitalism has again succeeded in achieving a certain stabilization of intern

economic relations, but so far there can be no talk of overcoming the crisis. The latter circumstance must inevitably give rise - already in the very near future - to a new aggravation of the contradictions between the imperialist powers, which makes a number of international political complications extremely probable, fraught with the danger of armed conflicts both around the Pacific Ocean and in Europe. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully subscribes to Comrade Stalin's assertion

that despite the undoubted efforts of a number of states, it will not be possible to prevent a new world war: the second half of 1935 and the beginning of 1936 should be recognized as a critical period. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is deeply convinced that war will break out first not in Europe, but in the Far East, namely between Japan and the United States of America. Remaining true to the basic principle of its policy, the Soviet Union must direct all its efforts to avoid being involved in the above-mentioned conflict. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks therefore considers it tactically correct to continue avoiding a clash with Japan, while at the same time

delaying the settlement of Soviet-Japanese relations as much as possible until the moment when the aggravation of the situation around the Pacific Ocean puts the USSR in conditions most favorable for negotiations with Tokyo as well. and with Washington. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes, however, that the indicated main trend of Soviet foreign policy should not affect the pursuit of the immediate goal of Soviet diplomacy, namely: the creation of a united front of the great powers against Japan. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks reminds the comrade leaders of the NKID that the need for a policy of alliances should not obscure the main desire of the NKID: to help draw Japan into a conflict with the most powerful adversary or - even more desirable - with the largest number of opponents, avoiding a direct involvement of the USSR in the specified

collision.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully shares the point of view of Comrade. Stalin that a completely similar task is facing Soviet diplomacy in relation to Germany, which should not, however,

hinder the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and demonstratively pursue the line of appeasement and disarmament of Europe. In the opinion of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the maximum use of the idea and apparatus of the League of Nations to achieve the real political and economic interests of the Soviet Union and for the corresponding use of the Geneva institution in the direction of a planned and systematic struggle against international fascism should be one of the main tasks of Soviet diplomacy.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks emphasizes that Comrade Litvinov's mistake lies precisely in the fact that he does not clearly distinguish between the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy. The entry of the USSR into the concert of the capitalist powers is only a means, and not an end in itself, a tactical step, and not the main foreign policy line. The subordination of the tactics of the Comintern to the tasks of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs is only a transitional stage, a preparatory maneuver for the communist attack on international capitalism. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks categorically recommends that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs should not forget about this, despite the joy of "diplomatic successes".

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks of November 11, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard at the meeting on November 11, 1934, the message of comrade. Krestinsky about the current trends in German foreign policy, comes to the conclusion that Germany really decided to get out of a state of some international isolation and is looking for acceptable ways to return to the League of Nations. The German proposals to the Great Powers ultimately boil down to the following: the Great Powers recognize Germany's equality of rights in the field of armaments and authorize the increase in the German armed forces that has already taken place, while Germany, for its part, returns to the League of Nations, again takes part in the disarmament conference, agrees to the conclusion of an Eastern European security and mutual assistance pact and renounces for a certain period any claims to Austria. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that from the point of view of the interests of the foreign

policy of the Soviet Union, only the involvement of Germany in the system of "Eastern Locarno" seems essential and that the direct task of Soviet diplomacy is to attract

of the German Imperial Government to participate in the Eastern European Guarantee Pact, at least at the cost of active support

Soviet Union of German claims in the field of armaments. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is well aware that the main disagreements between Berlin, on the one hand, and Paris and London, on the other, essentially concern the formal approach to the Treaty of Versailles, the actual violation of which by Germany, France and England refuse to sanction. The

Politburo of the CPSU (b) considers it expedient to strongly recommend vols. the leaders of the foreign policy of the USSR to take upon themselves the task of putting into practice such a solution to the "German problem" that would formally satisfy France and in fact lead to a more or less complete acceptance by the powers of the German conditions. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks conceives such a decision in the

following form: 1) Germany returns to the League of Nations; 2) The Conference on Disarmament ceases its activities; 3) Under the League of Nations, a special commission on weapons;

4) The League of Nations speaks out in favor of the destruction of parts of international treaties providing for the unilateral disarmament of this or that power; the states that are members of the League of Nations shall carry out the said general decree of the League of Nations in life;

5) The League of Nations raises in full the question of a general reduction in armaments and implements a system of guarantees for the territorial of individual states, which provides for the automatic application of sanctions against the "aggressor". Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks of November 13, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of Com. Litvinov on the international situation, fully subscribes to the point of view of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, that the emerging thinning of the atmosphere in relations between Germany and France confirms the correctness of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, but at the same time requires extreme caution and flexibility from Soviet diplomacy in pursuing its goals.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sees the main danger to the interests of the USSR in the desire of the German government to harmonize the policy of direct rapprochement with France with the basic premises of the Polish-German agreement regarding Eastern Europe⁵⁹. Taking into account that German diplomacy retains in its hands the trump card of the united front of Germany - Poland - Hungary - Austria - Italy, which is of particular importance in view of the impossibility of harmonizing the interests

of Italy and the Little Entente in Central Europe for a long time, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) believes that Berlin's foreign policy position with regard to both Paris and Rome seems strong enough to enable the German imperial government to successfully defend the minimum requirements that it sets as its condition for returning to the League of Nations. Proceeding from this fact, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks considers it necessary to strongly recommend Comrades. leaders of Soviet foreign policy to use every effort to prevent German-Italian and to promote German-French rapprochement, however, with the essential proviso that the agreement between Paris and Berlin should be preceded by the coordination of German foreign policy with the interests of the USSR and the Little Entente. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it a completely feasible task for Soviet diplomacy to exclude Polish influence both in Paris and Berlin and shift the center of gravity of the Franco-German collusion to satisfy Germany's demands both in the field of armaments and in relation to a significant strengthening of German political and economic influence in the Danube basin and the Balkans. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is firmly convinced that the Franco-Italian and German-Italian contradictions are so obvious in the light of historical interests, and not temporary tactical advantages, that the practical impossibility of a real and lasting rapprochement between Italy and the Little Entente will inevitably force France to seek agreements with Germany.

Supporting for tactical reasons the French plan to create a united front of France - England - Italy - the USSR with the possible inclusion of Poland in it and with the indispensable participation

Little Entente, the Soviet government is well aware of the impracticability of such a project and, for its part, must make every effort to harmonize the foreign policy interests of France, Germany and the Soviet Union, so far as Europe, France, England, Italy and the USSR are concerned, so far as Asia is at stake. From the indicated direction of Soviet foreign policy naturally follows the inevitability for the diplomacy of the USSR to promote the implementation of Mussolini's old plan, which found expression in the pact of four powers, provided that the latter is transformed into a pact of five with the participation of the Soviet Union, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) steadily adheres to the view that only a consistent

and the systematic implementation of this political line will allow Soviet diplomacy to finally achieve its main goal - ensuring the security of the borders of the USSR. According to the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the same political

nia will return to Soviet diplomacy the much lost freedom of maneuver.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 14, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of Com. Stalin on the world situation, comes to the unanimous conclusion that the line of foreign and domestic policy pursued by the party seems to be the only correct one, both from a principled and tactical point of view. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks fully subscribes to the statement of comrade. Stalin that the Soviet Union, fully aware of its historical responsibility to the international proletariat, should not only become the decisive factor in international political and economic relations, stubbornly and unswervingly pursuing "great power" goals, but also adapt its internal structure to the new requirements of the moment. The Politburo of the CPSU (b) fully shares the main

thesis of the report of comrade. Stalin that this international situation is forcing the CPSU (b) to subordinate its tactics to the main task facing the world communist movement, namely: to preserve political power within the USSR at all costs and to strengthen the international positions of the latter.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that in the field of foreign policy, the Soviet government has regained the opportunity - and to a much greater extent than hitherto - not only to maneuver relatively freely, but also to exert a more or less significant influence on the relationship between the decisive factors of the world politicians. The timely and skillful use of contradictions between the great powers, as well as between the leading groups of international capital, the tactically correct application of the methods of revolutionary and positional struggle in connection with the new phase of world capitalist development - all this gives the CPSU (b) a powerful, albeit double-edged weapon.

The skillful use of this weapon, i.e., the correct combination of the methods of "great force" - politics - with the tactical methods of the Comintern, must inevitably lead to such a change in the international situation that will enable the CPSU (b) to intervene decisively in the course of world events. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks unanimously subscribes to Comrade Stalin's assertion that war will be the inevitable result of the existing political situation, and that Germany in the West and Japan in the East, two imperialist militaristic states, the two imperialist militaristic states, whose ruling regime will be forced to seek a way out in foreign countries, will inevitably become direct participants in this war. expansion.

The named circumstance is a growing threat to the USSR and thus to the world communist movement insofar as the greedy views of the German "cultural traders" and Japanese militarists are aimed at the "possibility of colonization" of the territory of the USSR, and the fight against the "communist threat" in the name of saving the "values of civilization" provides a convenient - for rather indefinite - ground for uniting the capitalist powers and coordinating their predatory interests in nature.

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, while stating with satisfaction that Soviet diplomacy succeeded in destroying the plan for a united front of the capitalist powers against the Soviet Union, still sees no real guarantees that more successful attempts in this direction will not be repeated. Continuing the policy of betting on peace and striving for the creation of a system of guarantee pacts

security and mutual assistance, providing for the automatic application of international sanctions against the attacking side, the Soviet government must direct all the efforts of its diplomacy to create an international situation that completely and in advance excludes any possibility of an armed attack on the USSR, either from the West or from the East. In practice, this task can be successfully solved not by a system of

international treaties, which can be extremely easily and undoubtedly will be violated, but by the involvement of Germany and Japan in conflicts of such a nature that would lead both of these powers to an armed clash along the lines of maximum distance from the borders of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy must already reckon with the danger of concluding peace between the capitalist powers at the expense of the USSR even before the moment when conditions are created favorable for the revolutionary intervention of the Comintern.

By virtue of what has been said, the Politburo of the CPSU (b) fully subscribes to the view of comrade. Stalin that in the interests of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement is a war between Italy and Germany (to a much greater extent than an armed conflict between Germany and France), as well as a war between the USA and Japan, which, of course, is not eliminated for the Soviet foreign policy, the need for the consistent implementation of the task of "ensuring peace and security," neither through a system of guarantee pacts, nor through active assistance to the emergence of an anti-German and anti-Japanese bloc of powers. In conclusion, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks emphasizes that the principle of "peace policy" remains as before the basis of the tactics of the USSR in relation to the capitalist powers, just as Vneshtorg continues its tactics invariably applied to competing groups of world capital.

Decree of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 15, 1934. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having heard the report of the NKID on the international situation at the meeting on November 15, 1934, comes to the unanimous conclusion that the decisive influence on the development of events not only in Europe, but also globally is currently owned by the British government. E

The firm conviction of the Politburo of the CPSU(b) depends at least on the decisions that will be taken by the London Cabinet in the next few days whether a new world war will break out in the immediate future or whether an armed clash between the imperialist powers can be postponed for some time. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks considers it quite obvious that the inevitable failure of the London negotiations on naval armaments will force the British government to make every effort to prevent a race in the field of military shipbuilding by finding a compromise solution between the Japanese and American points of view, or to take the side of the United States quite definitely.

The latter circumstance is of extreme importance for the Soviet Union, allowing us to count on a real possibility of ending the anti-Soviet line of British foreign policy and even creating a united front of the Pacific powers against Japan, especially since the progressive strengthening of the influence of the Laborites on British foreign policy opens up new broad opportunities for the Anglo-Soviet rapprochement and cooperation. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

considers extremely indicative from this point of view the fact that London absolutely unambiguously rejected all Tokyo's proposals, which practically boiled down to the formation of a united Japanese-German-British front against the USSR in exchange for concessions to Japan in relation to Great Britain and the United States on the issue of naval armaments. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks further considers as a fact of exceptional importance the sharp deviation of British policy from the outlined direction towards the creation, with the complicity of Germany, of a military bloc of the Scandinavian countries, the spearhead of which was to be directed directly against the USSR.

The Politburo of the CPSU (b) pays special attention to Comrades. leaders of Soviet foreign policy to the tendency that has appeared in the environment of the British Cabinet to raise in full the question of "secret" weapons of Germany - especially in the field of military aviation - and to apply military sanctions against Germany in order to

timely, decisively and quickly prevent an armed conflict in the future, which in some year

would certainly take on a protracted and very serious form. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks urges the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to develop the most intensive activity in the direction of active assistance to all international political combinations, the implementation of which would mean indirectly securing the borders of the USSR from external attack. The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6), however, considers it expedient to give obvious preference to international guarantees, at least on the basis of the League of Nations, over the system of alliances and blocs that deprive Soviet policy of freedom of maneuver and fraught with the constant danger of new, sometimes unexpected regroupings.

DOCUMENTS OF

THE SPECIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID OF THE
USSR To the Special Department of the Embassy
in Austria Vienna Sov.

confided to the

USSR NKID Special Department Moscow, August 24, 1934
No 5803 Eastern Department --

XVIII Dear comrade,

Confirming the receipt of the report of the Eastern Department -- No 1622, The Special Department, for its part, considers it necessary to highlight especially those tasks that currently fall to the share of the Eastern Department and require exceptionally careful preparation and extremely precise execution .

If there is no doubt that Austria at the present moment represents a position for the mastery of which a stubborn struggle is already being waged among the great powers, then it is quite obvious that Soviet foreign policy is no less interested than the Comintern in this or that course of Austrian events. , as well as in the development of relations of an international order, the starting point of which is the problem of Austria.

For the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, National Socialist Germany remains the defining moment in relation to Europe, since Berlin has not yet lost hope of reaching an agreement between the European powers at the expense of the USSR, relying on

support for Warsaw, although the current guiding line of Polish foreign policy consists ultimately in Poland continuing its game between Germany on the one hand, France and the Soviet Union on the other. Tensions between Berlin and Rome as a result of the

failed of the National Socialist putsch in Austria and the resulting tendency of Italian policy to finally break with the revisionist bloc and go for close rapprochement with France - this circumstance naturally aroused alarm in Berlin and prompts German policy to temporarily abandon all expansion to the southeast. diplomacy in Belgrade is essentially nothing more than a tactical maneuver on the part of both Germany and Yugoslavia: the former hopes to exert psychological pressure on Italy, the latter on France.

that the Yugoslav government will renounce an alliance with France only in the event of such a form of Franco-Italian rapprochement that is clearly directed against the interests of

Yugoslavia. The latter seems extremely unlikely to the Special Section. All of the above gives reason to assume that Germany, isolated in foreign policy, will try in the very near future to radically change the tactics of its diplomacy and go for a decisive rapprochement with the newly emerging tripartite alliance of Italy-France-England. There can, of course, not be

the slightest doubt that this attempt by Germany will be dictated by finally the obvious desire to find an object of compensation for itself in the east of Europe, especially since it is precisely at this point that Berlin, not entirely without reason, can count on the sympathy and assistance of London. The leadership of the foreign policy of the USSR, of course, closely follows the slightest fluctuations in the international political atmosphere. A special department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was given a special responsible task - to create, to the best of its ability and within the limits of practical possibility, conditions that prevent rapprochement

between Berlin and Paris, and in particular between Berlin and Rome, in addition to

direct or indirect participation of the Soviet Union in that. It is quite natural that the Saarland and Austria are areas for the corresponding fulfillment of the above task.

Germany's refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria does not at all mean the end of the activities of the Austrian National Socialists. On the contrary, the radical elements of the Austrian Nazis - with or even without any support from outside - will carry on their subversive work. From now on, the direct duty of the Eastern Department is to attend to the adoption of real measures to ensure that the first sign of a German-Italian agreement is immediately reduced "and no" by this or that National Socialist action in Austria. The threat of a German-Italian conflict must constantly exist as long as Soviet diplomacy will not be able to create a firm guarantee of the security of the western border of the USSR. Until such time as a firm system of treaty relations is established that ensures the firm position of the Soviet Union in the European concert of powers, the second, similar to

the first, task of the Eastern Department remains in full force: to preserve Austria the role of a bone of contention in relations between

Rome and Prague. Revolutionary work among the Austrian working masses, necessary in itself, must be under the absolute control of the Eastern Department, because in case of emergency the possibility of tactical use of this factor for the purposes of Soviet foreign

politicians.

The Eastern Department is further requested to focus its efforts with particular effort and with exceptional care on organizing an urgent and absolutely accurate information service. The results achieved so far by the Eastern Division can be considered quite satisfactory. But this is not enough. The intelligence apparatus of the Eastern Division must be truly perfect. The Special Department considers it possible to provide the Eastern Department, solely for this purpose, with an additional loan in the amount of GB 1,500 pounds sterling monthly. Special attention should be paid to the following issues:

- 1) Relations between Heimweh⁶⁰ and Christlichsozial⁶¹. Italian support for Heimweh.
- 2) Transports of weapons and ammunition from Italy to Austria. 3) Everything related to the problem of cooperation between Austria and Hungary. Legitimist work.
- 4) The problem of Yugoslav-Austrian and Yugoslav-German relations.

5) Polish-Hungarian rapprochement. 6) The problem of the crisis of the Little Entente, especially the differences between Belgrade and Prague.

7) Secret negotiations between Vienna and Berlin. Secret negotiations between the Austrian government and the Austrian Nazis. With communist greetings, Head of the Special Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign

Affairs I. KUDRYAVTSEV

(signed) To the Special Department of the Embassy in Austria Vienna Sov.

confided

to the USSR

NKID Special Department Moscow, September 20, 1934

No 6603 Eastern Department --

XVIII Dear comrade,

Confirming the receipt of the report of the Eastern Department -- No 1893, the Special Department considers it necessary to give some clarifications in connection with the political situation in Central Europe and partly in the Balkans, especially since these clarifications will be at the same time a response to questions occupying

the Eastern Department. 1) The Austrian, or rather, the Austro-Hungarian problem is gradually becoming that stumbling block over which all attempts by great and small powers to reach an agreement among themselves, at least for a certain period of time, stumble.

Based on the totality of information data at its disposal, the Special Department draws a situation for itself as follows: a) Neither the annexation of Austria

to Germany, nor the creation of a single state entity from Austria and Hungary,

given the political situation by solutions that are practically feasible: each of them contains the danger of an acute international conflict, in all likelihood, ending in an armed clash, i.e., a new pan-European war. Any other decision (of course, with the exception of the triumph of the communist revolution in Central Europe) will at best be a rim, at worst a new stimulus for armed conflict. Both the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Presidium of the ECCI come to the conclusion that at the moment it is not the Balkans, not Lithuania, not Danzig, and not even the Saarland, but precisely Austria, that is a powder keg, every minute threatening to explode and thereby cause an all-European fire; b) The internal political situation in Austria is such that at the moment it is not

difficult to provoke events in the country that will inevitably lead to a general squabble and fight between the neighboring states of Austria. This circumstance forces the Special Department to urgently demand from all organs and employees the most exact implementation of the directives of the center, because the slightest thoughtless, hasty or arbitrary action can have truly fatal consequences.

The task of the Eastern Department is, first of all, to precisely coordinate the work of its apparatus, the agencies of the Intelligence Agency and the apparatus of the Comintern, and not so much in the main directions, which is already taking place, but precisely in particulars, in trifles, details. Just in Austria, our entire mechanism must work without interruption.

The task facing the Eastern Department boils down in its main features to the following proposition: while the Communist Parties of Germany and Austria are concentrating their forces and preparing the possibility of seizing power through a mass action of the proletariat, the organs of the Special Department, together with the apparatus of the Intelligence Agency, carefully take into account all the data, relating to the growth of a new international conflict, and for their part prepare the conditions for the artificial creation of one at the right moment for the purposes of the foreign policy of the USSR. At the

same time, it is necessary to constantly remember that the time and development of events in Europe (especially in Germany and in

Austria) are working for the communist revolution. According to the exact directives of the Politburo of the CPSU(b), however, hasty and unorganized actions that could undermine the final success are unacceptable. Our thesis is extremely simple: the triumph of communism in Central Europe passes through three stages: 1) preparation of forces and conditions for revolutionary action, 2) armed clash of capitalist powers among themselves without the participation of the USSR in the conflict, 3) a revolution supported by the armed forces of the USSR. 2)

The second most important problem at the moment is the problem of relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. According to the directive of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the task of the Special Department is to prevent the Italian-Yugoslav agreement, while simultaneously preventing the plan of Polish diplomacy to achieve rapprochement between Belgrade and Budapest, a plan strongly supported by Berlin. Pointing out this task to the Eastern Department in general terms, the Special Department in one of its next relations will give detailed directives on this matter.

With communist greetings, I.

KUDRYAVTSEV (signed)

Decree of the Yugoslav Council of Ministers of September 27, 1934

Material: No. Yu--10367/703 (in extracts) Source: Yu--39 (Belgrade) ...

Government of His Royal Majesty. ... notes with a feeling of deep satisfaction that ... the attempt of Italian diplomacy to secure the hegemony of Italy in Central Europe with a special pact guaranteeing the independence of Austria, the hegemony of Italy in Central Europe ... and to establish an Italian protectorate over Austria ... has failed completely ... The Government of His Royal Majesty places the Minister of Foreign Affairs in particular high merit... for his courageous and unwavering defense of the Yugoslav point of view, which ultimately led to the establishment of a single political line of the Little Entente in the spirit of the desires and interests of Yugoslavia... The Council of Ministers... sees a major success for the Yugoslav diplomacy in the fact that... Messrs. Bartou and Messrs. Beneš had to admit the validity of Yugoslav fears regarding Italy's "special interests" in the Danube basin...

The Government of His Royal Majesty considers it necessary to continue firmly and unswervingly to adhere to the foundations of its Central European policy and ... invites the Minister of Foreign Affairs to bring to the attention of the French government that ... Yugoslavia does not see the possibility of harmonizing its policy with the policy until the latter ... will not refuse to support, directly or indirectly, the plans of revisionism and the restoration of the Habsburg monarchy... The Yugoslav royal government is firmly convinced of the failure of Barthou's visit to Rome and... at the same time attaches extremely great importance to the direct negotiations that have begun between Berlin and Vienna. .. The Council of Ministers authorizes the Minister of Foreign Affairs to direct again his efforts to establishing ... relations of cooperation between the Little Entente and Germany in the field of the economic restoration of the Danube basin and ... to promote rapprochement between France and Germany in the main questions of international politics .. His Royal Majesty's Government continues to firmly stand on the point of view that ... the policy of Mr. Bartou and Mr. Beneš ... has sufficiently shown its inconsistency and requires ... a concrete revision ... in the spirit of the provisions consistently defended and carried out Yugoslavia The Government of His Royal Majesty ... attaches exceptional importance ... to the meeting of both Slavic monarchs in Sofia, which should lead to the final oblivion of the former fraternal strife and ... to the establishment of close allied relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria ... Council of Ministers for

considers it possible to start ... solving the problems of its Central European program only after the successful solution of the problem of the Balkan bloc. In the Special

Department of the Embassy in Austria Vecha

Sov. confided to the USSR

NKID

Special

Department September 29, 1934

No 7299 Eastern

Department Dear comrade,

In addition to the attitude of the Special Department of the NKID No. 7291, the Eastern Department is informed that it is instructed to pay special attention to the fullest possible information (in urgent cases - by telegraph) not only to the Special Department, but also to departments in Berlin, Paris and Prague regarding the following questions:

1) The course and state of direct negotiations between Vienna and Berlin, moreover, not so much official as between the National Socialist Party and Austrian political groups of various shades;

2) Polish-Hungarian and German-Hungarian combinations, again paying attention not only to the official exchange of views, but also to the smallest details of behind-the-scenes intrigues and negotiations between minor characters;

3) Everything that happens inside the monarchist organizations and - in particular - all kinds of Legitimist "circles" in Austria and Hungary; the Croatian and Slovak connections of these groups should be subjected to particularly careful coverage; 4) Papen's official and

unofficial activities⁶³ in Vienna; 5) A network of French and Italian agents in Austria; the number of paid agents in official Austrian institutions must be especially carefully considered; 6) The work of the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak intelligence

against each other; 7) Communication between the German Nazis and

the Romanian "Iron Guard"⁶⁴ as it passes through Vienna. The Special Department pays special attention to all these issues.

Eastern Division, emphasizing that at the moment no as much general information as the smallest and "unimportant" details.

Further instructions follow. With communist greetings, I.

KUDRYAVTSEV (signed)

Telegraph service of the Special Department,
People's Commissariat of

Foreign Affairs October 10, 1934 No 7013/392 Deciphered October 10, 1934, 4:07 pm ... The assassination of Marseilles⁶⁵ may provoke a campaign against the USSR. Dot. It is necessary to take timely measures to paralyze at

Dot. A thorough investigation of the actual circumstances of the act and especially its preparation is entrusted. Dot. Make the necessary connections immediately. Dot. At the same time cut off all permanent contacts [with] Croats and Macedonians without exception. Dot. Desirable detailed accurate coverage of the impression of Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria. Dot. It is recommended, regardless of the actual state of affairs, to work towards the guilt of the Nazis. Dot. A thorough investigation into the role of the Austrian and Hungarian monarchical-Catholic circles is necessary. Dot. Send immediately six or seven experienced workers Belgrade, Budapest. Dot. Keep a constant connection with Rome. Dot. Telegraph messages. Dot. Kudryavtsev. Dot. Telegraph service of the Special Department of the NKID No. 8201/1439 of October 14, 1934. Decrypted on October 14, 1934, 4 pm. 13 pm The Eastern Department is notified as a matter of urgency about the attempt going on in London, Berlin, the White Guard circles in Paris. Dot. A version of the participation of employees of the Intelligence Agency or the Special Department in the preparation of the Marseille

assassination is put forward. Dot. The motive comes down to the alleged desire of the Soviet government to eliminate

Alexander⁶⁷, who prevented the recognition of the USSR by Yugoslavia. Dot. It is indicated that the king was the only serious obstacle to the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Belgrade by Moscow. Dot. The absence of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Eastern European Yugoslavia due to the failed plan of Eastern Locarno. Dot. The Eastern Department is instructed by its side to immediately begin to discover the sources of these rumors, as well as their influence on public opinion and the course of the investigation. Dot. Suggested immediately

made it difficult conclusion south
pact, replace

It is necessary to take measures to paralyze such rumors, as well as to establish a version that does not affect the interests of the USSR as soon as possible. Dot. Until the circumstances of the case are clarified, it is recommended to spread versions about the support of terrorists by National Socialist Germany, revisionist Hungary, and fascist Italy. Dot. The motives of Germany or Hungary are clear. Dot. Italy's motives boil down to the belief that Alexander will thwart the French

Italian rapprochement, will persuade France to tentatively negotiate Germany's mediation of Yugoslavia by Germany. Period, maximum caution is required. Dot. Telegraph results. Dot. Kudryavtsev. To the Special Department of the

Embassy in Austria Vienna Sov. confidentially
Tov. P. Nekunde USSR NK'ID

Special
Department

Moscow, October 25, 1934

No 7453 Eastern Department --

XVIII Dear comrade,

The Special Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Eastern Department to the fact that its coverage of the political situation in Central and South-Eastern Europe is in rather significant contradiction with the information on the issue available to the Special department from other sources. Since the consequences of the assassination of King Alexander and Barthou in Marseilles continue to stand at the center of European events and will undoubtedly have a decisive influence on the future fate of Europe, a thorough and accurate establishment of the entire behind-the-scenes side of the matter is necessary. The latest reports from the Eastern Department are mainly the transfer of Yugoslav accusations against Hungary and the repetition of outdated data regarding the links of Croatian and Macedonian terrorists with the German Nazis. Adhering to this method, the Eastern Department could, without much difficulty, discover an undoubted connection between the murderers of the Yugoslav king and certain Soviet institutions abroad. The

Special Section considers it necessary to point out to the Eastern Section that there are very real indications of the direct dependence of the Ustashe⁶⁸ and VMRO⁶⁹ on agents and organs of Italian intelligence and that there should be clear evidence of this in Vienna.

In any case, the Special Department makes it an indispensable duty for the Eastern Department to concentrate its efforts precisely in this direction. The Special Division furthermore, on the basis of at least previous reports from the Eastern Division, has clear evidence of more,

than the close connection between the Croatian separatist movement and some very influential Austrian circles at the present time. Meanwhile, the latest reports of the Eastern Department do not contain anything significant just about the Italian and Austrian role in the Marseille affair. The Special Branch urges that these gaps be filled as soon as possible.

Yugoslav sources of information are extremely little used by the Eastern Department or (which, after all, is also possible) untenable. Meanwhile, precisely at this moment, the exact answer to the question of what steps the Belgrade government intends to take in connection with the results of the investigation into the behind-the-scenes side of the Marseille murder is decisive. Particularly interested in the Special Department is a thorough and reliable coverage of all the above aspects of the issue from the point of view of various Viennese sources. In particular, everything about Morreale is extremely important. With communist greetings Head of the Special Department of the People's Commissariat of

Foreign Affairs I. KUDRYAVTSEV

(signed) To the Special Department of
the Embassy in Austria

Vienna Confidentially Comrade. P. Nekunde
USSR NKID Special Department

Moscow,

November 3, 1934

No 7431 Eastern Department --

XVIII Dear comrade,

Confirming the receipt of the report of the Eastern Department No 2057, the Special Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to single out certain aspects of the political situation in Central Europe as deserving special attention. The Special Department is unfortunately forced to state that all the latest reports from the Eastern Department have by no means contributed to obtaining a clear picture.

the political situation in Central Europe, which, according to all data, can be attributed to the insufficiently developed information network and the poor functioning of the sources already at the disposal of the Eastern Department. Meanwhile in Vienna

ample and reliable information is now concentrated, which, for example, the British or Czechoslovak intelligence services use to the full, while the Eastern Department continues to confine itself to the reports of secret agents, either not well-informed, or preferring to give incomplete and inaccurate information. The Special Department strongly suggests that drastic measures be taken to eliminate these deficiencies.

The Special Section emphasizes that Austria's domestic political situation is currently playing more than a secondary role, and that the fate of the Danube basin is now determined by the development of international relations, in particular the relations between Paris, Rome and Berlin. It

should be noted here that the assassination of King Alexander in Marseille is no longer at the center of European attention. There is almost no doubt that the whole matter will be referred to the League of Nations, where it will be buried in the first category. Since not only Hungary and Austria, but also Italy bears - at least indirectly - responsibility for the Marseille attempt, French and, in particular, British diplomacy are making every effort to hush up this matter. Apparently, they will succeed. The center of gravity now lies in

which of the two main foreign policy combinations will be implemented: a rapprochement between Paris and Rome, or an agreement between Paris and Berlin? A timely and accurate answer to this very question is the task that the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks set for the Special Department of the People's

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. As the Eastern Department should be aware, French policy has set itself the goal of achieving an agreement between Italy and the Little Entente, especially between Rome and Belgrade. Such an agreement is possible, however, only if Italy formally recognizes, at least for a period of 10 years, the principle of territorial status quo in Central Europe and the Balkans. Until now, the Roman government, in an effort to keep its hands free, has shied away from assuming this obligation. Contrary to the information

available to the Eastern Division, the Special Division has absolutely reliable data that

under no circumstances can one expect France to waive the said demand. In case of graduation

Mussolini's refusal to recognize the principle of the status quo cannot be any (even compromise) agreement between Italy and the Little Entente, and thus France.

Hungarian and partly Polish diplomacy is working towards a new rapprochement between Rome and Berlin, with the aim of expanding the Roman bloc by joining Germany and, perhaps, Poland. The hidden spring of this combination lies in the redistribution of Europe at the expense of Czechoslovakia. An indispensable condition on the part of Italy for an agreement with Germany is the latter's real renunciation "forever" of "Anschluss". In this regard, the role of German diplomacy (and, in particular, Papen) is curious, seeking to indirectly support the restoration plans in Austria and Hungary in order to cause a conflict between them and the Little Entente, to occupy Austria on the sly and to agree primarily with Prague and Paris on the basis of the so-called "Belgrade program" (this side of the issue is also extremely poorly covered in the reports of the Eastern Department). The Berlin government, ready for any combination that

would allow it to get out of the present "unbearable" situation, sees a real threat to Germany precisely in the French-Italian conspiracy, while at the same time quite correctly considering that the contradictions between France and Italy are so "great" that in the end As a result, a clash of their interests will become inevitable.

French policy, which clearly takes into account the possibilities and even benefits of the Franco-German agreement, is unable, however, to get rid of the psychosis of "German revenge" and is looking for any way out of the current impasse, except for the only natural one. The aggravation of the Saar problem only contributes to the emergence of new complications.

All these moves and countermoves in the diplomatic game of the European great and small powers are vividly reflected both in Vienna and in Budapest. The special attention of the Eastern Department should be paid to

them. In conclusion, the Special Section considers it necessary to urge the Eastern Section to carefully select and timely

communication of all, without exception, reliable information that can help to answer correctly the question that is of great interest to Soviet foreign policy at the present time, namely: to what extent does the idea of a pact of four or five powers continue to be at the center of Italy's foreign policy aspirations? Is this idea an essential part of Mussolini's foreign policy, or has it even lost its relative importance as a tactical maneuver?

The Special Department hopes to receive comprehensive information on all the issues raised in the near future. With communist greetings! Head of the Special Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs I.

KUDRYAVTSEV (signed) Notes 1 JV Stalin (1879-1953). in the party since 1898. In 1912-1913. - Member of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. In 1917-1922 (he was People's Commissar for Nationalities, at the same time from 1919 - People's Commissar for State Control, from 1920 - People's Commissar of the RCT. Member of the Revolutionary Military Socialist Republic. From 1922 - General Secretary of the Party. In 1922 d. enters into a struggle for power with the ill Lenin and wins the battle, remaining in power after the death of Lenin, contrary to the "testament" left by Lenin. In the blocs subsequently formed against Trotsky, he always remains in the shadows, substituting Zinoviev, then he pushes back those who helped him, Zinoviev and Kamenev (accusing them of the left opposition, and classifying himself among the right), then removes Bukharin, accused of right opportunism (from the position of the center, which Stalin proclaims). Coming out by 1929 as the sole winner of the intra-party struggle, Stalin prepares and carries out the assassination of Kirov and, with reference to the terrorists who raised their heads in the USSR, conducts party purges of 1935-1939. Having freed himself from the old party asset, which could interfere with the implementation of a new political course, he concludes an agreement with Hitler on the division of Europe and, thanks to the neutrality of the latter and the connivance of the democratic countries, seizes a number of European states (fully: the Baltic states, partially: Finland, Romania and Poland). Because of Hitler's refusal to agree to the transfer "into the Soviet sphere of influence" of all Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and

Prolovov is preparing to break off relations with Hitler and change his political course, apparently hoping to eventually join the anti-German coalition. Hitler, who guessed this turn, starts a war, which, however, he loses, and Stalin gains control of the territories called Eastern Europe. After the Berlin Crisis of 1948, as a result of which Stalin sought recognition by Western governments of the division of Germany into East and West, he broke the established good-neighborly relations with democratic countries, supported the formation of Israel in defiance of England, anathematized the independent communist Tito and pursued a moderate isolationist policy. Gradually losing power. In 1952, he was removed from the post of general secretary (through the abolition of this position). The circumstances of Stalin's death cannot be considered clarified. It is possible that he was killed by conspirators, among whom

were Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev.

2 M. M. Litvinov (Max Ballach, 1876-1951), in the party since 1898. Since 1918 - member of the Board of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, since 1921 - plenipotentiary in Estonia. In 1930-1939. - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In 1941-1943. - Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov and Plenipotentiary to the USA.

3 N. N. Krestinsky (1883--1938), in the party with. 1903 In 1918-1921 - People's Commissar for Finance of the RSFSR, since 1921 - plenipotentiary in Germany. In 1917-1921 he was a member of the Central Committee. In 1919-1921. - Member of the Politburo and secretariat of the Central Committee. In 1927 he was an oppositionist. He repented, was restored to his rights. Since 1930 - Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Exposed at the third Moscow (Bukharin) trial as an accused and shot.

4 Little Entente - the political union of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1920-1938; created with the assistance of France. The main organizer of the Little Entente was Beneš. 5 Diplomatic relations of Romania and

Czechoslovakia with the USSR
were installed on June 9, 1934

6 The London Protocol on the definition of aggression was signed by the Soviet Union on July 3-5, 1933 with ten states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

7 Yugoslavia remained the only country of the Little Entente that opposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR. They were established only in June 1940. On January

22, 1934, the conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Little Entente, held in Zagreb, decided on "the timely resumption by the member states of the Little Entente of normal diplomatic relations" with the USSR, "as soon as the necessary diplomatic and political conditions". The Permanent Council of the Little Entente, which met in early June in Geneva, decided that "political and diplomatic conditions now allow each of the member states of the Little Entente to act at the right moment in accordance with the Zagreb resolution."

9 KE Voroshilov (1881-1969), since 1903 a Social Democrat. Veteran of the Civil War. Since 1925, after the mysterious death of Sklyansky and the no less strange death of Frunze, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In 1934 - People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, since 1940 - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

10 Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), socialist, expelled from the party in 1914. In 1919, he founded the Fascist Party of Italy. From 1922 to 1943 Fascist dictator of Italy. In 1945 he was captured by Italian anti-fascist partisans and executed by the tribunal of the National Liberation Committee of Northern Italy.

11 Adolf Hitler (Schicklgruber, 1889-1945), since 1921 - the leader of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. In 1933 he became Chancellor of Germany. In 1934, he combined this post with the post of president of the republic. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, he pursued an extremely successful and popular foreign policy, the main goal of which was to destroy the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, imposed on Germany as a peace treaty after the war of 1914-1918. In September 1939, he unleashes a major European war, the purpose of which is to defeat France and England. Being unable to land troops on the British mainland and force England to surrender, he decides to defeat the Soviet Union. In 1945, just before the defeat of Germany in the war, he committed suicide.

12 Hitler and Mussolini met in Venice 14-15
June 1934

13 Leader of the National Socialist group that broke away from Hitler and published Der schwarze Front in Vienna.

14 Thyssen-Oppenheim financial group, which arose at the end of the 19th century. Its financial center was the banking house of Oppenheim. The industrial core is the metallurgical and industrial concern Thyssen, founded in 1871 by 15 Hermann

Goering (1893-1946), one of the leaders of German Nazism. Since 1922 - the head of the SA, since 1933 - the head of the government of Prussia, the imperial minister of aviation. At the Nuremberg trials, he was sentenced to death. Committed suicide.

The 16th Locarno Conference was held in Switzerland on October 5-16, 1925. Its participants were Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland. On October 16, the Locarno Treaties were initialed in Locarno, and on December 1, the Locarno Treaties were signed in London. The main document was the Rhine Guarantee Pact signed by Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium on the inviolability of the German-French and German-Belgian borders and the preservation of the demilitarized Rhine zone. Italy and Great Britain acted as guarantors of the pact. Germany made no commitments regarding its eastern borders.

17 Since 1924, the CER, built in 1897-1903, was under the joint control of the USSR and China, which led to constant conflicts with Japan, which tried to dominate the territories of the decentralized Chinese state. Unable to resist Japanese influence, the Soviet government in 1935 sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to the government of Manchukuo, backed by Japan.

18 15 July. In 1933, England, France, Germany and Italy signed a "four-power agreement and cooperation pact" in Rome. 19 The growth of

fascism in Austria and the ever-increasing armament of the Austrian fascists, coming from Germany, forced the Austrian government to issue a decree on July 12 introducing the death penalty for smuggling and possession of explosives. July 20 was appointed

trial of seven Nazi terrorists subject to this decree. On the eve of the trial, Munich radio, in a broadcast to Austria, indicated that Dollfuss and his government would answer with their heads for the fate of the seven convicts. Engelbert Dollfuss (1892-1934),

since 1932 he was the Federal Chancellor of Austria and Minister of Foreign Affairs, one of the leaders of the Christian Social Party. On July 25, a Nazi detachment broke into the building of the Austrian broadcasting campaign and, under threat of execution, forced the announcer to announce the resignation of the Dollfuss government and the formation of the fascist government of Rintelen. At the same time, another group of Nazis broke into Dollfuss's office and mortally wounded him. On the evening of the same day, Mussolini, who at that time spoke out against the Anschluss of Austria to Germany, ordered four divisions to be sent to Brenner and to the border of Carinthia, and the ambassadors of England and France made energetic presentations in Berlin, reminding Hitler of the international guarantees of the independence of Austria. Hitler had to retreat. A formal condolence from the German government was sent to Vienna on the murder of Dollfuss; The German ambassador Riet, who had been involved in the coup attempt, was recalled from Austria, and von Papen was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary in his place. At the meeting of the League of Nations on September 12, 1934, the new Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg announced Austria's firm determination to defend its independence. 20 On April 16, 1922, during the Genoa Conference in Rapallo, a Soviet-German separate treaty was signed on the restoration of diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and Germany, the mutual renunciation of claims and trade

economic ties.

21 Eduard Beneš (1884-1948), statesman of Czechoslovakia. In 1918-1935 - Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1935-1938. -- the president. Since 1940 - in exile. In 1946-1948. - President of the country. He committed suicide under very strange circumstances, giving reason to believe that he was killed by the Soviet security forces 22 Louis Barthou (1862-1934), from 1894 he was repeatedly a minister in the French government. In 1913 -

Prime Minister of France. In 1934 - Minister of Foreign Affairs, a supporter of the Soviet

French cooperation. In October 1934, in Marseilles, together with King Alexander I of Yugoslavia, he was killed by a Macedonian terrorist revolutionary.

23 Frank Kellogg (1856-1937), US politician, lawyer, member of the Republican Party. In 1917-1923. - Senator, in 1924 - Ambassador to England. From 1925 to 1929 he was Secretary of State. In 1930-1935. Member of the Permanent Court of International Court of Justice at The Hague. 24 Aristide Briand (1862--4932), French

politician. In 1909-1931. - Eleven times he was Prime Minister of France and 25 times - Minister, mostly - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Together with Kellogg, he initiated the Treaty of Paris, which prohibited war as an instrument of national policy. In other words, the pact established an international legal prohibition on waging an aggressive war. The treaty was signed on August 27, 1928 by the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, and Canada. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, Japan, India, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Soviet Union acceded to the treaty, which went down in history as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, on September 6, 1928. On February 9, 1929, the USSR, Poland, Estonia, Romania and Latvia signed the Moscow Protocol on the early entry into force of the Kellogg-Briand Pact . However, formally, the pact entered into force only on July 24, 1929. The pact did not provide for sanctions against the aggressor and tools to counter aggression, and therefore had an exclusively moral

meaning.

25 We are talking about the possibility of a Polish-German bloc against the USSR, on the one hand, and Lithuania, on the other. German-Polish contradictions, however, were so strong that an agreement between the Nazis and the Polish government was out of the question.

26 This refers to the territorial conflict between Hungary and Czechoslovakia over the issue of Transcarpathian Ukraine, which until 1919 belonged to Austria-Hungary, and then to Czechoslovakia. In 1938, Transcarpathian Ukraine, with the tacit consent of Germany, was occupied by Hungary, in 1944 by the Soviet Red Army. In 1945

-- annexed by the Soviet Union (declared part of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR).

27 Vilna conflict 1917-1939 between Poland and Lithuania occurred because of the city of Vilna (Vilnius) and the Vilna region, occupied by Poland, and led to a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two states. After the occupation of Eastern Poland by the Soviet Union (according to the German-Soviet agreement on the division of spheres of influence in Europe), Vilna and the Vilna region were transferred by the Soviet government to Lithuania (to be re-occupied a year later, now together with the entire Baltic). 28 D. 3. Manuilsky (1883-1959), came from a spiritual family, the son of a village priest. In 1903

he entered St. Petersburg University, at the same time he joined the Bolshevik Party. Engaged in propaganda and agitation in underground circles. He was arrested for participating in a demonstration against the Russo-Japanese War. In June 1906, after the defeat of the 1st State Duma, as a Bolshevik agitator he took part in the uprising of soldiers and sailors in Kronstadt. He was arrested and, for lack of proof of the crime, was exiled administratively to the Arkhangelsk province. On the way to the place of exile, he escaped from the Vologda prison (he was taken out in a basket)

In the Vologda prison in the summer of 1906, many arrested people accumulated. The prison regime was free. The cameras are open. One of the exiles had a large basket. Manuilsky was short and thin. They put him in this basket and carried him out. His absence was noticed only a few days later.

After a few months in Kyiv, Manuilsky left for Paris, where he lived until the revolution, in 1917. It was difficult to live in emigration, which may be why he took the pseudonym Ivan Unemployed. He disagreed with Lenin on the question of the participation of the Bolsheviks in the 3rd State Duma (he joined the "otzovists", who believed that the deputies - the Social Democrats from the Duma should be recalled). Lenin found himself in the minority on this issue in the party, but he did not obey the decision of the party and continued his political line. Manuilsky also actively participated in another anti-Leninist campaign connected with Lenin's refusal to hand over the money expropriated

exes

The money obtained by the exes went to the central party cash desk, which, for its part, assumed certain obligations in relation to the ex-miners, especially if they came across. After the split, the central treasury of the Bolsheviks remained in the hands of Lenin, who was accused of failing to comply with these obligations. In particular, the accusations were made by a group of Ural militants operating in 1907 in the Perm and Vyatka provinces under the leadership of Lbov. Lbov himself was killed by the police during his arrest. A number of members of his squad were arrested. Others, once abroad, demanded money to organize the escape of those arrested (Lbov contributed about 30 thousand rubles to the Bolshevik cash desk). Lenin refused to give money, and one of the Lbov emigrants, Alexander Sergeev, distributed an open letter to the Bolshevik center under the pseudonym Sasha Lbovets, demanding the return of 6 thousand rubles. The actual author of this letter was Menzhinsky, one of the otzovists and the future head of the GPU. Manuilsky, a close friend of Menzhinsky, took an active part in this anti-Leninist campaign. Moves from France to Switzerland for health reasons. He is ill with tuberculosis and was considered hopeless by doctors. Upon his return to Russia after 1917, Manuilsky did not immediately enter the Bolshevik Party, but joined one of the groups standing between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Prints articles in the spirit of Trotsky But Trotsky treats Manuilsky with condescension, and the latter soon joins the Bolsheviks and quickly advances. In the winter of 1917-1918, he held the post of Deputy People's Commissar for Food, was a member of the delegation that negotiated with the Germans in Brest-Litovsk. In the summer of 1918, he was a member of the commission that worked out a peace treaty with Ukraine, with Hetman Skoropadsky. Later - the representative of the Comintern in Kyiv (during the period of the Hungarian revolution, relations with which, without much success, he established). At the beginning of 1919, he was sent to Paris as head of a special mission of the Soviet Red Cross, serving as a cover for the activities of the Comintern. Arrested by the French government (exchanged for members of the French Red Cross arrested in Soviet Russia). In 1920-1921. - People's Commissar of Agriculture in Ukraine. Since 1921. 1 - Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Since 1922 - member of the Central Committee. Since 1924 - Member of the Presidium of

Comintern. In the Comintern, on the instructions of Stalin, he first opposed Zinoviev, then against Bukharin. He was a conductor of Stalin's policy in the Comintern, in particular, at the Seventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in November 1926, he delivered a report "Pacific contradictions and China", where he pointed out that "American imperialism is the most dangerous for the working masses of the whole world ... Objectively offensive role play "the United States," objectively defensive - Japan and England. This character of the United States forces them to systematically prepare for war against Japan. The central task of the United States, Manuilsky continued, is "the creation in East Asia of a more or less strong state that could challenge Japan's dominance among the Asian peoples in the Far East. This state must be sufficiently strong to threaten Japan from the rear, but at the same time weak enough to sail in the wake of US imperialism." [Ways of world revolution. T. 1. S. 422--430. Official report on the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, published in Moscow. In fact, of course, it was about creating a strong China to counter Japan in the Far East. Stalin, through the mouth of Manuilsky, formulated his own policy and blamed the United States for it. Hence the future

Soviet policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek (and not supporting the Chinese revolution in 1927). From this, Manuilsky drew the conclusion that he supported the Pan-Asian

movement against "foreign imperialists." In 1928 or 1929, after the fall of Bukharin, Manuilsky was appointed secretary of the Presidium of the Comintern. In 1934 he was replaced by Dimitrov, who was released from a German prison. Manuilsky remained to work in the Comintern in smaller roles. Gradually removed from business, appointed to the formal post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Removed, repressed. [AIG, col. Nikolaevsky, box 511, folder 48 and box 515, folder 21. B. I. Nikolaevsky Two biographies of Manuilsky.]

29 See Appendix.

30 The USSR joined the League of Nations on September 18, 1934. 31 The League of Nations was located in

refused

Geneva. United States, Versailles

contract,

sanctioning the post-war European borders, refused to enter the League of Nations, not wanting to interfere in European politics. 32 Alfred

Rosenberg (1893-1946), German National Socialist. Since 1922 - chief editor of the central organ of the National Socialist Party. Since 1933 - the head of the foreign policy department of the party. Since 1941, Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories. Executed by the verdict of the international military tribunal in Nuremberg. 33 B. S. Stomonyakov (1882-1941), in the party since 1902,

S. 1921 - authorized by the NKVT in Germany. In 1921-1925. -- trade representative of the RSFSR (USSR) in Germany, at the same time in 1924-1925. -Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR Krasina. In 1923- -1926. - Member of the collegium of the NKVT of the USSR. In 1926-1934. -- Member of the Collegium of the NKID of the USSR, in 1934-1938. - Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

34 And M. Maisky (1884--1975), Menshevik. Since 1921 - Bolshevik. Soviet diplomat. In 1929-1932. -- plenipotentiary in Finland, in 1932-1943. - Ambassador to the UK. In 1943-1946. - Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Author of several books and memoirs.

35 Night of "long" knives in Germany, a kind of party purge, when Hitler's supporters carried out mass arrests and murders of Nazi oppositionists, primarily the Rem group. 36 Attempt of a fascist coup in

Austria and the assassination of Dollfuss. 37 That is, the Chinese

government. Nanjing is a city in China. In 1927- -1937 and 1946--1949 - the seat of the government of China.

38 K. K. Yurenev (Krotovsky, 1888-1938). Since 1905 he was a social democrat. In 1913-1917. - "interregional". Since 1917 - Chairman of the Bureau of the General Staff of the Red Army. Since 1921 - in diplomatic work: plenipotentiary in Bukhara, Latvia, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Iran, Austria, Japan.

Executed by firing squad 39 In the spring and summer of 1934, when, mainly on Barthou's initiative, the East European Pact was being negotiated. However, it was obvious that, on the one hand, Poland would take part in such an agreement only if Germany joined the pact, and that, on the other hand, Germany would never join such a pact. 8

September, 1934 Germany and on September 27 Poland rejected proposals for an Eastern Pact. 40 The

procedural admission of the USSR to the League of Nations was formalized as an "invitation" of 30 member states of the League to the USSR to join this organization. On September 15, "at the initiative of France", i.e., the great power most friendly to the USSR, a telegram was sent to the Soviet government inviting the USSR "to join the League of Nations and bring its valuable cooperation." On September 18, the general meeting of the League decided to accept the USSR and include its representative in the Council of the League as a permanent member. Only three countries voted against: Holland, Portugal and Switzerland. On December 14, 1939, in response to Soviet aggression in Finland, the USSR was expelled from the League of

Nations. 41 After the end of the First World War, Japan remained the main foreign policy adversary of the Soviet Union Throughout the twenties, and especially in connection with the revolution that began in China, the question of avoiding a direct military conflict with Japan was one of the top priorities of Soviet foreign policy. Above (see note 29) we have cited excerpts from documents explaining Stalin's "leftism" versus Bukharin's "moderation" on the Chinese question. But there was also the "leftism" of Trotsky's left opposition in relation to Stalin's "moderation": in 1927 the left opposition accused Stalin and Bukharin of sabotaging the Chinese revolution. The reasons for the sabotage were clear. Like Lenin in

1918, who signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Stalin and Bukharin did not want to take risks, realizing that active interference in Chinese affairs would lead to a conflict with Japan, which was exactly what needed to be avoided. In addition, in order to counter Japan, it was more profitable for the Soviet government to have a strong national China, united, for example, by Chiang Kai-shek, and not communist China, fragmented and weakened by the revolution. The interests of the Comintern and the world revolution were in direct conflict with the foreign policy and geopolitical goals of the Soviet state. In 1927, the Soviet government sacrificed the revolution in

China, as in 1918 it sacrificed the revolution in Germany. The Chinese revolution did indeed end in defeat, but the time was

won, and the first serious conflict with Japan occurred only in 1938. A year before that, the creation of a powerful industrial base in the Urals, the Far East, Kazakhstan, Siberia and Central Asia began. Today, this fact is usually cited as proof of the foresight of the Soviet leadership, which hardly foresaw the war with Germany and the evacuation of industry carried out during the war years. Meanwhile, the creation of a second industrial base in the east of the USSR was caused solely by the desire to provide an economic basis close to the potential front.

In the summer of 1937, Japan began an open seizure of China, which for the Soviet government, which was trying to gain a foothold there, was a serious defeat in foreign policy. In July, the Japanese occupied Beijing, in November - Shanghai, in December - Nanjing. By October 1938, they had occupied the main industrial centers and the most important railway lines of China. The Soviet Union, for its part, occupied Mongolia in September 1937. A confrontation between the two armies began, which at least twice led to local conflicts: at the end of June 1938 in the area of Lake Khasan, where the fighting continued until August 9, and in May (1939) on the Khalkin-Gol River in Mongolia, where the conflict was settled only thanks to the mediation of Germany shortly after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on September 16, 1939. It remains only to add that even after the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II, the peace treaty between the USSR and Japan was never signed. Russia is still at war with Japan, now because of the occupation of a number of Japanese territories by the Soviet Union.⁴² On September 27, 1934, on the initiative of Barthou, an Anglo-Franco-Italian

declaration was signed on the need to preserve the independence and integrity of Austria.⁴³ October 3 In 1933, Dollfuss was assassinated by the Nazis, the chancellor was slightly

wounded, martial law was declared in Austria, and Hitler issued an ultimatum for the "unification" of Austria. Mussolini assumed the role of mediator in the conflict. As a result, on February 17, a declaration of three powers (England, France and Italy) was signed, which, however, did nothing.

added to the already existing contractual guarantees of the Austrian independence.

44 Memel region - the modern city of Klaipeda with its environs, Lithuania. In 1871-1918. - part of the German Empire, then under the control of the Entente. In 1923 - transferred to Lithuania.

45 Obviously, Lithuania could be compensated for the transfer of the Memel region to Germany only by transferring Vilna and the Vilna region to Lithuania, i.e., at the expense of Poland, to which, in turn, Poland would never voluntarily agree. This plan was implemented only in 1939-1940, after the signing of the relevant German-Soviet treaties and the fourth partition of Poland.

46 The Danzig Corridor (or Polish Corridor) is the name of a strip of land received by Poland under the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and giving Poland access to the Baltic Sea.

47 The Kuomintang is a "national party", a political party in China, established in 1912. From 1927 to 1949, it was the ruling party of the Republic of China. After 1949 Taiwan ruling party

48 Apparently, this refers to the "Rome Protocols" signed on March 17, 1934 in Rome between Italy, Austria and Hungary by Mussolini, Dollfuss and Hungarian Prime Minister Gembes.

49 I. Z. Surits (1882-1952), Menshevik, then Bolshevik, Soviet diplomat, in the diplomatic service since 1911. He had the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. In 1918-1919. -- Deputy Soviet plenipotentiary in Denmark, 1919-1921. -- plenipotentiary in Afghanistan, 1921-1922. - Member of the Turkocommission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and authorized by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for Turkestan and Central Asia.

1922--1923 -- Soviet plenipotentiary in Norway, 1923-1924 -- in Turkey, 1934-1937.

-- in France, 1937-1939. Member of the Soviet delegation at the sessions of the League of Nations.

50 Konstantin Neurath (1873-1956), in 1932-1938 Foreign Minister of Nazi Germany. In 1939-1942. - Headed the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. At the Nuremberg trials sentenced to: 15 years in prison. Released in 1954 for health reasons.

51 See Appendix. 52

A. A. Troyanovsky (1882-1955), like the future Soviet diplomats Maisky and Surits, was at first a Menshevik. In 1918 he accused the Bolsheviks of spying for Germany. On

diplomatic service since 1927. In 1927-1933. - Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Japan. In 1933-1938. -Ambassador of the USSR to the USA.

53 Apparently, we are talking about the Soviet-German non-aggression and neutrality treaty signed on April 24, 1926 in Berlin, then extended on June 24, 1931

34 Alfred Hugenberg (1865-1951), German monopolist, one of the organizers of the Pan-German Union (1891). From the 1920s he financed the German National Socialist Party. In 1928-1933. Chairman of the far-right German National People's Party. Minister of Food and Agriculture in the Hitler government. 55 Saar or Saarland, since 1871 most of it was part of Prussia. In 1919, it was transferred to the management of the

commission of the League of Nations. At the same time, the coal mines of the region were transferred to the ownership of France. In 1935, according to a plebiscite held in the Saarland, the region passed to Germany. After the Second World War - in the French zone of occupation of Germany. According to the 1956 agreement between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, from January 1, 1957, it became part of the Federal Republic of Germany.

56 October 14-19, 1933 Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, and its the delegation left the conference on disarmament in Geneva.

57 DR MacDonald (1866-1937), one of the founders and leaders of the Labor Party of Great Britain. In 1924 and 1929-31. -Prime Minister of Great Britain. In 1924 he established diplomatic relations with the USSR. In 1931-1935, having left the Labor Party, he headed the coalition national government.

58 MI Frumkin (Germanov, 1878-1939), in the party since 1898 met the February Revolution in exile in Krasnoyarsk. After the October Revolution, he was a member of the Regional Economic Council of Western Siberia. Since 1918 - Member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food. In 1920 - Deputy Chairman of the Sibrevkom, then authorized by the People's Commissariat for Food in the North Caucasus. Until March 1922 - for

Deputy People's Commissar for Food of the RSFSR. Since April of the same year - Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the RSFSR. In 1928 - Deputy People's Commissar of Finance. On June 15, 1928, he sent a letter to the Politburo criticizing Stalin's policy on the issue of collectivization. Solidarized with Bukharin. Died during the purge.

59 On January 26, 1934, the German-Polish non-aggression pact was signed. The Soviet government has always viewed this agreement as directed against the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe, in other words, as a prejudice on the division of spheres of influence between Germany and Poland.

60 Heimweh (German) - literally: nostalgia, homesickness, this was the name of the armed legion, which received subsidies from the Italian fascists and was an instrument of Italian policy in Austria. It should be noted, however, that Italy was at that moment the only factor holding back the German occupation of Austria. 62 The Habsburgs, a dynasty that ruled

Austria from 1867 to 1918,

ruled by Austria-Hungary

63 Franz von Papen (1879 - 1969), in July - November 1932 - head of the German government, in 1933 - 1934. -- Vice Chancellor. Supporter of the Anschluss

of Austria 64 Iron Guard - a fascist organization in Romania in 1931-1944. In 1934, after the assassination of Romanian Prime Minister I. Duka, by members of the Iron Guard, it was disbanded. Continued to operate under the name "Party - All for the Fatherland" In 1938, together with other political parties, banned by Carol II and existed illegally Dissolved in 1944 after the defeat of Romania in World War II

65 It is about the assassination of L. Bartu and the King of Yugoslavia Alexander I

66 Apparently, this refers to the Croatian and Macedonian underground nationalist organizations that were involved in the assassination and connections with Soviet intelligence abroad. It is clear that the publication of information about the existence of such connections could compromise the Soviet government 67

Alexander I Karageorgievich (1888-- 1934), since 1921 the king of Yugoslavia. In foreign policy, he was guided by France. Killed in October 1934 in Marseille (together with French Foreign Minister L. Barthou) by a Macedonian terrorist revolutionary

68 Ustashe - in 1929-1945 fascist organization of Croatian nationalists. Founded abroad by a former officer of the Austrian

Ante Pa-velich's army. After the occupation of Yugoslavia by Germany, they created the "Independent State of Croatia" under the auspices of Germany and formed a puppet government.

69 Vardar Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.

Appendix

This appendix contains quotations from the archives of B. I. Nikolaevskii concerning foreign policy issues of Soviet policy in the 1920s-1930s, primarily secret Soviet-German relations. The documents used in the "Appendix" are introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. These are most often excerpts from letters and manuscripts not intended for publication. Taken together, they give some idea of the information on the basis of which Boris Ivanovich Nikolaevsky came to certain conclusions.

The secret Soviet-German relations along the lines of the General Staffs, which violated the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and developed after the signing of the Rapallo Agreement, were known in wide government and military circles of the USSR and Germany. Here is what the Menshevik and economist N. V. Valentinov-Volsky wrote in a letter to R. A. Abramovich¹, one of the leaders of the Menshevik Party:

"Arriving in Lipetsk in the summer of 1927, to my greatest surprise, I found it full of Germans and in the sky above it there were as many flying airplanes as I had not seen in Moscow at that time either. In Lipetsk there were German arsenals and aerogars guarded by the GPU. All the townsfolk knew about it, but no one dared to talk about it - the GPU arrested such people. At the cemetery in Lipetsk there was a whole corner with monuments in honor of the dead German pilots. [...] When, having arrived from Lipetsk (I took mud baths) and visiting Rykov⁵, in a conversation with him, I touched upon the German aviators in Lipetsk, he dryly interrupted me, saying: "Sorry, I won't talk about this with you"³. and Bendelstrasse was carried out through high-ranking Red Army commanders (Tukhachevsky⁴ and Berzin⁵) and, conversely, through German officers who traveled between Berlin and Moscow "on official assignments"⁶.

Valentinov also informed Abramovich that since 1924 "Junker" had been building aircraft in the USSR and that a plant for the production of asphyxiating gases had been built in Samara.

Abramovich was also aware of Soviet-German military cooperation. Here is what he answered Valentinov: "I have an extremely extensive material on this, based on more than 225 books, reports, articles, etc.

German and other presses. It began during the civil war, when Chicherin appeared at night at the German embassy to the "heir" of Mirbach von Gelferich and offered him an unspoken military agreement for a joint fight against the Germans, Finns and Baltics against the British in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. This was in July-August 1918 d. This cooperation continued before Hitler and under Hitler. The initial period [was] until about 1926; now there is no dispute [...] and what you are now reporting in a letter about Lipetsk and Trotsk (that was the name of the town near Samara, in which there was a chemical gas factory for the Germans). All of Germany thundered about these chemical grenades, when the German Social Democrats persuaded the Hamburg loaders to drop several boxes from the Soviet steamer, and grenades with asphyxiating gases with the RSFSR brand were scattered all over the embankment in front of many people. Then there was a request in parliament, public debates, and this incident was extinguished with difficulty "8. Much was said about this after the Second World War,

when a large number of former Soviet citizens found themselves abroad, from prisoners or interned by the Germans during the war years. One of these emigrants, P. Trenin, wrote: "The beginning of German influence must be considered

from 1922, when a secret agreement was concluded between the Soviet government and Germany on arming and technical equipment of the Red Army. From an economic point of view, this agreement brought Germany some benefit, because it sold part of the military-chemical and aviation stocks left after the great war and subject to destruction to the Soviet government. [...] In the second half of 1922, German aviation specialists - officers of the Reichswehr - arrived in Moscow, signed a contract for 5 years and founded an aircraft factory in Fili, near Moscow. All technical

equipment was brought from Germany. The working and technical staff at first was also German. In the same 1922, the first Russian-German aviation society "Deru Luft" was founded, which established the first line Moscow - Koenigsberg. At the beginning of 1923, another group of German chemical officers was founded in 12 kilo. from Moscow between the mountains. Lyubertsy and mountains. Lublin military-chemical small plant. At first, only a few dozen people worked here, including management personnel. They were exclusively Germans. This plant did not independently produce any chemical products, and its task was only to equip mines. artillery chemical shells and poisonous smoky bombs with chloropicrin, adamsite and other toxic substances brought from Germany. The plant also tested these mines. shells, checkers, as well as gas waves. All this took place on the territory of the future scientific and chemical testing ground [...] Gradually, the Bolsheviks created their own

chemical staff and built two powerful chemical plants. [...] When these plants were ready in 1925, the Bolsheviks decided to liquidate the German chemical plant. Since the contract was valid until 1927, [...] one of the autumn September nights of 1925, they set fire to a factory and a house of German employees in Podosinki (17 kilometers from Moscow along the Kazan railway). Only one shed with chemical products remained from the plant, and the residential building burned to the ground. After that, the Bolsheviks accused the Germans of sabotage [...] Soon after that, another German group of aviation specialists was thrown out of the aircraft factory in Fili "9. An untitled note from the Nikolaevsky archive reports about the same:

"As a result of the very hard and painstaking work of the semi-official representatives of the Reichswehr (since 1922), the USSR currently has decent stocks of German property and (officially, entire industrial organizations of the "state enterprises of military-Voenveda"), created at the expense of the German Reichswehr and with its direct technical control [...] The Reichswehr took care mainly of the artillery and machine-gun armament of the Red Army; improvements to the English type

tanks, setting the military-chemical business and aviation to the proper height. In the area of the naval Reichswehr worked to improve technical diving "10. Military cooperation was followed by political and even ideological rapprochement. The struggle against the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (Rhineland) at the beginning of 1923 was presented literally as an action of the Comintern. They were illegally thrown to work there even Soviet agents. At the same time, "plans were discussed for the battle of Russian-German forces with French imperialism on the Rhine and the supply of the Reichswehr and German nationalists with Soviet grenades" 11. Differences on the question of Soviet-German relations were one of the causes of the

conflict between Stalin and Bukharin. Bukharin's position was greatly influenced by questions of foreign policy, wrote Nikolayevsky. - It was on them that he broke with Stalin: Bukharin in 1926 came to the conclusion that Germany had ceased to be a country in a semi-colonial position. Do you remember Bukharin's articles in Pravda in 1926-27, when he argued that after Locarno Germany had ceased to be an exploited country? After all, this is against Stalin. Stalin held on to an alliance with the Reichswehr of Bredov-Schleicher. Ludwig Reisse, 15 who was killed in Switzerland in 1937, received the Order of Lenin for establishing secret communications with German naval intelligence leaders early in 1928. From that moment on,

a purely Stalinist game of secret agents is being played - twice underground. In a conversation between Bukharin and Kamenev, 16 it is consistent with allusions to Stalin's refusal to punish the Shakhtins for having ties with the Germans.

"I am impressed by your arguments that Stalin had pro-German sympathies," wrote Nikolaevskii, a former communist and now well-known Sovietologist, Louis Fischer. "I understand that he would have welcomed close cooperation with the Reichswehr. tradition began, as I understand it, in 1919, which means that Trotsky and Chicherin, of course, saw the benefit in it. After Hitler came to power in January 1933, Stalin waited a year. I was in that year Moek-ve.[...]

Moscow has always been afraid of a foreign invasion. In 1934, Radek told me that Stalin feared a simultaneous Polish-Japanese attack against the USSR. For this reason, mainly, the Chinese Eastern Railway was sold to Manzhou - Guo¹⁸ (Japan) in 1935. Of course, Stalin dreamed of directing Hitler's expansion to the West. But the German military work in Spain did not harm Hitler. It was a way to train the armed forces. The purpose of Stalin's policy in Spain, in my opinion, was to force France and England to abandon appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini in foreign policy and force them to take the path of active opposition. Munich showed that this attempt ended in failure. Chamberlain¹⁹, Daldier²⁰ and Roosevelt²¹ did not go against Hitler. But during this time, Stalin, through purges, ensured that he was completely free in his actions in foreign and domestic policy. And, of course, he has now returned to his goal: cooperation with

Nazis.

I think that the date preceding the Soviet-Nazi agreement of August 23, 1939, is April 1, 1939, the day of the British guarantees to Poland. [...] Negotiations with France and England were open. Negotiations with Germany - secret. If Stalin wanted to come to an agreement with Britain and France, he would have acted in exactly the opposite way: he would have conducted open negotiations with Hitler in order to put pressure on the West for even greater concessions. But the West had nothing to give. They could not give up the Baltic states, and an agreement with the West meant war for the USSR, while an agreement with Hitler meant no war for some time and - imperialist expansion - just what Stalin wanted.

We disagree on [...] whether Stalin seriously pursued a policy of collective security. I believe that Litvinov was serious in this matter and that he could not act against the will of Stalin. But this policy failed on the Rhine, in Spain, and in general everywhere. And Stalin refused it and turned to Hitler.”²²

Nikolayevsky replied: “Slutsky,²³ the head of the NKVD's foreign department, giving instructions to Krivitsky²⁴, said back in 1935: “Know that with Germany we are either

otherwise, but we will come to an agreement." And the real foreign policy went [...] through Slutsky. This latter said to Krivitsky at the same time: "Remember that your reports are carefully read by Stalin himself." [...] Stalin himself always dreamed of collusion with Germany and, moreover, a large collusion to fight against the Anglo-Saxons. He was a staunch supporter of the Haushofer version of geopolitics, and Haushofer himself²⁵ sent secret reports to Stalin for many years. And Molotov²⁶ knew what he was talking about when, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet under signing the treaty with Hitler spoke of Stalin's brilliant foresight. Of course, when Hitler openly pursued an anti-Soviet policy, Stalin could not help but oppose him, but he always did so in order not to make an agreement [im]possible in the future. It was his struggle for Soviet Hitler's Pact"²⁷.

"In one of our conversations, I told you that Stalin's decision to conspire with Hitler dates back to April 1936, when it became clear that France would not go against Hitler on her own. Now I have a number of data in this direction [...] And another: do you know anything about bringing Gorky's archive to Russia in April 1936?²⁸ And do you know that this bringing had a great influence on Stalin's plans?[...] The history of Gorky's

papers is long. Gorky left them for safekeeping with his last wife (Maria Ignatievna Budberg, nee Benckendorff, daughter of the last tsarist ambassador to England; she was in 1917-18 the beloved of the famous Bruce Lockhart²⁹. "Masha" - - in the memoirs of the latter; there is a lot about her in the memoirs of Peters.³⁰) Gorky made it a condition not to give out the papers to anyone, and even if he demanded that they be sent to him in Moscow, to refuse. Stalin in 1935, when Gorky interceded for Kamenev, refusing to leave Gorky went abroad to a congress of writers in Paris, demanded that the archive be given to him. Peshkova³¹ came abroad with powers from Gorky; then Budberg refused to hand over the papers (I know this from Kuskova³², who then saw and spoke with Peshkova).

Budberg's change of position, according to information, was due to the influence of Lockhart, who then pursued a special policy towards Moscow. Budberg arrived in Moscow in April 1936, a special

carriage, from the station she went straight to the sanatorium where Gorky was then staying, and there

she met Stalin and Voroshilov. [...] By the way, did you know that Wilhelm II's apartment in Doorn was a stronghold for the work of Stalin's agents?³³ That a secret pamphlet against Hitler written by Matilda Ludendorff was copied by Krivitsky and distributed by Wilhelm's wife? That was in 1936 -- in 1938 the generals visiting Doorn were arrested. Krivitsky was convinced that they had been betrayed to Hitler by Stalin."³⁴ This already complex plot of

relations was superimposed by another line: the Comintern. The government saw the threat mainly and above all in European Social Democracy "The struggle against the German Social Democracy as the main force which in Germany resists the revanchist policy of the Reichswehr," Nikolayevsky wrote in his notes to himself. -- Plebiscite against the government of the Social Democrat Otto Braun (1931). carried out jointly by the communists and the Nazis at the direction of the Reichswehr (the struggle in this regard in the ranks of the German Communist Party). Two main trends in the ranks of German nationalists and their attitude towards Russia: the Reichswehr is a supporter of cooperation; Nazis are opponents. The crisis of 1932 in Germany and the victory of the Nazis: the defeat of Stalin's policy"³⁵.

In general, Abramovich was of the same opinion:

"The whole course of events in Germany after January 31, 1933 did not quite coincide with Stalin's foresight and desire. [...] Litvinov was ordered to try to prepare a variant of Hitler's international isolation. When in London at a conference League of Nations in July 1933 adopted the definition of an aggressor³⁶, then Soviet Russia and Romania joined in [...] In connection with this new Litvinist line of foreign policy, the line of the Comintern was also changed. ³⁸ French fascists and royalists, who went along with the "fiery crosses" to storm the Bourbon Palace, already on February 12 received other instructions - to join the anti-fascist demonstrations of the trade unions and

socialists. In June, Moscow put forward a proposal for a united front with the socialists and support for all those pacifist organizations that were then, under the skilful leadership of Münzberger³⁹ and other communist "fronts" and were working on Moscow's assignments. [...] He ^{Moscow} ^{agents} came [Stalin] considered it a great triumph when Germany agreed in 1934 to renew the trade treaty with Russia. In these economic negotiations, he always instructed the representatives of the Soviet Union not to hesitate to make concessions.

mi Germany. The main thing is to reach an agreement. At one time, Stalin hoped to reach an agreement with Poland. To discuss this issue [...] a special meeting of the Politburo was convened with representatives of the departments concerned. [...] Poland really did not go for rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and Stalin was finally convinced that the Kremlin needed to reach an agreement with Hitler. [...] Poland and Romania stubbornly refuse an agreement under which, in the event

of war, the Soviet Union would have the right to send its troops into Polish or Romanian territory. This refusal was motivated by the fact that the Soviet troops that entered the well-known Polish and Romanian territories would never be withdrawn from there, and this would mean the division of Poland and Romania.

[..] The events of June 30, 1934 came, when Hitler dealt with both the Rem⁴⁰ group and von Schleicher with one blow. At a meeting of the Politburo with the participation of representatives of the departments concerned, Stalin again returns to his cherished thought about the need to reach an agreement. Stalin believed that Hitler's dictatorship not only did not weaken, but [...] only stabilized after the destruction of its internal opposition [...] and therefore he is the main force, and it is necessary to enter into an agreement with him. The failure of the Austrian Social Democrats' attempt to prevent the coming of Austrofascism to power through the so-called February uprising clearly acted in the same direction.⁴¹ Not formally proclaimed, the new policy of uniting all anti-fascist forces demanded a change in the old tactics of the Comintern that were subversive in relation to "all European governments.

The first attempts to form a "united front" apparently date back to 1932-1933 and are associated with the name of Heinz Neumann. A German communist, an employee of the Comintern and a representative of the Soviet government in Germany, Neumann, at the direction of the Soviet government, initially advocated in Germany for a bloc of Nazis and Communists in the struggle to destabilize the already shaky democratic German government. It was under his influence that the Central Committee of the German Communist Party decided to vote together with the Nazis during the plebiscite against the Severing-Brown government in Prussia (and so they dumped him).

Neumann soon realized the fallacy of this tactic and tried to change the course of the German Communist Party. However, Stalin, whose personal emissary was Neumann⁴², prevented him. And it is obvious that the decision to pursue the policy of a united front with the Social Democrats in the fight against fascism was taken by the Politburo against the will of Stalin.

Among the staff of the Comintern, the opinion was widespread that Stalin was a "leftist." "Lozovsky always defended the most leftist position, that is, the position of Stalin," wrote F. Ezers-Kaya-Toma in a letter to Nikolaevsky. "[...] On German issues [...] Bukharin was always with the conciliators [...] who considered him their man.[...] About Germany, Stalin in 1928 thought that the revolution was overdue, he believed in information about the mood in the Ruhr area (remember the strikes of 1929) Bukharin knew what the situation was ; therefore, he leaned towards us, although he definitely did not express himself publicly.

Apart from Stalin, many other functionaries of the Comintern opposed the tactics of the united front: S. Lozovsky⁴³, B. Kun⁴⁴, V. Knorin⁴⁵ and Wang Ming⁴⁶. In the leadership of the Central Committee of the KKE, the group of H. Schubert and F. Schulz openly sabotaged the new line of the majority of the Soviet government, accusing W. Pick⁴⁷ and W. Ulbricht⁴⁸ of opportunism. And in general, the German Communist Party continued in those months to adhere to the former ultra-left "Neumann line", which the Soviet government supported all these years - by analogy with the policy of the Comintern, which Neumann pursued

in China in 1927. That year, together with Lominadze⁴⁹ and Semyonov,⁵⁰ who had played the role of a provocateur at the 1922 Social Revolution

to organize an uprising. "When we, i.e., opposition-minded comrades, found out that this troika was in China, we were sure that 'revolutionary events' would take place there," Ezerskaya wrote in a letter to Nikolaevsky. "[...] Stalin and his supporters in the Comintern then thought that events were ripe in China.[...] Other comrades, who had even less confidence in Stalin, believed that he simply wanted to take revenge on Chiang Kai-shek⁵¹ for betraying him, Stalin.[...] Differences between Stalin and Bukharin first came to light at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, depending on their differences in Soviet affairs.[...] Stalin was always on the extreme left, Bukharin leaned towards a conciliatory position, but often gave in. In China, as in many other countries, Stalin considered the position directly revolutionary, and Bukharin was sure that an attempt at an uprising at that moment would lead to putschism. When Neiman, Lominadze

and Semyonov returned to Moscow after the suppression of the uprising, a discussion took place in the Comintern about whether this was an uprising or a putsch. Neiman and Lominadze argued that there was a "revolution". Stalin also claimed that there was "a real mass uprising, and not a coup by a small group of people." Bukharin and others "saw clearly that there could be no question of any revolutionary movement." But, Ezerskaya-Toma continues, "We all knew that he [Stalin] was on the side of Neiman and

Lominadze." "Soon after the discussion," Ezerskaya recalls, "I happened to see a letter from the Chinese comrades, members of the Executive Committee. In this letter, the Chinese Central Committee spoke very clearly about the role of Neumann. He was reproached for making reports in China, in which he deliberately lied, that all his stories about the preparedness of the Chinese masses are fantasy.[...] Neumann in Canton he lied about the situation in China, but at the reports of the local committees he lied about the strength of the Central Committee, at the Central Committee he lied about the situation in the provinces, which he seemed to have seen for himself, which Neumann gave, and what happened in reality. The Central Committee believed that all his stories were a deliberate lie. At the moment of danger, he allegedly disappeared. [...] At the end of the letter, the Chinese comrades even suggested that Neumann be shot for his pernicious role. Stalin was not impressed by this, he continued to regard Neumann as a leader.

Nikolaevsky explained Stalin's position as follows: "Speaking of the Canton uprising, you mean, of course, the events of December 11-13, 1927 [...] Why did Stalin need them at that particular time? was guided by considerations of big politics, i.e., the desire to strike at that time the rapprochement between the Chiang Kai-shek group and the British and especially the Americans? [...] Stalin was greatly influenced by geopolitics (I don't know if you know that Karl Haushofer in for a number of years he wrote special secret reviews of the international situation for Stalin). The latter mainly stood for the rapprochement of Japan with Russia and China against England and especially America. Stalin undoubtedly has the same sentiments. The sharpness of his speeches against Chiang Kai-shek grows depending on from the transition of the latter to the ranks of supporters of an agreement with the Anglo-American bloc"⁵³.

"I no longer doubt," Nikolaevsky wrote in another letter, "that Stalin was under the direct influence of geopolitics. Of course, not completely, but only adapting them to his concepts. But precisely what separated him from Bukharin in these concepts, --namely, the anti-English and anti-American orientation in Far Eastern affairs, was inspired by Haushofer⁵⁴.

Another document testifies to the fact that during this period Stalin took an extremely leftist position on the issues of the Comintern: a note by N. I. Muralov⁵⁵ to Trotsky dated December 18, 1927. Here is what Muralov

wrote: "In connection with the latest reports about the uprising in Canton, and then about the suppression of this uprising, about the break with the USSR, etc. deputy editor

"Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee" comrade. Trotsky. Persuading me to renounce opposition speeches, comrade. Trotsky touched, among other things, on the Chinese question, arguing that now, by the very course of things, it has been removed from discussion, since completely new events are brewing there that will push all past failures into the background. In particular, comrade. Trotsky informed me that "a new uprising is being prepared and will soon break out in Canton, which will lead to the establishment of Soviet power"⁵⁶.

Bukharin was at that time the head of the Comintern, and Stalin's organization of the uprising in Canton behind Bukharin's back was connected, of course, also with the factional struggle within the party leadership of the USSR. Thus the circle closed. The extreme left position in the Comintern is in relation to Bukharin. Extremely right-in relation to Trotsky. Pro-fascist - in relation to the official ideological line of the Soviet leadership. And behind all this is Stalin's struggle for the sole leadership of the party and the country and the Soviet-German rapprochement for the division of spheres of influence that followed in 1939. Notes 1 R. A. Abramovich (Rhein, 1880-1963 one of the leaders of the Bund, at the same time a member of the all-

Russian social

democratic movement. By 1917 one of the leaders of the Menshevik Party. One of the founders in 1921 of the Socialist Bulletin -- organ of the Menshevik Party in exile, member of the foreign delegation of the RSDLP and representative of the Mensheviks in the Socialist International.

2 A. I. Rykov (1881-1938), in the party since 1898. In the first Soviet government - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. He left the Council of People's Commissars in protest against Lenin's policies. In 1918-1921 and (1923-1924 - Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR (USSR). From 1921 - Deputy Chairman of the SNK and STO of the RSFSR. In 1924-1930 - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR (until 1929) From 1931 to 1936 - People's Commissar for Communications of the USSR From 1923 to 1928 - in a bloc with Stalin against Trotsky. One of the leaders of the right opposition, who spoke out against the curtailment of the NEP and against forced collectivization (1928-1929). In 1929 renounced his views and took the side of Stalin. In 1937 he was expelled from the Central Committee and from the party. In 1938 he was put forward as one of the

defendants at the third Moscow trial (Bukharinsk). Shot. 3 AI G, Col.

Nikolaevsky , box 591, folder 14. Letter from N. V. Valentinov-Volsky to R. A. Abramovich dated January 28, 1958 - P. 4--6.

4 M. N. Tukhachevsky (1893-1937), Bolshevik since 1918. During the Civil War, commander of a number of armies. -- Chief of Staff of the Red Army Since 1931, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. Since 1934 - Deputy, and since 1936 - 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935). Shot in June /1937 on charges of military conspiracy.

5 R. I. Berzin (Berzins, Yazepovich, 1888-1939), Soviet military leader. In the party since 1905. In November 1947, he commanded the Northern detachment to liquidate the headquarters in Mogilev, then the 1st Minsk revolutionary detachment. From January 1918 - commander of the 2nd revolutionary army. In February - March - Commander-in-Chief of the Western Revolutionary Front. From June 1918 - Chairman of the Higher Military Inspectorate in Siberia, commander of the North Urals of the Siberian Front; in July - November - 3rd Army. In 1919 - army inspector under the Soviet government of Latvia. In 1919-1924 he was a member of the RVS of a number of

fronts, in 1924-1927. - Western Military District. In 1927 - 1937. worked in the military industry. Arrested in 1938. Shortly before his arrest, he was transferred to work in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the RSFSR. Shot.

Rehabilitated in 1955. 6 League, Col. Nikolaevsky, box 508, folder 44. Erich Wollenberg. Erich Wollenberg to B.I. Nikolaevsky. Letter from Hamburg to California, April 20, 1965. Transl.

with him. 7 AIG, col. Nikolaevsky, box 591, folder 14. Letter from N. V. Valentinov-Volsky to R. A. Abramovich dated January 28, 1958, pp. 4 - 6. 8 AIG, col. Nikolaevsky, box 591, folder 14. Letter from R.

Abramovich N. V. Valentinov-Volsky. February 4th. 1958, p. 2.

9 AIG, col. Nikolaevsky, box 295, folder 23. P. Trenin. Germans and Russian aviation chemistry. Newspaper

clipping. 10 AIG, col. Nikolaevsky, box 14, folder 1. Reichswehr and Comintern. No date and no author. P. 1,

3. 11 AIG, Nikolaevsky stake, box 629, folder 3. V. V. Sukhomlin. In the ring of changes. The betrayal of Trotsky, Stalin, Bukharin, the Chinese, the British, etc. // Will of Russia.

1926 P. 131. 12 N. I. Bukharin (1888-1938). In the party, intermittently, from 1906 to 1937. Member of the Central Committee in 1917-1934, member of the Politburo in 1924-1929. Longtime editor of Pravda. Before 1928 in a bloc with Stalin against Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev. In 1928 he decided to break with Stalin. Blocked with Tomsky and Rykov (the so-called right-wing opposition), was defeated and in 1929, by a resolution of the April plenum, was expelled from the party, removed from

"Pravda" and Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern Repented, Was reinstated in the party, From 1930 to 1934. worked for Ordzhonikidze in the people's commissariat of heavy industry. In 1934, he was appointed editor of Izvestia and was formally considered to be the editor until January 16, 1937, although in fact from the end of 1836 Izvestia was published under the editorship of B. Tal. Arrested on February 27, 1937. One of the accused at

the trial in 1938. Shot. 13 AIG, col. Nikolaevsky, box 476, folder 34. Letter from Nikolaevsky dated 6 October.

1965 1 p. 14 Ferdinand Bredow, general, one of the leaders of the Reichswehr in 1932-1933. Kurt Schleicher, German general. Since May 1932 - Minister in the government of von Papen. Since December 31, 1932 - Chancellor, head of government, on January 28, 1933, German President Hindenburg resigned Schleicher and entrusted the formation of a new government to Hitler. On June 30, 1934, during Hitler's purge of the SA, Bredow and Schleicher were killed.

15 Ignatius Reise (Ludwig, Nast, surname Poretsky), Soviet intelligence officer who switched to the position of a defector in the summer of 1937 and became a Trotskyist and a member of the Fourth International. On September 4, 1937, he was killed by Soviet security forces near Lausanne (Switzerland). 16 L. B. Kamenev

(Rosenfeld, 1883-1936) in the party since 1901. Since 1914 - a Bolshevik. Member of the Central Committee in 1917-1927. (in October and November 1917 he left the Central Committee). Member of the Politburo in October 1917 and 1919-1925. In October - November 1917 - Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In 1918-- 1926 - Chairman of the Moscow Council. At the same time, from 1922 - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR (then the USSR), from 1924 - Chairman of the STO, from 1923 - Director of the Lenin Institute. In January - August. 1926 - People's Commissar for Foreign and Internal Trade of the USSR. Until 1925, in a bloc with Stalin, he fought against Trotsky, since 1926, together with Zinoviev and Trotsky, he formed a bloc against Stalin, a member of the "new opposition". Since January 1907 - plenipotentiary in Italy. In December 1927, he was expelled from the party. He repented of his activities and was restored in 1928. Since 1929. - Chairman of the Glavkontseskom. In 1933, Mr.. appointed head of the publishing house "Academy", in 1934 - director of the Institute of World Literature. M. Gorky. On December 20, 1934, he was finally expelled f

counter-revolutionary, arrested in the case of the murder of Kirov and sentenced, like Zinoviev, in January 1935 to imprisonment,

Later put up as a defendant at the first Moscow trial in August 1936. Shot.

17 LEAGUE, count. Nikolaevsky, box 472, folder 32. Letter from Nikolaevsky to I. M. Berger dated October 2, 1961 1] I. The conversation between Bukharin and Kamenev mentioned by Nikolaevsky took place in July 1928. Just at that time, in May-July, the trial of "pests in the Donbass" was taking place in Moscow - the so-called "Shakhtin case". The case was fabricated. Five of the accused were sentenced to death, the rest to various terms of imprisonment. The defendants were accused, among other things, of spying for Germany. And Stalin's proposal not to give death sentences, which Bukharin and his supporters finally insisted on, was seen as flirting with Germany.

18 Manchukuo - Manchu state, in 1932-1945. a puppet state created by Japan in the territory of Northeast China, Manchuria. In August 1945, after the defeat of Japan in World War II, the Japanese army left Manchuria. Manchukuo ceased to exist and was temporarily occupied by Soviet troops. Currently northeastern China. 19 Austin Chamberlain (1863-1937), statesman of Great Britain, Secretary of the Treasury 1903-1905, 1919-1921. In 1915--1917. - Minister of Indian Affairs. In 1924-1929. -- Foreign Secretary. Held a number

of other ministerial posts. One of the initiators of the break in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Socialist Republic in May 1927

G.

20 Édouard Daladier (1884-1970), leader of the French Radical Party, repeatedly served as a minister in the French government, in 1933-1934 and 1938-1940. -- Prime Minister. Initially a supporter of the Popular Front, then his opponent. Signed the Munich Agreement in 1938. 21 Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945), since 1933 President of the United States from the Democratic

Party. He was elected to this post 4 times. In 1933 he established diplomatic relations with the USSR.

22 AIT, col. Nikolaevsky, box 479, folder 13. Letter from Louis Fischer to Nikolaevsky dated January 26, 1966. Transl. from English.

23 A. A. Slutsky, Head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) under the NKVD of the USSR. On February 17, 1938, in the office of his boss, he was poisoned with potassium cyanide. According to the official version, he died of a heart attack. 24 V. Krivitsky (1889-1941), head of Soviet

intelligence in Western Europe. In December 1937 he moved to the position of defector. He provided Western intelligence with a number of valuable information about the GRU. In 1939, he published in English the book "Stalin's Secret Police". 'Killed in Washington by Soviet security forces.

25 Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), German sociologist, one of the main representatives of geopolitics, who justified the aggressive policy of the Nazi leadership.

26 V. M. Molotov (1890-1986), in the party since 1906. During the Bolshevik coup, he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet and a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. Since 1919 - Chairman of the Nizhny Novgorod Provincial Executive Committee, then Secretary of the Donetsk Provincial Committee of the RCP (b). In 1920 - Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine. In 1921-- 1930. - Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). In 1930-1941. - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In 1941-1957. --1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (later - the Council of Ministers). In (1939-1949 and 1953-1956 - People's Commissar (Minister) of Foreign

Affairs. Since 1957 - Ambassador to Mongolia. In 1960-1962 - Permanent Representative of the USSR to the International Atomic

Energy Agency. 27 AIG, Col. Nikolaevsky, box 479, file 13. Letter from Nikolaevsky to Louis Fischer dated February 4, 1966, sheet 28 M. Gorky (A. M. Peshkov, 1868-1936),

Soviet writer, sympathized with the Bolsheviks before the revolution , subjected them to liberal criticism after the October coup.Emigrated.Returned.He was the first secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers specially created for Gorky.He died as a result of improper treatment, deliberately organized by Stalin.

29 Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart (1887-1970), British diplomat. In the diplomatic service 1911 In 1912-1915. - vice consul, in 1915-1917 -- Consul General of Great Britain in Moscow. January-September 1918. led the British mission in Soviet Russia. In August 1918 he was arrested and in October expelled from the RSFSR. B 1919-1922 worked in the British mission in Czechoslovakia. In 1939-1940. British Foreign Office Political Intelligence Officer. In 1940-1941. - Representative of Great Britain to the provisional Czechoslovak government in London. In 1941-- 1945. -- Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Director of the Committee on Political Warfare.

30 I am Kh. Petere (1886-1938), in the party since 1904. In 1917, a member of the Petrograd BPK, after the coup, a member of the board of the Cheka. In 1918 -Deputy Chairman of the Cheka F. E. Dzerzhinsky, Chairman of the Revolutionary Tribunal In 1920-1922. - Representative of the Cheka in Turkestan Since 1923 - Member of the Board of the OGPU. In 1930-- 1934 - Chairman of the ICC

of the CPSU (b). Shot. 31 E. P. Volzhina (Peshkova, 1878-1965), from August 30, 1896 until the end of 1903 - Gorky's wife. From the end. 1903), Maria Fedorovna Andreeva (real name Yurkovskaya, 1868-1953), famous Russian actress of the Moscow Art Theater, member of the Bolshevik Party since 1904, publisher of the Bolshevik newspaper Novaya Zhizn (1905), commissar of theaters, became Gorky's common-law wife and spectacles of Petrograd in 1919-1921 In 1931-1948 he was the director of the Moscow House of Scientists.

32 E.D. Kuskova (1869-1958) publicist, ideologist of Economism, leader of the Union of Liberation After the October Revolution, she worked in Pomgol. In 1922 she was sent abroad.

33 Wilhelm II lived in exile in Holland until his death in 1941. 34 YAG, col. Nikolaevsky,

box 479, folder 13. Letter from Nikolaevsky to Fischer dated December 14, 1965, 2 sheets. 85 AIG,

Nikolaevsky stake, box 510, folder 24. Results of the Russian experiment (Ways of development of Russian Bolshevism). 1917--1941 S. 7--8.

36 The Convention on the definition of the aggressor was signed by eleven states July 3-5, 1933

37 On February 6, 1934, with the support of the French Communists, a coalition of French right-wing political parties - nationalists and veteran organizations - staged a demonstration outside the Chamber of Deputies in the hope of forcing the Daladier government to resign. The rally led to clashes with the police, but Daladier's government failed to topple. The defeat of the February 6 demonstration led to a change in the policy of the Soviet government and the Comintern in France. Since that time, the French Communists have supported the tactics of the united front.

38 Groix de Feu (fr.) - "Fiery Cross" paramilitary right-wing anti-parliamentary organization, mainly from decorated veterans. It existed from 1927 to 1936, when it was banned by the government of the Popular Front. It consisted of which some of the Social Democrats joined. In December 1936, the Popular Front issued

an appeal to the German people, which, together with the Communists, was signed by the Social Democrats W. Brandt, R. Breitscheid, as well as the writers L. Feuchtwanger, G. Mani and A. Zweig. 40 Ernest Röhm (1887-1934), one of Hitler's early associates. He joined the National Socialist Workers' Party in the early 1920s. Engaged in military training of stormtroopers Member of the "Beer Putsch" 1923 C,

1931 - head of the assault squads. After the fascists came to power, the imperial minister From about this moment on, Rem and Hitler's contradictions intensified. Rem wanted to create an army based on assault squads. Hitler, interested in supporting the German military, opposed this. On June 30, 1934, on the "Night of the Long Knives", Rem and a number of other leaders of the assault squads were arrested on charges of treason and immoral behavior (in particular, homosexuality) and killed. 41 LIG, col. Nikolaevsky, box 602, folder 19 R. A. Abramovich. Stalin's foreign and domestic

policy. At the beginning of 1934, labor unrest broke out in Austria, which, however, were suppressed.

by the combined efforts of the heimwehr, the army and the police. In contrast to France, where anti-parliamentary speeches resulted in the formation of a united national front and a bloc of French communists and socialists, in Austria the socialists, partly because of Italian pressure and fear of provoking Germany for an occupation, preferred to bloc with the right political spectrum. On February 15, 1934, the general strike in Vienna was crushed.

42 YAG, col. Nikolaevsky, box 502, folder 21. Letter Nikolaevsky Suvarin dated June 23, 1962, 1 sheet.

43 A. Lozovsky (Dridzo S. A. 1878--1952), in the party since 1901. Member of the first Russian revolution in Kazan. Since 1921 - General Secretary of the Profintern. Since 1937 - director of Goslitizdat. In 1939-1946 - Deputy. People's Commissar (Minister) of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Since 1939 - a member of the DC. Member of the ECCI. In 1937-1950. --Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Repressed. 44 Bela Kun (1886--1939).

Social Democrat since 1902. In 1916 he came to Russia as a prisoner of war. Then he joined the Bolshevik Party. Organizer and leader of the Hungarian group under the RCP(b). People's Commissar for Foreign and Military Affairs in the Soviet Hungarian government during an attempted communist coup in Hungary in 1919. Arrested by the Hungarian royal government. Exchanged for Hungarians who were in Soviet Russia and declared hostages. After returning to the RSFSR, he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front. Member of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Since 1921 - member of the ECCI. Shot. 45 V. G. Knorin (Knorinsh, 1890-1938), in the party since 1910. In

1926-1927. - in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), c. 1927--1937. gg. -- Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus, 1928--1935 - in ECCI. Shot. 46 Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyun,

1904-1974), in 1931 served as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In 1931- -1945. Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. From 1932 until the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, he was a member of the Presidium of the ECCI.

Member of the CPC Central Committee. 47 Wilhelm Pick (1876-1960), in 1895-1918 Member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. One of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany in 1918 and the SED (1946). Since 1918 - member of the Central Committee. Since 1936 - Chairman of the Central Committee of the KKE. In 1928-1943. - Member of the ECCI. Since 1949 - the first president of the GDR.

48 Walter Ulbricht (1893-1973), in 1912-1918 Member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. In 1918 - a member of the Union of Spartak. Since 1923 - a member of the Central Committee of the KKE, since 1935 - in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KKE. In 1928- -1933. -Deputy of the Reichstag, at the same time (1928-1943) - a candidate member of the ECCI. In 1946-- 1949 - Deputy Chairman of the SED, since 1949 - member of the

Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED. 49 In Lominadze, Secretary of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, then at work in the Comintern. 50 G. I. Semenov (Vasiliev)], an agent of the Cheka and a provocateur within the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. By position in the AKP - the head of the central combat detachment under the Central Committee of the AKP In February 1922, during the preparation by the Soviet government of an open trial against the party of socialist revolutionaries, under the authorship of Semenov, the book "Military and combat work of the party of socialist revolutionaries for 1917" was published, in Berlin --1918

sabotage, sabotage and individual terror of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party after the Bolshevik coup. Together with L. V. Konoplyova, another agent provocateur, Semyonov then appeared at the trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries as a witness for the prosecution, at the same time being, like Konoplyova, the accused. The verdict of the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. all the defendants, including Semyonov and Konoplev, were sentenced to death, but on the recommendation of the same tribunal, as they realized their guilt, they were completely released from punishment. To top it off, by the time the process was over and they were released from prison, both turned out to be members of the RCP (b), as if they had joined the party in a cell. It was this Semyonov who was sent to China to organize the revolution together with Neiman and Lominadze.

51 Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi, 1887-1975), head of the Chinese government since 1927. After the victory of the Chinese communist revolution in 1949, he emigrated to Taiwan.

52 YAG, col. Nikolaevsky, box 478, folder 43. Letter F Yezerskaya-Tom B.I. Nikolaevsky dated September 14 and 22, 1942. 53 Ibid., dated September 16, 1942, 1 sheet. 54 Ibid., box 477, file 22 Letter from B. I. Nikolaevsky to Yu. P. Denike dated September 16, 1942. - Commander of the Moscow Military District. (In 1920.

oppositionist, Trotskyist. In December 1927, he was expelled from the party by the decision of the Fifteenth Congress and exiled to Tara. 56
Defeat of the Left Opposition in the USSR. Letters of the Exiled
Bolsheviks

(1928) // Past: Historical Almanac Issue 7 / Open Society Phoenix.
Moscow. S. 055.